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ABSTRACT 
Great powers have often sought to achieve their strategic goals through the allocation of 
military aid. The United States is no exception, as it has frequently used military aid to 
influence the policies and military capacity of its allies and partners. However, our 
understanding of the effects of US military aid on the conflict behavior of recipient states—
and especially the mechanisms underlying these effects—remains poorly understood. The 
results of previous studies of U.S. military aid are often contradictory, and are mostly based 
on over-aggregated, country-level data. In this dissertation, I argue that examining the 
individual-level effects will give us a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
country-level associations between US military aid and recipient behavior. I examine three 
research questions related to the manner in which military aid influences conflict in recipient 
countries.  First, I explore the individual effects of U.S. IMET using semi-structures in-depth 
interviews and an original survey of Hungarian military officers and non-commissioned 
officers. This paper investigates the transmission of professional values and “democratic” 
norms to individual participants through the U.S. IMET programs. Second, I investigate the 
effects of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration. I argue that government forces 
with more robust U.S. IMET participation will accumulate more and better military human 
capital, which incentivize rebels to hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged 
civil conflict. Finally, while exploring recipient states international conflict behavior I 
theorize that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home with a 
better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civil-
military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. I argue that these military 
personnel advise their political masters against the use of military force during international 
disputes leading to a decreased probability of MID initiation. I find support for each of the 
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main arguments presented in the dissertation. Overall, this dissertation represents one of the 
first attempts to move beyond country-level data and explore the micro-foundations of US 
military assistance.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Different forms of military aid have been used by donors to influence recipients` behavior 
since the beginnings of human history. The Greeks, the Romans, the Ottomans, and different 
European empires all employed different forms of military aid to achieve their political goals. 
(Mott, 1999). The United States is not an exception since it has been using different military 
aid programs to augment its military strategy and achieve its foreign policy goals since World 
War II. Mott (1999) argues that the U.S. military aid programs are traditionally “discrete, 
coherent, type or mode of international relations, not simply an obsolescent policy tool” 
(Mott 1999: xiv) and with that these programs have been and are central instruments in 
American military strategy and foreign policy.  
 U.S. military aid programs consist of arms and equipment transfers as well as foreign 
military education and training programs (Mott, 1999). This dissertation focuses on the latter 
version of U.S. military aid and investigates how these programs affect participating 
individuals and through them the recipient states` behavior both domestically and 
internationally. The scope of this project is limited to investigating the effects of only one of 
the fourteen1 U.S. foreign military education and training efforts, the International Military 
Education and Training programs (hereafter, U.S. IMET).  
 
1 The U.S. foreign military education and training programs include the Foreign military sales, Foreign military 
financing, International military education and training, International narcotics and law enforcement, Global 
peace operations initiative, regional centers for security studies, Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, 
Mine action programs, Disaster response, Regional defense combating terrorism fellowship program, Section 
2282 Global train and equip, Service-sponsored activities, Foreign assistance act, Department of homeland 
security/U.S. Coast guard activities. I specifically explore the effects of U.S. IMET programs and collect data on 
these programs because as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue these programs are “the most transparent and 
receives the largest amount of scrutiny” (Savage and Caverley, 2017:548) meaning that they present the 
strongest test to my theory. Based on these characteristics I suggest that the relationship I find between the U.S. 
IMET programs and the participating individuals are likely to be the same for all other U.S. foreign military 
education and training programs as well. 
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 Better understanding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs is important for several 
reasons. First, these programs have been the subject of several Congressional investigations 
since their establishment in 1976, because both individual graduates of these programs and 
recipient states have demonstrated quite a variance in their behavior which led to the 
questioning of the effectiveness of these programs. This still seems to be an ongoing issue 
since the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act codifies the requirement for the U.S. 
Department of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of the different security assistance 
programs, including the U.S. IMET programs, however no such evaluation mechanism exists 
yet. Second, recent U.S. administrations have been giving a significant role in their national 
security strategies to activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries without a 
clearly established and effective feedback mechanism regarding the actual effects of the U.S. 
security assistance programs. Third, international relations literature investigating the 
potential effects of the U.S. IMET programs seem to leave some room for improvement and 
expansion due to challenges related to the availability of limited data, issues with research 
designs, limited theoretical contribution, weak empirical evidence, and contradictory results. 
Finally, collecting useful and coherent data that effectively demonstrates the value of the U.S. 
IMET programs has been a long-lasting challenge for researchers which presents an 
opportunity for major contribution. 
 Although this dissertation intends to address all of these issues its primary focus is 
policy relevance. The primary aim of this dissertation is to provide scientifically investigated 
and well-supported evaluation of the value and effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs by 
answering the question how these programs affect the participating individuals and through 
them the recipient states` behavior. For this reason, rather than explaining the variation in a 
single phenomenon from different angles this project is connected through the independent 
variable. The dissertation answers the posed research question through the investigation of 
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three independent but interrelated sub-questions where all dependent variables are directly 
derived from the legislatures and policy documents codifying the goals of the U.S. IMET 
programs. Answering the three research questions provide evidence for policy makers 
whether the U.S. IMET programs are valuable and effectively fulfil their purposes. At the 
same time the project also offers an overarching theoretical framework by arguing that U.S. 
IMET participation improves the quality of the individual military personnel attending these 
programs and through them the recipient states` military human capital becomes better. This 
improvement in the quality of military human capital of the recipient states influences their 
international and domestic behavior. 
 The first paper investigates the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs 
and explores whether participation in these programs is associated with improvement in 
individual qualities. According to the 1978 and 1992 amendments to the 1976 International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act one of the main goals of the U.S. IMET 
programs is to transmit the U.S. military`s professional values and norms such as the respect 
of democratic values, human rights, and civil control to participating foreign military 
personnel and with that to improve their personal qualities. Although previous literature 
assumes that this transmission actually happens at the individual level only one of these 
studies offers a theory of norms transmission. Additionally, the literature does not seem to 
provide convincing empirical evidence demonstrating that the norm transmission actually 
happens. The first paper intends to address these issues by further improving the existing 
norms transmission theory and test the untested assumptions of prior literature. The study 
employs semi-structured, in-depth interviews and an original survey conducted in Hungary 
with 350 military respondents (140 U.S. IMET graduates and 210 Non-U.S. IMET graduates) 
to determine whether U.S. IMET participation is associated with an improvement in personal 
qualities. The results of the analysis of the responses demonstrate that the professional norms 
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and values of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to participants and with that the 
military human capital of the recipient states improves. Additionally, the study provides 
initial evidence for further norm diffusion within the military as a whole. 
 The second study investigates how improved military human capital due to U.S. 
IMET participation affects recipient states` behavior during domestic conflicts. I theorize that 
participation in U.S. IMET programs improves the military human capital of the government 
forces. This improved military human capital makes the overall military more capable and 
effective which incentivizes rebels to disperse, hide and minimize their operations leading to 
a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I use a new dataset that includes detailed 
information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation between 1976 and 2003. The 
results show that militaries with more U.S. IMET participation fights significantly longer 
civil conflicts. As further support to the theory I also find that more U.S. IMET participation 
corresponds with a higher probability of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner. 
To provide further support to the findings of the statistical analysis I illustrate the theoretical 
argument through a case study as well.   
 Finally, the third paper investigates the relationship between better military human 
capital due to U.S. IMET participation and the probability of recipient states international 
conflict behavior. The research question that is being explored in this paper is once again 
derived from the goals of the U.S. IMET programs related to the aim to improve regional 
stability and reduce the probability of interstate conflict. Investigating this question is also 
important because the potential effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military 
education and training on states` international conflict behavior has never been investigated 
previously. In this paper I argue that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET acts differently 
than other forms of military aid and instead of increasing the probability of conflict initiation 
it rather restrains countries` from aggression. I argue that better military human capital due to 
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more U.S. IMET participation reduces the probability of the recipient states becoming an 
interstate dispute initiator because the American trained and educated military leaders advise 
their political masters against the offensive use of the military forces. I test this theory 
through the employment of several logistic regression models and find that the more U.S. 
IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates interstate conflicts. Additionally, I 
find that more U.S. IMET participation is associated with decreased probability of escalating 
violence during ongoing conflicts. Besides providing support regarding the U.S. IMET 
programs effectiveness in reducing recipient states` aggression the findings also contribute to 
the ongoing debate about how U.S. military aid affects interstate conflict initiation.   
 Taken together, the results of this dissertation provide strong evidence that U.S. 
military aid in the form of U.S. IMET indeed fulfill the goals established by the U.S. 
Congress. The results show that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET improves the 
individual qualities of participating foreign military personnel and with that the military 
human capital of the recipient states. The improved military human capital affects the 
recipient states conflict behavior both domestically and internationally and with that supports 
the achievement of U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals. Besides providing a direct 
feedback about the effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs these findings might urge policy 
makers to consider paying more attention to this less tangible form of U.S. military aid and 
invest more efforts and resources to support the further improvement of these programs. In 
addition to the policy related benefits this dissertation makes significant contributions to the 
growing body of academic literature on the effects of U.S. military aid. First, the dissertation 
presents original, individual level data about the effects of the U.S. IMET programs. Next, 
the dissertation further develops the theory for international norm transmission at the 
individual level in a military setting and tests previously untested assumptions. Third, through 
the employment of a combination of qualitative exploration techniques and large-N statistical 
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analyses the dissertation further expands and improves previous literature by providing 
stronger empirical evidence in support of the findings of several prior studies. At the same 
time the dissertation presents novel insights on how U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. 
IMET programs affects the recipient states` domestic and international conflict behavior. 
Finally, through its findings the dissertation contributes to the wider international relations 
discussion about the effects of foreign aid as well. 
 7 
CHAPTER TWO: U.S. IMET PROGRAMS AND REVIEW OF 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The first official U.S. military aid program started during World War II. with the Lend-Lease 
Act that authorized the transfer of American weapons, supplies and services to several 
countries2 that were fighting against Nazi Germany (Mott, 1999). This program was 
terminated on 2 September 1945 after providing $48.5 million in arms to 42 countries 
(Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, 1967). The next major U.S. military 
aid program was initiated on 12 March 1947 when President Truman asked the U.S. Congress 
to authorize $400 million worth of surplus arms to be transferred to Greece and Turkey, and 
in 1948 to China. The general framework for grant based foreign military education and 
training as an additional form of U.S. military aid was established in 1949 with the passing of 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.3  
 While during the next couple years the American military aid programs included both 
the transfer of surplus weapons from World War II4 and foreign military education and 
training programs the total value of U.S. military aid in the 1950s was still less than $1 
billion. However, with the developing communist threat and the need to contain the Soviet 
Union quickly raised the importance of military aid programs and their scope was also 
significantly extended. Till the mid-1970s the term military assistance was officially used to 
describe the military aid programs, which only referred to the transfer of “U.S. military 
weapons, equipment, and training to recipient governments” (Mott 1999:4). With the 1976 
Congressional amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 additional political and 
 
2 The Lend-Lease Act authorized military assistance for Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, Free 
France, the Soviet Union (after 1941) and China (after 1942). 
3 This legislation is generally called the Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP), which allowed the U.S. 
government to provide military aid in the form of education and training to selected countries to help them 
defend themselves from aggression. 
4 4000 surplus Navy vessels were transferred to 60 countries during this time period (Mott, 2002). 
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economic aspects were added to these programs and a new term, security assistance5 was 
introduced. This same legislature also established a new framework for foreign military 
education and training in the form of International Military Education and Training Programs 
(hereafter, U.S. IMET). With the inclusion of political and economic aspects into military aid 
and with the reorganization of education and training efforts the U.S. military aid increased to 
an average $12 billion per year by the end of the 1970s. The next decade saw an even more 
significant increase in these programs with a $21 billion per year value. Although the end of 
the Cold War brought some serious reduction in U.S. military aid efforts the Global War on 
Terror that followed the events of 11 September 2001 once again has put a lot of emphasis on 
developing allied and partner countries` military capabilities through arms transfer and 
training. Although as Figure 1. demonstrates there has been significant fluctuation in the 
allocation of resources for the U.S. military aid programs, the overall average between fiscal 
year 2006 and fiscal year 2017 remained around $20 billion annually which is very close to 
the Cold War years. 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Military Aid Funding Trends, FY 2006 – FY 2017 
 
5 From now on this study uses the term military aid and security assistance interchangeably. These terms contain 
all forms of military aid programs including weapons, equipment, training and education transfers and other 
political and economic activities. 
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Besides its significant annual dollar value over the last couple decades the better 
understanding the effects of U.S. military aid is important for several other reasons. First, 
recent U.S. administrations have been giving a significant role in their national security 
strategies to activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries, which includes 
significant military aid efforts. Second, since the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act 
requires the U.S. Department of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of all U.S. security 
assistance programs the investigation of the effects of these programs carries an opportunity 
for significant policy relevant contribution. Third, international relations literature 
investigating the effects of these security assistance efforts demonstrate contradictory results. 
While some studies find positive relationship between U.S. military aid and the achievement 
of foreign policy goals, others argue that military aid in fact negatively affects U.S. strategic 
interest. Finally, the better understanding of military aid related considerations might also 
have some valuable contributions to the more general international relations discussion about 
the potential effects of foreign aid.  
While the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer have 
been studied extensively in international relations literature (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; 
Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth, 1988; Kinsella, 1994, 1995; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995; 
Kinsella and Tillema, 1995; Craft and Smaldone, 2002; Krause, 2004) much less attention 
has been given to explore the effects of the other type of U.S. military aid, foreign military 
education and training. This dissertation intends to contribute to the latter literature by 
focusing on improving our understanding of the effects of a specific version of the U.S. 
foreign military education and training programs, the International Military Education and 
Training programs. 
Although there are fourteen programs providing military education and training for 
foreign military personnel the centerpiece of these efforts is the U.S. IMET programs. The 
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investigation focuses on these programs for several reasons. First, the author has personnel 
experience in these programs since he participated in three different U.S. IMET courses.6 
Second, the most reliable and transparent data related to the U.S. foreign military education 
and training efforts is the U.S. IMET data. This is due to the ongoing Congressional interest 
in the effects of these programs.7 Third, all previous studies that have investigated the effects 
of U.S. foreign military education and training programs exclusively employed and analyzed 
U.S. IMET data. Finally, as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue due to U.S. IMET`s size, 
budget and significance it is safe to assume that if one finds a relationship between U.S. 
IMET and the subject of the investigation than this same relationship is true for the entire 
U.S. foreign military education and training efforts. 
While the U.S. Congress established the general framework for grant based foreign 
military education and training as early as 1949 with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act8 the 
U.S. IMET program was only born in 1976 when the 94th Congress passed the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which was an amendment for the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (Cope, 1995). Since its early days U.S. IMET has been overseen by 
the Department of State while most sub-elements are administered by the Department of 
Defense (Atkinson, 2010). From their beginnings the U.S. IMET programs have been seen as 
a fundamental instrument supporting broad national security goals through developing 
partner nations` military capabilities and promoting peace and stability both regionally and 
within the recipient states. Today the U.S. IMET programs provide education and training for 
foreign personnel in around 4,000 different courses both within the United States and 
 
6 USMC Basic Officer School April 2004 – September 2004; USMC Infantry Officer School September 2004-
December 2004; USMC Expeditionary Warfare School July 2005-May 2006. 
7 Since its establishment in 1976 U.S. IMET programs have been a subject to numerous Congressional 
investigations due to their mixed empirical results. 
8 This legislation is generally called the Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP), which allowed the U.S. 
government to provide military aid in the form of education and training to selected countries to help them 
defend themselves from aggression. 
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overseas. Although U.S. IMET focuses on Professional Military Education (PME) mostly 
conducted at higher level military educational institutions like the war and staff colleges it 
also includes short term practical training focused courses as well (Atkinson, 2010). The U.S. 
IMET programs do not seem to be a particularly expensive effort (especially when compared 
to the multi-billion-dollar arms and equipment transfers) since as Atkinson (2010) notes it 
only accounts for about 0.2 percent of the budget of the State Department. According to 
Savage and Caverley (2017) in Fiscal Year 2015 the program only cost $876.5 million while 
about 76,400 students participated in it from 154 countries (Savage and Caverley, 2017). 
Figure 2. shows the number of students trained in U.S. IMET compared to funding 
appropriated between 2000 and 2010. 
 
Figure 2. Number of Students Trained Compared to U.S. IMET Funding Appropriated, 
Fiscal Years 2000 and 20109 
 Although traditionally European and Eurasian countries have been receiving the 
majority of U.S. IMET support all other regions have seen a continuous increase in U.S. 
 
9 Source: State Congressional Budget Justification. 
 12 
IMET funding during recent years. Figure 3. demonstrates the changes in U.S. IMET funding 
per region between fiscal year 2000 and 2010.  
 
Figure 3. U.S. IMET funding appropriated, by Region, for Fiscal Years 2000 and 201010 
The goals of the U.S. IMET program have evolved over time. When the 94th Congress 
established the original framework for U.S. IMET its primary goals were to avoid the 
controversies associated with the original Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP) and 
to support countries that could not afford to buy U.S. military education and training through 
the Foreign Military Sales (hereafter, FMS) Act (Cope, 1995). Congress assigned two goals 
to the U.S. IMET program in the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act:  
1. to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding 
between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of goals of 
international peace and security. 
 
2. to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, 
including defense articles and defense services obtained from the United States, with 
maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such 
countries (Cope, 1995: 11). 
 
10 Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Budget Justifications. 
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 In 1978 the program goals were extended to improve the awareness of U.S. IMET 
participants about issues related to universal human rights (Goodman, 1990; Allen, 1982). 
Further legislations in 1991 authorized the expansion of the program leading to the creation 
of Expanded U.S. IMET (hereafter, E-U.S. IMET) that provides education and training for 
foreign  non-military personnel to accommodate the defense related interest of foreign non-
defense ministries and nongovernmental organizations. E-U.S. IMET courses specifically 
focus on: 
1. Responsible defense resource management. 
 
2. Greater respect for and grasp of democracy and civilian rule of law, including the 
principle of civilian control of the military.  
 
3. Military justice systems in a democracy. 
 
4. Better understanding of internationally recognized human rights (Cope, 1995: 12). 
 
More recent policy documents as the Department of State and the Department of 
Defense Foreign Military Training Joint Report, Fiscal Year 2012 and 2013 summarizes the 
current official goals of the U.S. IMET program as to: 
 
1. Further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to 
 military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation 
 between the United States and foreign countries. 
 
2. Provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces 
 to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces; and 
 
3. Increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain 
 democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own 
 government and military (U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, 
 2012/13). 
 
The understanding of the U.S. IMET goals and their evolution are important because 
the few previous studies derived their research questions from these goals and the follow-on 
investigation also utilizes these goals when exploring the potential effects of U.S. IMET 
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programs both at the individual and state levels. To explain how previous literature is 
connected to the U.S. IMET programs` goals and identify potential areas for expansion and 
improvement, next, I review those studies that have investigated the effects of these efforts.  
First, early studies are looking at the institutional effects of the U.S. foreign military 
education and training programs within the recipient states. Lefever (1976) investigates 
whether the early version of U.S. foreign military education and training called Military 
Assistance Program11 (hereafter, MAP) met the goal of increasing interstate stability. Lefever 
(1976) argues that the MAP is a “low-cost, low-risk foreign policy instrument that has served 
the United States interest in interstate stability” (Lefever, 1976: 85). The author finds support 
for the achievement of one of the assigned goals and argues that MAP program increases the 
professional performance and readiness level of the participant countries` militaries leading 
more security and stability. Through the assessment of the effects of MAP in Latin American 
countries Fitch (1979) finds somewhat contradictory results. Although the author argues 
along similar lines as Lefever (1976) regarding the effects of the MAP on the military, he 
also suggests that MAP increases the political involvement of the military and 
institutionalizes the coup d’état as a form of political progress. Fitch (1979) finds that U.S. 
MAP increases the level of professionalism of the recipient states` military by improving 
technical skills, providing managerial and administrative experience, extensive training in 
nonmilitary matters and enhancing self-confidence. According to the author due to these 
factors the military might see itself as an alternative solution to the civilian government in 
times of political crisis which results in the institutionalization of coup d’état. These results 
seem to be contradictory with the stated goals of MAP, however in several Latin American 
cases (especially during the Cold War) encouraging military backed coups were indeed the 
 
11 In 1976 renamed as U.S. IMET. 
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interest of the U.S foreign policy. This contradiction between the goals included in legislature 
and “facts on the ground” created an ongoing interest from scholars even after the MAP 
programs were replaced by U.S. IMET. 
Using the idea that U.S. IMET participation improves the military human capital of 
the recipient states as their theoretical foundation, Ruby and Gibler (2010) and Savage and 
Caverley (2017) explore whether U.S. IMET programs achieve the goal of creating domestic 
stability. According to Ruby and Gibler (2010) the U.S. IMET programs develop the 
recipient countries` militaries` human capital through the transmission of the U.S. military`s 
professional norms and values. According to the authors this improvement in military human 
capital leads to improved domestic stability because it decreases the probability of military 
backed coups in the recipient countries. The authors argue that foreign military personnel 
trained and educated in the United States absorb the idea of civilian control over the military 
and this is the primary casual mechanism behind the decreased probability of coups. On the 
other hand, Savage and Caverley (2017) argues that U.S. IMET actually leads to less 
domestic stability. While the authors use the same theoretical framework as Ruby and Gibler 
(2010) and argue that U.S. IMET participation indeed improves the military human capital of 
recipient states they suggest that this improvement has the opposite effects to what Ruby and 
Gibler (2010) suggest. According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the norm most likely to be 
transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign military personnel is 
the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity. Savage and Caverley (2017) 
argues that this improved professionalism increases the recipient militaries` capabilities 
relative to the regime in a way that no other foreign aids do (human capital cannot be 
redirected to coup-proofing), and this improved capability doubles the probability of military-
backed coup attempts. Another set of studies investigating whether U.S. IMET programs 
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meet the stated goals focus on the exploration of the relationship between U.S. IMET 
participation and democratic values and human rights both at the individual and state levels. 
Reynolds (2001) investigates whether U.S. IMET programs successfully improve 
individual participants` attitudes towards internationally recognized human rights. Through 
surveying actual U.S. IMET participants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua 
Reynolds (2001) finds promising but inconclusive results suggesting that U.S. IMET 
participation facilitates improvement in individuals` respect for internationally recognized 
human rights. Along similar lines, but with the inclusion of democratic values into the scope 
of their investigation Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) present a study that explores the effects of 
U.S. IMET on participating individuals. Employing a pair of pre and post participation 
surveys for the international students of the 2010 U.S. National Defense University class the 
authors find that participation in this PME course significantly improves the foreign military 
personnel`s appreciation for both democratic values and human rights. 
In her two studies Atkinson (2010, 2015) argues that the U.S. IMET programs are 
effective soft power (Nye 1990; Williams 2004) tools in the hands of the United States since 
they effectively promote American values and help diffusing democratic norms. According to 
Atkinson (2010, 2015) U.S. IMET programs in general, but more specifically the professional 
military education element in it (hereafter, PMEs) achieves this goal, because it improves the 
participants` respect for democratic norms and human rights. Finally, using Reynolds (2001) 
and Atkinson`s (2015) findings as their fundamental assumptions Omelicheva et al. (2017) 
investigate how U.S. IMET affects the probability of human rights violations in conflict at the 
state level. The authors find that more U.S. IMET participation is associated with less 
atrocities against civilians during conflict. 
While arriving to contradicting empirical findings all the reviewed studies seem to 
share the same fundamental idea that U.S. IMET participation improves the professional 
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qualities of the participating military personnel through the transmission of the professional 
norms and values of the U.S. military and the improvement of personal qualities also leads to 
an improvement in the military human capital of the recipient states. While Lefever (1976), 
Fitch (1979), Ruby and Gibler (2010), and Savage and Caverley (2017), Omelicheva et al. 
(2017) all use the idea of norm transmission as their theoretical framework they provide 
neither a theory of norm transmission nor empirical evidence demonstrating whether this 
transmission happen. Reynolds (2001) and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) actually offer a test 
to investigate whether norms are transmitted and how they change the U.S. IMET graduates 
professional qualities. Although Reynolds` (2001) cross-national survey and Jungdahl and 
Lambert`s (2012) pre and post-participation surveys at the U.S. National Defense University 
both make significant contributions to the ongoing debate by providing empirical evidence of 
attitude change among U.S. IMET graduates they do not explain the mechanisms through 
which the norms are transmitted. Atkinson (2010, 2015) seems to be the only one till now 
who proposes a theory for norm transmission and test that theory. She argues that two factors 
influence the transmission of U.S. military norms and values to U.S. IMET participants. 
According to the author these conditions are the depth and extent of social contacts, and 
shared common identity. Atkinson (2010, 2015) argues that U.S. IMET programs allow 
foreign military personnel and their families to directly interact with the American society for 
an extended period of time which leads these soldiers and their families to absorb the 
American values resulting in participants` improved respect of democratic norms and human 
rights. Atkinson (2010, 2015) also suggests that these norms and values also diffuse in the 
home countries because upon the U.S. IMET graduates` return home they promote the 
learned values and norms to the rest of their society.  
Although the reviewed studies provide significant contributions to better understand 
the effects of U.S. foreign military education and training programs both at the individual and 
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state levels they also leave room for expansion and further improvement. Further research can 
provide both theoretical and methodological improvements leading to a stronger theory of 
norms transmission and more convincing empirical evidence regarding the effects of U.S. 
IMET participation.  
In better investigating the individual level effects of U.S. IMET, further research can 
address some of the research design limitations of previous studies (Reynolds 2001; Jungdahl 
and Lambert 2012; Atkinson 2010, 2015) by including comparing and contrasting U.S. IMET 
graduates with non-U.S. IMET graduates. To have a more comprehensive understanding 
about the effects of the U.S. IMET programs, the scope of the investigation can be extended 
from looking at the effects of U.S. IMET at the PME institutions (Jungdahl and Lambert 
2012, Atkinson, 2010, 2015) or only within the E-U.S. IMET program (Reynolds 2001) to 
including all U.S. IMET courses.  
All prior studies that investigate the effects of U.S. IMET at the state level look at 
domestic behavior and find contradictory results. This generates a need for further analysis 
that contributes to the ongoing discussion by providing stronger evidence in support of either 
side (Fitch 1979, Savage and Caverley 2017, and Ruby and Gibler 2010). At the same time, 
the prior focus on domestic behavior and the ignorance of international effects requires 
further investigation with regards to the effects of U.S. IMET on states` international conflict 
behavior. An assessment of such relationship is a major contribution to international relations 
literature. 
The dissertation proceeds with the investigation of three independent but interrelated 
questions with the aim to improve and expand existing research along the discussed 
opportunities as well as to provide direct feedback to policymakers about the effectiveness of 
the U.S. IMET programs.  
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CHAPTER THREE - IMPROVING FOREIGN MILITARIES – THE 
EFFECTS OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING PROGRAMS ON PARTICIPATING INDIVIDUALS 
Abstract 
How do the U.S. IMET programs affect the participating individuals? While the studies that 
investigate the effects of the U.S. IMET programs at the participating individual level all 
seem to assume that participation in these programs improves the personal qualities of the 
participants through the transmission of the professional norms and values of the U.S. 
military such as respect for democratic values, human rights and civil control, no studies have 
provided either a strong theory of norm transmission or convincing empirical evidence 
whether this process actually happens. This study indents to fill this void. I theorize that the 
norms and values of the U.S. military are transmitted to U.S. IMET participants through the 
mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure, and common professional identity and with 
that the personal qualities of participants indeed improve. I test the proposed theory through 
the employment of a survey conducted in Hungary with 350 military respondents and in-
depth interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates. The results of the analysis 
demonstrate that the professional norms and values of the U.S. military are indeed 
transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since graduates of these programs demonstrate higher 
respect for human rights, democratic values and civilian control than their non-U.S. IMET 
graduate peers the findings of this study support the argument that U.S. IMET participation is 
associated with improved personal qualities and with that better military human capital of the 
recipient states. I also find initial promising results showing that the transmitted values 
further diffuse within the participants` military organizations. 
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Introduction 
How do the U.S. IMET programs affect the participating individuals? While one of the main 
goals of the U.S. IMET programs is to improve the military human capital of the recipient 
states through the transmission of the U.S. military`s professional norms and values such as 
the respect of democratic values, human rights, and civil control to participating individuals 
(Cope, 1995; Atkinson, 2010; Ruby and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017), whether 
and how this norm transmission to participating individuals actually happens has not yet been 
convincingly established in international relations literature. Besides the lack of a strong 
theory of norm transmission and convincing empirical evidence in support of the existence of 
such process, answering this research question is also important because the 2017 National 
Defense Authorization Act codifies the requirement for the Department of Defense to 
evaluate all security assistance programs, including the U.S. IMET programs to determine 
whether these programs effectively meet their assigned goals yet due to resource constrains 
this has not been done yet. Furthermore, the fact that the empirical records of U.S. IMET 
graduates` behavior regarding those three international norms demonstrate quite a variance 
makes this question even more interesting. While throughout the U.S. IMET programs` 
history graduates have demonstrated high level personal qualities by playing crucial roles in 
their home countries` democratic political transformations (Mali 1991), championing the 
cause of human rights (Thailand 1992) and putting down numerous attempts against 
democratically elected civil governments (Venezuela 1992, Guatemala 1993) one can easily 
find several unpleasant examples as well (Cope, 1995). The U.S. IMET programs graduated 
several Latin American officers who later became well known human rights abusers 
(Grimmett and Sullivan, 2001), leaders in coup attempts (Honduras, 2009 or Mali 2012) as 
well as infamous terrorist leaders like Abu Omar al-Shishani, the Islamic State terrorist 
group`s “minister of war” (Savage and Caverley, 2017).  
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Additionally, besides all the discussed factors the fact that all recent U.S. 
administrations have been giving a significant role in their national security strategies to 
activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries, also increases the importance of 
better understanding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on the participating individuals. 
Finally, a clearer understanding of U.S. IMET related considerations might also have some 
valuable contributions to the more general international relations discussion about the 
potential effects of U.S. foreign aid. 
Prior studies (Lefever 1976; Cope, 1995; Miller, 2006; Atkinson, 2010, 2015; Ruby 
and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017; Omelicheva et al., 2017) that evaluate the value 
and effectiveness of the U.S. foreign military education and training efforts all seem to 
assume that during the participation in these programs; the recipient states` military human 
capital is being improved due to the fact that the professional norms and values of the U.S. 
military are transmitted to the participating individuals. At the same time, none of these 
studies provide neither a strong theory of norm transmission at the individual level nor 
convincing evidence that these processes actually occur. This study intends to fill some of 
this void. Using prior arguments from the socialization literature I theorize that the 
professional norms of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted during the U.S. IMET 
programs through the mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure, and common identity, 
and with that the military human capital of the recipient states improves. I test this theory by 
employing a survey conducted in Hungary with 350 military respondents and in-depth 
interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates. Empirically, I find that U.S. IMET 
participants indeed show more respect for human rights, democratic values, and civil control 
than those who have not participated in such U.S. military education and training programs. 
Besides providing support for norm transmission the results also suggest that the U.S. IMET 
 22 
programs meet those goals that Congress assigned to them and effectively improve the 
military human capital of the recipient states. 
The paper proceeds in six parts. It starts with a short introduction of international 
norms and a review of the literature that has explored the effects of the U.S. IMET programs. 
Next, the study proposes a theory of norm transmission during the U.S. IMET programs and 
then proceeds with the introduction of the research design which includes the discussion of 
the data collection techniques and the method of analysis. Next, I discuss the results of the 
analysis. Using a sample of Hungarian military personnel I find that the professional norms 
of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since graduates of 
these programs demonstrate higher respect for human rights, democratic values and civilian 
control than their non-U.S. IMET graduate peers the findings of this study support my 
argument that U.S. IMET participation is associated with improved personal qualities and 
with that better military human capital of the recipient states. Next, I address some potential 
limitations and criticisms. Then close the study with a short summary of the findings and 
discussion of contributions.  
International Norms and U.S. IMET 
Numerous studies in the international relations literature argue that norms cross over borders 
and influence behavior both at the individual and state levels. Scholars have offered several 
definitions of these international norms. Krasner (1983) and Cortell and Davis (1996) suggest 
that norms “represent standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” 
(Cortell and Davis, 1996: 452). Farrell (2001) argues that “norms are intersubjective beliefs 
about the social and natural world which define actors, their situations and the possibilities of 
action. Norms are intersubjective in that they are beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through, 
social practice” (Farrell, 2001: 71). Towns (2012) argues that norms are “essentially about 
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value—they validate certain kinds of behavior for specific sorts of actors and devalue other 
sorts of behavior” (Towns, 2012: 187). Among many others, internationally recognized 
norms include free trade (Finlayson and Zacher, 1983), human rights (Risse and Sikkink, 
1999), sovereignty (Kratochwil, 1989), and collective security (Ruggie, 1992).  
 There are also internationally recognized norms that are considered fundamental 
characteristics of a professional military. As Farrell (2001) notes these  norms “are beliefs 
held by military officers, expressed and codified in military literature, reinforced in military 
education, and embodied in military practice about how militaries that aspire to be 
professional should organize themselves and act” (Farrell, 2001: 73) He also suggests that  
“military norms provide cognitive and normative frames to guide professional practice that 
are history contingent” (Farrell, 2001:78). When referring to these transnational military 
norms I do not talk about beliefs about specific tactics, techniques, and procedures, but rather 
fundamental norms and values that considered the core of transnational military practice.  
 As Avant (2000) argues transnational military norms were not developed during a 
natural, Darwinian evolution rather they were created through social interaction and 
collective learning during several centuries. Additionally, Avant (2000) suggests that the 
actual content of these norms and how this content is applied also evolved over these 
centuries. For the purposes of this study I focus on three of these transnational military 
norms: respect of democratic values, human rights, and civilian supremacy over the military. 
 These norms evolved over time in individual states and started becoming 
transnational military norms with the spread of the western style state from the 16th century 
onwards. The three norms in question experienced especially strong international diffusion 
and acceptance during the second half of the 20th century when they were codified in a series 
of international treaties (Farrell, 2001). 
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 Based on Atkinson (2010) Ruby and Gibler (2010), and Savage and Caverley (2017) I 
argue that respect of democratic values, human rights, and civilian supremacy over the 
military are the core values of the U.S. military and integral part of its professional identity. 
The 1978 and 1992 amendments to the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms 
Export Control Act specifically directs the foreign military education and training efforts, 
especially the U.S. IMET programs to spread these norms among the foreign participants. 
Prior studies exploring whether these norms are transmitted to the participating foreign 
military personnel (Lefever, 1976; Atkinson, 2010; Ruby and Gibler, 2010; Savage and 
Caverley, 2017) seem to leave some room for improvement and expansion because they 
neither provide a mechanism for such transmission nor present convincing empirical 
evidence to effectively support the existence of such processes. 
 In an early study Lefever (1976) proposes that U.S. foreign military education and 
training increases the personal qualities and professional performance of participating 
individuals but does not support his assertions with convincing empirical evidence. Based on 
his study that focuses on Latin American countries, Fitch (1979) also argues that participation 
in U.S. IMET programs increases the level of professionalism of the participants but suggests 
that this improvement in personal qualities lead to negative consequences. Fitch (1979) 
suggests that U.S. educated and trained foreign military personnel see themselves as an 
alternative solution to the civilian government in times of political crisis which results in the 
institutionalization of coup d’état. Similarly to Lefever (1976) Fitch`s (1979) argument seems 
to require further supporting evidence to make their argument stronger because their scope is 
limited to only Latin America and explore the relationship in a very specific timeframe. 
Savage and Caverley (2017) presents a similar argument about the relationship between U.S. 
IMET and military backed coups. The authors argue that the norm most likely to be 
transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign officers and non-
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commissioned officers is the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity, which 
ultimately increase the recipient militaries` capabilities relative to the regime in a way that no 
other foreign aid does, by improving military human capital. According to Savage and 
Caverley (2017) because the improved military human capital cannot be redirected to coup-
proofing by the regime, it doubles the probability of military-backed coup attempts. Although 
the authors present a convincing argument regarding the potential effects of the U.S. IMET 
program they do not discuss how the norms are transmitted and do not provide empirical 
evidence to support the existence of such process. Ruby and Gibler (2010) presents a 
challenge to Fitch`s (1979) and Savage and Caverley`s (2017) argument and suggest that U.S. 
IMET participation is associated with a decrease in probability of military backed coups. 
According to the authors U.S. IMET programs develop the recipient countries` military 
human capital because U.S. IMET participants absorb the professional norms and values of 
the U.S. military. While Ruby and Gibler (2010) argue that U.S. IMET graduates return home 
with better respect of democratic norms and civil control, which ultimately leads to decreased 
probability of military backed coups within the recipient countries similarly to Fitch (1979) 
and Savage and Caverley (2017) they offer neither a theory of norm transmission nor 
evidence for the existence of the process. Several studies that explore the individual level 
effects of U.S. IMET participation seem to address some of the theoretical issues and the lack 
of evidence of these studies. 
 While not offering an actual theory of norms transmission Reynolds (2001) 
investigates the relationship between U.S. Enhanced IMET program (hereafter, U.S. E-
IMET) participation and respect of human rights. The author argues that U.S. E-IMET 
participation facilitates improvement in individuals` respect for internationally recognized 
human rights and test this assertion through cross-national surveys. Using a sample of actual 
U.S. E-IMET participants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, Reynolds finds 
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promising but inconclusive results regarding the positive effects of U.S. E-IMET 
participation on attitudes towards human rights.  
 Along similar lines, but with the inclusion of democratic values into the scope of their 
investigation Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) present a study that explores the effects of U.S. 
IMET on participating individuals. Employing a pair of pre and post participation surveys for 
the international students of the 2010 U.S. National Defense University class the authors find 
that participation in this PME course significantly improves the foreign military personnel`s 
appreciation for both democratic values and human rights. Although similarly to Reynolds 
(2001), Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) do not offer a theory of norms transmission their results 
provide a strong evidence that U.S. IMET participation indeed affects the participating 
individuals and positively changes their attitudes towards democracy and human rights. 
 Atkinson (2015) seems to be the only one who both proposes a theory of norms 
transmission and conducts empirical testing of her theory. Similarly to Jungdahl and Lambert 
(2012) Atkinson`s (2015) investigation focuses on exploring how U.S. IMET participation 
affects individual level respect of democratic values and human rights. According to 
Atkinson (2015) U.S. IMET, especially the professional military education program 
(hereafter, PMEs) allows foreign military personnel and their families to directly interact with 
the American society for an extended period of time which leads these soldiers and their 
families to absorb the American norms and values resulting in participants` improved respect 
of democratic norms and human rights. Atkinson (2015) also suggests that upon their return 
to their home countries U.S. IMET participants promote the learned values and norms to the 
rest of their military and even the entire society. Using Reynolds (2001); Jungdahl and 
Lambert (2012) and Atkinson`s (2015) findings as fundamental assumptions Omelicheva et 
al. (2017) investigate how U.S. IMET programs affect the probability of human rights 
violations in conflict. The authors argue that U.S. IMET participants “acquire a better 
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understanding of the ways in which the U.S. military operates, an appreciation of its 
foundational values, personal connections to the people espousing those values, and, 
possibly, even a desire to emulate them” (Omelicheva et al. 2017:129). The authors argue 
that due to this norms transmission more U.S. IMET participation is associated with less 
atrocities against civilians during conflict. 
Although the reviewed studies provide significant contributions to better understand 
the effects of the U.S. IMET programs at the individual level they also leave room for 
expansion and further improvement. Further research can provide both theoretical and 
methodological improvements leading to a stronger theory of norms transmission and more 
convincing empirical evidence regarding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on 
participating individuals. 
 First, while Reynolds (2001) makes significant initial contributions to the literature 
through his cross-national12 investigation and finds promising results regarding the individual 
level positive effects of the U.S. IMET programs his limited scope generates a need for 
further improvement. The author limits his investigation only to participants of eight U.S. E-
IMET courses with a very small sample size.13 These issues generate some opportunities to 
further improve Reynolds` (2001) research by offering a theory of norms transmission and 
including non-graduates into the sample to compare their attitudes with the U.S. IMET 
graduates. Finally, extending the scope of the investigation to all U.S. IMET courses can 
provide stronger evidence regarding the effect of these programs. 
 Additionally, while Atkinson`s (2015) study offers both a theory of norms 
transmission and empirical testing of this theory her work can also be further expanded. Both 
 
12 The author surveys E-U.S. IMET graduates from three Latin-American countries including El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. 
13 68 respondents from El Salvador, 12 respondents from Guatemala and 35 respondents from Nicaragua 
bringing the total number of participants to 115 E-U.S. IMET graduates. 
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Atkinson (2015) and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) investigate the effects of U.S. IMET 
participation by only looking at PME institutions. These studies only include U.S. IMET 
courses with very specific curriculum and high-ranking foreign participants. These factors 
generate potential selection bias by excluding a large number of U.S. IMET participants and 
with that their samples are also not representative. These factors limit the validity of the 
findings of these studies. Additionally, similarly to Reynolds (2001), both Atkinson (2015) 
and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) only include U.S. IMET graduates in their assessment 
while missing the opportunity to compare and contrast the attitudes of U.S. IMET 
participants with those who never participated in the U.S. IMET programs.14 The expansion 
of the scope of these studies by including additional U.S. IMET courses and adding non-U.S. 
IMET graduates to the sample of the investigation generates an opportunity to provide a 
stronger theory of norms transmission and further empirical evidence regarding the individual 
level effects of the U.S. IMET programs.   
The next section of this paper intends to expand and further improve these prior 
arguments by presenting a theoretical framework for norm transmission at the individual 
level and testing both this theory and some previously untested assumptions of previous 
studies with the aim to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs. 
Theoretical Argument  
 Farrell (2001) argues that militaries and individual military professionals admire the norms, 
ideas and procedures of those foreign militaries that have won victories in recent wars or 
have gone through major technological developments. According to Farrell (2001) military 
organizations emulate the norms and procedures of those victorious examples even if those 
 
14 Jungdahl and Lambert`s (2012) pre and post survey address this issue to a certain extent, but the inclusion of 
non-graduates can provide stronger support to the findings.  
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norms and procedures do not fit the strategic interest of the given countries. The author 
argues that the implementation of an American style military, following the U.S. dramatic 
victory in the Gulf Wars, in countries like Botswana, Monaco or Micronesia are clear 
examples of such norm emulation (Farrell 2001; Goldman 2003, 2006). Based on this 
argument I propose that most military and with that most individual military personnel 
around the world admire the recent victories and technical advancement of the U.S. military 
and want to emulate its norms and values.  
 According to several institutionalist studies (Katzenstein 1996; Farrell, 2001; 
Goldman 2003, 2006) transnational norms transmitted among the members of professional 
organizations when they socialize “in professional networks and come to share norms of 
appropriate behavior and identity” (Goldman, 2006: 72). Katzenstein (1996), Farrell (2001) 
and Goldman (2003) and Giraldi (2012) argue that military norms are shared in the same way 
through the process of learning15 and suggest that the worldwide spread of the norm of 
conventional warfare is one example of such diffusion through the learning process (Farrell, 
2001). Atkinson (2010) proposes two additional mechanisms through which professional 
military norms are transmitted at the individual level. According to the author the success of 
norm transmission depends on the extent of social interactions between the U.S. IMET 
participants and the American society and the sense of common identity the participants share 
with their fellow American service members16 (Atkinson, 2010).  Combining the arguments 
 
15 Giraldi (2012) suggests that diffusion mechanisms can be categorized into four groups: coercion, competition, 
learning, and emulation. According to Giraldi (2012) norm diffusion through coercion happening when a strong 
country or an international organization forces policy change within a country. The author suggests that 
competition happens when the different countries influence each other either for economic or security reasons. 
In Giraldi`s (2012) framework diffusion happens through learning when “experience of other countries can 
supply useful information on the likely consequences of a policy” (Giraldi, 2012: 13) while “emulation means 
that the normative and socially constructed characteristics of policies matter more than their objective 
consequences” (Giraldi, 2012: 13). 
16 Atkinson (2010) also suggests a third condition, namely whether upon their return to their home countries the 
participants attain influential military or policy positions, but since this condition relates to the question whether 
the norms further diffuse within the recipient states` military organization I do not discuss that in this study. 
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of Katzenstein (1996), Farrell (2001), Goldman (2003) and Atkinson (2010) I theorize that 
the U.S. IMET programs are unique opportunities for the U.S. military to socialize its norms 
in a multinational professional network and to share appropriate forms of behavior and 
identity with foreign military personnel. I propose that the professional norms of the U.S. 
military are transmitted to the participating individuals through three mechanisms: formal 
learning, direct exposure, and common identity. These three mechanisms do not act in a 
vacuum, but rather reinforce each other`s effects. As Atkinson (2010) argues the U.S. IMET 
programs act as unique “socialization channel through which formal programs and informal 
interactions reinforce ideas on civil-military relations in a democratic state” (Atkinson, 2010: 
6). 
 The first mechanism that enables the transmission of the three norms investigated here 
is formal learning. The U.S. IMET programs are education and training events that are 
uniquely designed to facilitate learning and demonstration of appropriate behavior. Although 
the majority of the U.S. IMET courses do not focus on the investigated three norms they still 
contain several short lectures, discussions and practical exercises that are designed with the 
sole purpose to educate participants about the importance of these fundamental beliefs and 
provide opportunities to U.S. military personnel to demonstrate appropriate behavior. 
Additionally, the E-U.S. IMET courses` curriculum`s single focus is to educate participants 
about the norms of respect of democratic values, human rights and civil control. Beyond 
these elements in the curriculum there are several other factors that makes the U.S. IMET 
program a unique platform for norm transmission compared to any other foreign military 
training efforts. First, U.S. IMET receives the largest number of foreign military personnel 
which creates a unique professional networking opportunity. Second, the execution of the 
U.S. IMET program`s curriculum and the achievement of its educational goals are supported 
by the world`s largest military education and training infrastructure, the biggest training 
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budget and the most experienced military education and training cadre (Savage and Caverley, 
2017). Besides the learning specific factors of the U.S. IMET program, the norm transmission 
is also supported by a less formal factor, the so-called Informational Programs (hereafter, IP). 
 These programs are integral part of the U.S. IMET experience and exclusively focus 
on exposing foreign participants to the ideas of democracy and human rights (Cope, 1995; 
Atkinson 2015). The IP are purposefully designed to expose foreign military personnel to 
American social and cultural events such as visits to historical sites, culture centers and 
museums. During these events foreign military personnel and their families are exposed to 
U.S. society, culture, and history. Although the IP is not mandatory for U.S. IMET 
participants since they can take their entire families to these events for free of charge the 
majority of U.S. IMET participants take advantage of these events (Cope, 1995; Atkinson 
2015). These IPs are important elements in the transmission of norms because as several 
studies from different disciplines find the type and extent of the social interaction between 
foreign participants and the host country influence the attitudes of these individuals toward 
the norms and values of that country (Selltiz et al. 1963; Sunal and Sunal 1991; Ye 2001; 
Miller 2006, Atkinson, 2010). Besides formal learning and direct exposure, the shared 
professional identity also plays a crucial role in the transmission of the norms of the U.S. 
military. 
 Atkinson (2010) argues that although the level of the individual-to-individual 
interaction matters, it is even more important with whom this interaction happens. Several 
studies from different disciplines (Selltiz et al. 1963; Ye 2001,  Akerlof and Kranton, 2005) 
establish that sharing a common identity and belonging to the same professional community 
affects the participants` individual attitudes toward different norms and values. Akerlof and 
Kranton (2005) specifically argue that the U.S. military purposefully develops a common 
identity as a professional motivator and immerses foreign military personnel into them 
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completely during their U.S. IMET participation. According to Atkinson (2010) U.S. IMET 
programs “all share a deeply imbedded common identity” (Atkinson, 2010: 6) which 
incentivize foreign military personnel to emulate such norms.  
 The findings of Cope`s (1995) survey based study seems to provide some empirical 
evidence for the presented three mechanisms since he suggests that foreign military personnel 
learn about democracy, human rights and appropriate civil-military relationship during the 
U.S. IMET programs through dedicated courses, contact with U.S. service members and 
civilians, as well as just from living in the U.S. One of Cope`s (1995) respondent summarized 
the value of the U.S. IMET program participation as the “education, exposure and breadth of 
understanding” (Cope, 1995: 21). 
 Of course, these mechanisms do not affect everyone the same way. As the examples 
discussed in the introduction suggest U.S. IMET attendance might have an opposite effect or 
no effects at all on the participating individuals. No doubt, there are several U.S. IMET 
graduates whose actions do not reflect positive attitudes towards the investigated three norms. 
There may also be individuals who come to the U.S. from countries and cultures with strong 
traditions that cannot be changed through those mechanisms to which these individuals are 
exposed during their U.S. IMET participation. Cope (1995) argues that there always are U.S. 
IMET participants who have neither interest in learning the professional norms of the U.S. 
military nor are interested in sharing a common professional identity with their American 
peers. Additionally, the author also suggests that some foreign military participants might 
refuse to participate in programs that expose them to the American way of life. Although 
Cope (1995) suggests that these U.S. IMET students are atypical and represent only a small 
portion of the graduates of the U.S. IMET programs the existence of such examples makes 
the better understanding of the mechanisms of the norm transmission and the overall effects 
of the U.S. IMET programs even more important. 
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 Based on the above discussion I propose that the norms of respect of democratic 
values, human rights and civil supremacy indeed transmitted to foreign military personnel 
during their participation in the U.S. IMET programs and this transmission happens through 
the mechanism of formal learning, direct exposure and shared professional identity. These 
assertions lead me to the following three testable hypotheses. 
 H1. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates 
demonstrate more respect for democratic values than non-graduates. 
 
 H2. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates 
demonstrate more respect for human rights than non-graduates. 
 
 H3. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates are less 
likely to support military intervention into domestic politics than non-graduates. 
Research design 
This study was conducted using a survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews on a sample 
of Hungarian military personnel.17  The survey was conducted in Hungary in Hungarian 
between 18 June and 8 July 2019. The in-depth interviews were conducted between 26 
October and 15 November 2019. The survey`s primary purpose is to measure whether a 
difference exists between U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates` attitudes towards the 
investigated three norms and to identify potential mechanisms through which the U.S. 
military`s professional norms are transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. The interviews are 
conducted to provide additional support to the findings of the survey and to help better 
understanding the mechanisms of norms transmission.  
Hungary and the Hungarian military were chosen as a case for this research project 
for several theoretical and practical reasons. First, although following the end of the Cold 
War the U.S. has provided significant military aid to former Eastern Bloc countries in the 
 
17 Military personnel who participated and did not participate in U.S. U.S. IMET programs. 
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form of international military education and training, these countries have never been the 
subject of U.S. IMET related research. Hungary is not only one of these countries, but it is an 
interesting case regarding democratic norms and human rights. Hungary played a crucial role 
towards the end of the Cold War in the democratization process of the former Eastern Bloc, 
and for years served as an example for the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries in the 
implementation of international democratic values and respecting human rights. However, the 
country`s recent history has shown some serious backsliding in those universal norms (Agh, 
2016). Hungary has been recently accused by several members of the international 
community of activities that violate basic democratic values and limit universal human rights 
(Agh, 2016). As Agh (2016) reports the European Union has initiated several investigations 
into these claims and is looking into whether recent Hungarian governmental actions indeed 
restrict the freedom of the press, limit the activities of civil organizations, or create unfair 
conditions for opposition parties.  
 Additionally, Hungary has participated in the U.S. U.S. IMET program since 1991. 
The almost 30 years of participation and the fact that the majority of the Hungarian senior 
military leaders are graduates of the U.S. IMET program provide an appropriate case for the 
purposes of this investigation. Furthermore, according to the U.S. Office of Defense 
Cooperation18 (hereafter, ODC) in Budapest approximately 3,00019  Hungarian military 
personnel has participated in the U.S. IMET program since 1991. From the 3,000 military 
personnel about 500 were female while the remaining 2,500 were male. While the male 
 
18 According to the website of the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, The Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) is 
responsible for: “promoting, developing, coordinating and executing the following programs with Hungary: 
Security Assistance, Foreign Military Financing/Sales (FMF/FMS), International Military Education and 
Training (U.S. IMET), Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA), Engagement Activities, Hungary-Ohio State 
Partnership Program (SPP), Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), Marshall Center, and Counter Terrorism 
Program” (https://hu.usembassy.gov/embassy/budapest/sections-offices/defense-cooperation/) 
19 This study has exact data about the number of participants between 1991 and 2015. During this timeframe 
2112 Hungarian military personnel attended U.S. IMET programs. 
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participants mostly attended combat arms courses, the females mostly participated in training 
and education events that were related to language training, logistics, defense management, 
communication, medical and air traffic controller occupational specialties. Command and 
staff college and military university level education has been exclusively attended by male 
military personnel till 2019, however this year the first Hungarian female officer is attending 
the U.S. National Defense University in Washington D.C.20 Additional information about the 
specific number of Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates and the annual U.S. IMET budget 
dedicated to Hungary can be found in Savage and Caverley`s (2017) dataset and the U.S. 
State Department`s Archive website.21 Table 1. depicts the number of Hungarian U.S. IMET 
participants and U.S. IMET budget allocation between 1991 and 2015. 
 Although the curriculum of the courses, in which Hungarian military personnel have 
attended do not exclusively focus on the respect of democratic values, human rights and civil 
control all these courses included presentations and briefs regarding those three norms. 
Additionally IP events were integral part of all these programs meaning that most Hungarian 
participants22 and their families could participate in social and cultural events that were 
specifically designed to improve foreign participants appreciation of democratic values and 
human rights. These facts are important for the argument of this paper, because if I find 
support for my expectations than it means U.S. military norms transmitted to foreign 
participants even if the formal education and training they received did not specifically focus 
on democratic values, human rights and civil control. Besides Hungary being an interesting 
 
20 The information provided by the ODC in Budapest is approximate. ODC could not provide any additional 
details regarding the demographic data of the participants or the distribution of courses among different 
services. Additionally, the ODC informed me that it does not maintain a comprehensive dataset about the 
participants in the U.S. IMET programs and it does not have knowledge about the existence of such dataset in 
any U.S. records. 
21 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm 
22 Only 8 respondents out of the 140 U.S. IMET graduates reported that they did not participate in any IP event, 
while 111 respondents answered that they attended in three or more such activities. 
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case because of its 30 years of participation in the U.S. IMET program, it’s close to 3,000 
U.S. IMET graduates and its turbulent history with democratic values and human rights, 
some additional practical reasons also affected the case selection.  
 First, as a former Hungarian military officer accessing military personnel, sites and 
other necessary resources, securing approval for the execution of the survey and making sure 
that appropriate type and number of respondents were selected for the purposes of the study 
was easier for me than conducting the same type of research in other countries. 
Table 1. Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates and Annual U.S. IMET Budget Dedicated to 
Hungary Per Fiscal Year23 
Year Number of 
Students 
Annual U.S. IMET Budget 
in $Thousands 
1991 18 334 
1992 49 836 
1993 60 892 
1994 44 875 
1995 35 975 
1996 58 1243 
1997 49 1198 
1998 60 1573 
1999 197 1314 
2000 143 1576 
2001 103 1536 
2002 132 1940 
2003 170 2006 
2004 251 2109 
2005 111 1985 
2006 113 1632 
2007 90 1372 
2008 68 1088 
2009 110 1014 
2010 53 1060 
2011 37 1077 
2012 45 947 
2013 42 1044 
2014 37 1000 
2015 37 1000 
 
 
23 Sources are Savage and Caverley (2017) dataset, State Department Archive Website and ODC in Budapest. 
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Second, as a native Hungarian speaker I could quickly and accurately respond to the 
questions of the respondents which prevented potential misunderstandings and helped 
minimizing potential measurement errors. The easier access to respondents and other 
resources also enabled me to conduct a pilot survey before the actual survey was fielded to 
address potential question design issues and give me a chance to modify questions if they 
were necessary further mitigating potential measurement errors. 
The pilot survey was conducted on 16 June 2019 with 12 respondents. The 
respondents were handpicked from the author`s personal professional network and 
represented all demographic groups that were expected to participate in the main survey. 
These respondents were asked to fill out the survey through the internet and they were not re-
surveyed in the actual data collection. The participants in the pilot did not report any concerns 
and suggested that all questions were clear and understandable which led me to field the 
survey unchanged.24  
The actual survey contains 37 questions, which can be divided into four parts. The 
first part focuses on gathering data from the respondents on their demographic details with 
the aim to collect information on potential control variables. The second part of the survey 
intends to gather information on how respondents consider their level of military skills and 
experience. The third part includes sensitive questions that are aiming to gather information 
for testing the above proposed hypotheses. The final part of the survey gathers U.S. IMET 
specific information to allow the identification of variance within the group of U.S. IMET 
graduates. The actual survey questionnaire can be reviewed in Appendix A while the code 
book for the questionnaire is included in Appendix B.  
 
24 The pilot was also useful to determine the average time needed for conducting the survey (7 minutes and 35 
seconds). Based on the pilot results the time was set for 10 minutes. This information was included in the 
heading of the final questionnaire for respondents` awareness. 
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The sample size of for the survey was determined based on the actual size of the 
Hungarian military. While the authorized size of the Hungarian Defense Forces is 25,000, 
only about 18,000 positions are filled by military personnel because the remaining positions 
are either unfilled (around 4,500) or filled by civilians. Additionally, about 8,000 to 9,000 
soldiers are enlisted who are normally not eligible to participate in U.S. IMET25 leaving the 
potential population of this study around 9,000 officers and non-commissioned officers. 
Considering the number of potentially available U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates 
during the time period when the survey was planned to be administered, and to make sure 
that the results of this analysis are robust the sample size for this study was set to 350 military 
personnel26 including 140 U.S. IMET graduates and 210 non-graduates.  
To ensure the validity of the survey results I used multi-level random selection 
method. First, I randomly assigned two-digit numbers to each Hungarian military 
organization in three categories: land forces (10-30), air forces (40-60), command and 
supporting organizations (70-90). After that I randomly chose one from each group by pulling 
out numbers from each group. Since the Hungarian special forces has only one unit I added 
this site without any random selection to the other three selected locations. This selection 
method enabled me to ensure that all three services of the Hungarian Defense Forces were 
represented in the sample as well as the higher-level command organizations that has oversite 
over all three services. In each location I was presented by all available personnel on the 
given day when I visited the organization. I asked individuals to tell me whether they 
participated in U.S. IMET training or not. After receiving their answers I selected individuals 
 
25 Enlisted personnel are usually only eligible to participate in U.S. IMET if they belong to “unconventional” 
formations such as Special Forces, where enlisted personnel act in similar capacity as non-commissioned 
officers in conventional formations. Their number is quite low in the Hungarian military and were ignored for 
the purposes of this study. 
26 The sample size represents approximately 3.9% of the entire population. 
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as respondents by tossing a coin (I changed the “winner” side at each location). In each case I 
originally over selected the potential participants to allow me to match U.S. IMET graduates 
and non-graduates based on their rank, gender, and age. Due to the fact that different group of 
people were available at the given times at the different locations and because in the 
Hungarian military the representation of different demographic groups are not balanced 
(disproportionately large number of older, male, senior officers; significant number missing 
from middle-aged mid-rank officers) the sample is not perfectly balanced on demographic 
information, however it does represent the actual characteristics of the Hungarian Defense 
Forces. The final distribution of U.S. IMET graduates in the sample is 47 from the Land 
forces, 18 from Special Forces, 30 from the Air force and 45 respondents from higher 
command. That brings the total number of U.S. IMET graduate respondents to 140. In the 
group of non-U.S. IMET graduates 69 Land forces representative, 27 Special Forces 
respondents, 46 Air force personnel and 68 respondents from higher commands were selected 
randomly bringing the total number of non-U.S. IMET graduates to 210. The numbers of 
both U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates are proportional to the actual number of the 
members of these organizations within the Hungarian Defense Forces. The selected 
respondents represent between 5 and 10% of the manning of the organizations which makes 
the sample strongly representative. 
The survey was fielded in four different physical locations at four different times (two 
days at each location). At three locations I administered the survey personally while at the 
fourth location it was administered by a Hungarian military officer who was personally 
trained by me. In all four cases the survey was conducted using a paper-based form. The 
respondents filled out the survey either in a classroom/briefing room or an office like setting.  
The in-depth interviews contain 17 semi-structured questions. The first 8 questions 
focus on gathering demographic data from the respondents while the remaining 9 questions 
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collect information about the U.S. IMET graduates experiences during their participation in 
these programs. The goal of these latter questions was to help better understanding the 
mechanisms of norms transmission. The actual interview questions can be reviewed in 
Appendix C. The in-depth interviews were conducted via phone and social media platforms 
(Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, and Windows Messenger) with 14 Hungarian military personnel. 
The number of interviewees were determined as 10% of the overall Hungarian U.S. IMET 
graduates chosen for the survey. The 14 respondents were handpicked from the author`s 
personal professional network from those who participated in the survey. These participants 
were chosen to represent all demographic groups of the Hungarian U. S. IMET graduates 
including gender, rank and the three services. The individual information of the interviewees 
can be reviewed in Appendix D. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
There are three dependent variables in this study. The first dependent variable is respect of 
democratic values. This variable is measured in a scale ranging from 1 to 10 where 10 is the 
highest respect for democratic values. The second dependent variable is respect for human 
rights and similarly to the first dependent variable it is measured on a scale from 1 to 10 with 
10 being the most respect. The last dependent variable is respect of civil supremacy over the 
military also measured the same way as the previous two outcome variables. The actual 
wording of the questions related to each dependent variable can be reviewed in Figure 4. My 
main independent variable is U.S. IMET participation. This is a dichotomous variable which 
takes the value of 0 if the respondent has not participated in any U.S. IMET programs and 1 if 
he has attended such training. 
 41 
Control Variables 
Since the primary objective of this study is to measure individual level sentiments towards 
democratic values, human rights, and civil supremacy over the military the analysis controls 
for standard individual level variables including age, gender, and level of education. Several 
studies (Barro, 1999; Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Papaioannou 
and Siourounis, 2005) suggest that older people, females, and more educated individuals are 
more likely to have higher respect for democratic values. 
Dependent Variables Question 
DV#1: Democratic Values 
1-10 (Strongly Disagree-
Strongly Agree) 
To what extent do you agree with the following 
statement? 
Freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for 
all must be respected under every circumstance. 
DV#2: Human Rights 
1-10 (Strongly Disagree-
Strongly Agree) 
To what extent do you agree with the following 
statement? 
Universal human rights must be respected under 
every circumstance. 
DV#3: Civil Control 
1-10 (Strongly Disagree-
Strongly Agree) 
To what extent do you agree with the following 
statement? 
The military should be involved in the 
formulation of domestic policies. 
Figure 4. Actual Survey Questions for the Dependent Variables 
I also include these same variables into the models that assess the level of respect of human 
rights and civil control. Age is divided into five age groups starting with 18 to 25, 26 to 35, 
36 to 45, 46 to 55 and 55+ categories. The gender variable is binary and assumes the value of 
0 for males and 1 for females. The education variable contains five categories including basic 
education, high school, college, university, and PhD level education. This variable is ranked 
from 1 (basic education) to 5 (PhD school). As an additional indicator for the level of 
education within the military I also control for the number of languages the individuals speak. 
To account for potential military specific effects I include control variables that measure the 
individuals` rank and their years of service. I use these control variables because I expect that 
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higher-ranking individuals with more rights and responsibilities should have more respect for 
the three norms and rank might serve as an alternative explanation independent from U.S. 
IMET participation. Duration of service is also used as a control variable because the more 
time a soldier spends in a military organization the more opportunities he might get where he 
can interact with soldiers from the U.S. (multinational exercises, mobile training teams, 
military-to-military events, etc.) which can serve as a reinforcing mechanism for the norm 
transmission. Finally, I include two additional binary variables to account for respondents` 
combat deployment and additional foreign training other than U.S. training. The former 
variable is included because Hungarian soldiers who have participated in combat deployment 
have always been deployed as part of a multinational force and most of the time alongside 
their U.S. peers. I argue that these deployments might also serve as reinforcement 
mechanisms to further deepen the individual attitudes towards the investigated three norms. 
Last, but not least the other foreign military training and education variable is included 
because the effective isolation of the effects of the U.S. IMET programs from other 
international education and training efforts can provide strong support to the findings of this 
analysis. Both of these variables assume the value of 0 if individuals did not participate in 
either combat deployment or other foreign training and the value of 1 if they did. The 
summary statistics of the variables can be reviewed in Appendix E. 
Estimation Method  
Since the participants of this survey were randomly selected the first set of models assess the 
effects of U.S. IMET participation on the three dependent variables using linear regression 
technique. However, since in observational studies one of the potential inferential issues is 
that the selection into the treatment group (in this case participation in U.S. IMET programs) 
might be influenced by the subjects` base line characteristics I also estimate the effects of 
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U.S. IMET participation by employing propensity score matching technique. This method 
was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and designed to address selection bias and 
move researchers towards more casual estimates.  
 The first step of this method is the calculation of the probability (propensity score) of 
an individual experiencing the treatment, in other words being selected for U.S. IMET 
participation. The next step is using the calculated propensity scores and match individuals 
who has similar probability of participating in U.S. IMET. This allows one to have a more 
convincing comparison where the treated and untreated groups are similar on their observable 
characteristics. Next, it is necessary to evaluate the quality of the match by using statistical 
techniques to ensure that there is an acceptable level of balance of covariates. Finally, the 
process concludes with the evaluation of the effects of the treatment on the outcome variables 
(Pan and Bai, 2015).   
Results and Discussion 
Table 2. contains the results of nine linear regression models that assess the effects of U.S. 
IMET participation on individuals` attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and 
civil control over the military. The first three models explore the relationship between U.S. 
IMET participation and individuals` level of respect for democratic values. The results of all 
three models support H1 and show that U.S. IMET graduates on average have higher respect 
for democratic values than those Hungarian soldiers who have not participated in U.S. IMET 
programs. Besides the key explanatory variable age seems to have a positive effect on the 
respect of democratic values, which supports the findings of previous literature (Barro, 1999; 
Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2005).   
Next, participation in combat deployment seems to have a strong positive effect on individual 
attitudes towards democratic values.
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Table 2. The Effects of U.S. IMET participation on individual attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and civil control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Democratic 
values#1 
Democratic 
Values#2  
Democratic 
Values#3 
Human 
Rights#1 
Human 
Rights#2 
Human 
Rights#3 
Military 
Interv.#1 
Military 
Interv.#2 
Military 
Interv.#3 
U.S. IMET 1.740*** 1.587*** 1.522*** 0.883*** 0.665*** 0.523* -0.414* -0.520** -0.559** 
 (0.257) (0.264) (0.282) (0.245) (0.252) (0.271) (0.225) (0.233) (0.251) 
Rank  0.335 0.259  0.567** 0.548**  0.135 0.163 
  (0.280) (0.280)  (0.267) (0.269)  (0.247) (0.248) 
Age  0.441** 0.413*  0.133 0.140  0.230 0.248 
  (0.223) (0.222)  (0.213) (0.213)  (0.197) (0.197) 
Gender  0.414 0.162  0.255 0.215  -0.140 -0.0360 
  (0.328) (0.339)  (0.313) (0.326)  (0.289) (0.301) 
Edu  -0.192 -0.123  -0.348 -0.329  -0.271 -0.295 
  (0.314) (0.312)  (0.299) (0.300)  (0.277) (0.277) 
Language  0.627* 0.524  0.339 0.321  0.495* 0.536* 
  (0.329) (0.329)  (0.313) (0.316)  (0.290) (0.292) 
Dur. of service  -0.308 -0.359  0.0995 0.0460  0.0473 0.0455 
  (0.226) (0.228)  (0.215) (0.219)  (0.199) (0.202) 
Deployment   0.841***   0.0237   -0.403 
   (0.318)   (0.306)   (0.283) 
Non-US Train.   0.0166   0.376   0.181 
   (0.283)   (0.272)   (0.251) 
Constant 6.095*** 3.823*** 3.807*** 6.638*** 4.746*** 4.745*** 3.529*** 2.393*** 2.401*** 
 (0.163) (0.880) (0.874) (0.155) (0.840) (0.840) (0.142) (0.776) (0.776) 
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 
R-squared 0.116 0.149 0.167 0.036 0.070 0.076 0.010 0.028 0.035 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
 
 
This might be explained by the fact that Hungarian soldiers are exclusively deployed into 
combat as part of a multinational coalition and almost always together with the U.S. military 
which might act as an extra reinforcing mechanism to diffuse U.S. norms and values. 
Additionally, the models also suggest that while U.S. IMET participation significantly and 
positively influence individual attitudes towards democratic values, similar foreign education 
and training received in other countries do not have the same effects. This is an important 
finding because it suggests the uniqueness of the U.S. IMET programs compared to other 
foreign military training efforts. Models 4 to 6 explore how U.S. IMET participation effects 
individuals` respect of human rights. The findings of these models support H2 since as they 
demonstrate U.S. IMET participation is associated with higher respect of human rights. In 
these models besides the independent variable only respondents` rank show a statistically 
significant positive relationship with respect of human rights. Once again the models suggest 
that foreign military education and training programs received in other countries do not have 
a statistically significant effect on individuals` respect of human rights. 
 The last three models in Table 2. assess the relationship between U.S. IMET 
participation and respect of civil supremacy over the military. The findings of these models 
support H3 because as the results demonstrate U.S. IMET graduates are less likely to support 
military intervention into domestic politics than non-graduates. From the other assessed 
factors only the number of spoken languages demonstrate a slight negative relationship with 
the respect of civil supremacy, because those individuals who speak more languages are more 
likely to support military intervention into domestic politics.  
 I also run the same models to assess whether any variation exist among the members 
of the three services (Air Force, Land Forces and Special Forces) of the Hungarian Defense 
Forces. The results of the service specific models can be reviewed in Appendix F. 
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 Next, Table 3. depicts the results of the models with matching techniques. Both the 
graphical and statistical evaluation of the level of matching can be reviewed in Appendix G. 
The first three models (10-12) show the results with basic propensity score matching while 
models 13 to 15 demonstrate the results of U.S. IMET participation when nearest neighbor 
matching is employed. The results in all these models confirm the findings of the linear 
regression analysis and support the three hypotheses proposed. 
Table 3. Effects of U.S. IMET Participation, Models with Propensity Score Matching and 
Nearest Neighbor Matching 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military 
Interv. 
Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military 
Interv. 
U.S. IMET 1.127*** 0.522* -0.605** 1.267*** 0.529* -0.701** 
 (0.284) (0.291) (0.291) (0.295) (0.285) (0.299) 
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 Additionally, Figure 5. provides a visual demonstration of the average effects of the 
U.S. IMET participation on the investigated three dependent variables. The average level of 
respect of democratic values within the Hungarian military is 6.095. U.S. IMET participation 
increases this level with 1.740 points on a 1-10 Likert scale. The average level of respect of 
human rights within the military is 6.638 which is increased by .883 when we compare 
U.S.IMET graduates to non-graduates. Finally,  the average value of the willingness to 
militarily intervene into domestic politics is 3.529 which is already quite low within the 
Hungarian Defense Forces, but U.S. IMET participation even further decreases it with .701 
points. These changes are quite significant when one considers the actual value of the 
attitudes towards the three examined norms. 
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Figure 5. Average Effects of U.S. IMET participation on Democratic Values, Human Rights 
and Military Intervention 
 Additionally, I test the three mechanisms presented in the theoretical section to better 
understand how the professional norms of the U.S. military are transmitted during U.S. IMET 
participation. In these models I use the same three dependent variables while employ four 
explanatory variables. Two of these variables proxy for the mechanism of formal learning. 
The first is a binary variable that take the value of 0 if U.S. IMET graduates did not 
participate in PME course and 1 if they did. The second variable measures participation in 
technical and tactical courses and coded the same way as the PME variable. The next 
explanatory variable serves as a proxy for social interaction and measures whether the U.S. 
IMET graduates participated in social activities. This variable is coded 0 if U.S. IMET 
graduates participated 1 or less social events and 1 if they participated in 2 or more events. 
The last independent variable accounts for shared identity. It measures on a 1 to 10 scale 
whether the U.S. IMET participants considered the U.S. IMET experience a professional 
development opportunity.  
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 The models in the mechanism tests also control for additional factors that I propose 
effecting the stickiness of the investigated three norms. These variables include the number of 
U.S. IMET courses participated by an individual, the time since graduation, the duration of 
service, combat deployment, whether been commanded by another U.S. IMET graduate, and 
keeping in touch with American classmates from the U.S. IMET programs. Table 4. shows 
the results of these models.  
 The results show that the type of the U.S. IMET program has a significant effect on 
the participating individuals attitudes towards the three assessed norms. The analysis provide 
support to Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) and Atkinson`s (2015) previous arguments and show 
that PME graduates have a higher respect for democratic values and human rights than those 
who participated in other programs. At the same time, while the results are not significant 
they also demonstrate that tactically and technically focused training events are associated 
with a decrease in the respect of those investigated norms. The results of the in-depth 
interviews seem to provide additional support to these findings. While those interviewees 
who participated in U.S. IMET PME courses all report that they think these courses contain 
much more information (readings and practical exercises) regarding the investigated three 
norms when compared to similar Hungarian courses, those U.S. IMET graduates who 
attended only tactical level courses do not report significant differences. While for example 
Respondent#2, a U.S. IMET PME course graduate specifically reported that “I think U.S. 
IMET PME courses are doing a better job than the Hungarian courses that I have participated 
in making sure that their graduates leave the course with a lot of knowledge about democratic 
values human rights and civil control,” Respondent#10 a non-PME, tactical course 
participant reported that “I did not really find any difference between Hungarian course and 
U.S. IMET courses regarding what and how they teach about democratic values, human 
rights and civil control.”  
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Table 4. The Effects of U.S. IMET type, social interaction and professional identity sharing on attitudes towards democratic values, human 
rights, and civil control 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
VARIABLES Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military 
Interv.#1 
Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military 
Interv.#2 
Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military 
Interv.#3 
Tech. Training -0.727** -0.306 -0.00517       
 (0.304) (0.318) (0.332)       
PME    1.038*** 0.642** 0.170    
    (0.304) (0.321) (0.338)    
Social       0.0972 0.919** 0.318 
       (0.372) (0.375) (0.398) 
Constant 8.116*** 7.640*** 3.116*** 7.473*** 7.297*** 3.055*** 7.759*** 6.793*** 2.862*** 
 (0.188) (0.197) (0.206) (0.180) (0.190) (0.200) (0.331) (0.334) (0.354) 
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
R-squared 0.040 0.007 0.000 0.078 0.028 0.002 0.000 0.042 0.005 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
VARIABLES Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military  
Interv.#4 
Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military 
Interv.#5 
Tech. Training    -0.168 0.0775 -0.0999 
    (0.389) (0.410) (0.446) 
PME    1.037** 0.635 0.0515 
    (0.436) (0.460) (0.500) 
Social    -0.216 0.762* 0.253 
    (0.391) (0.412) (0.448) 
Professional -0.159 0.0610 -0.0793 -0.167 -0.0214 -0.0911 
 (0.139) (0.143) (0.149) (0.139) (0.146) (0.159) 
Grad. time    0.692*** 0.871*** 0.633** 
    (0.248) (0.262) (0.285) 
Dur. of serv.    -0.324 -0.247 0.0934 
    (0.234) (0.247) (0.268) 
Deployment    0.435 -0.635 -0.301 
    (0.396) (0.417) (0.454) 
U.S. IMET_C2    -0.733 0.166 -0.339 
    (1.008) (1.062) (1.156) 
Intouch    -0.104 0.520 0.606 
    (0.326) (0.343) (0.373) 
Constant 9.263*** 6.973*** 3.828*** 9.351*** 6.156*** 2.708 
 (1.257) (1.298) (1.352) (1.662) (1.751) (1.905) 
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140 
R-squared 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.182 0.143 0.064 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The results of the social interaction variable also demonstrate some promising results. 
Although the results are mixed and mostly insignificant, when they are significant, they 
demonstrate the expected relationship. Once again in-depth interview respondents seem to 
provide some support for the effects of social interactions. All 14 respondents report that they 
participated in IP programs and these programs not only positively changed their sentiments 
about the U.S. as a country and American society, but also improved their understanding 
about democratic values and the importance of human rights. Respondent#7 specifically 
states “IP programs were great. I had a lot of opportunity to visit historical sites and 
American landmarks. I also went to a military ball and was invited several times to dinner by 
my American peers. These events taught me a lot about how the American society is and 
what they value.” 
 The effects of the shared identity variable are mixed and not statistically significant. 
At the same time all in-depth interview respondents report that they think the U.S. military is 
a highly professional military organization and its norms and values should be emulated by 
all other militaries. For example Respondent#9 suggests “the behavior of the individual 
American soldier, the military`s acceptance of civil supremacy, their merit-based selection 
and promotion system and cutting-edge technology were very impressive to me. I think it is 
fair to say if you want to be a good military you should try to follow the American example.” 
 Among those variables that assess how long the transmitted norms affects individual 
attitudes only the time since graduation variable demonstrate significant results. While the 
more time spent since graduation is positively associated with both respect of democratic 
values and human rights it also seems to increase the probability of supporting military 
intervention into domestic politics. While the results of the initial models suggest that as 
argued the international norms of respect for democratic values, human rights and civil 
control that characterize the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to foreign participants 
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during the U.S. IMET programs the results of the mechanisms tests although promising in 
some cases do not provide a strong support to the overall argument. While the findings 
clearly demonstrate that the U.S. IMET programs are meeting their fundamental aims and 
improve the participants` attitudes towards the investigated three norms the actual 
mechanisms of norms transmission require further investigations. 
Diffusion of Norms Within National Militaries 
Although it is outside of the original scope of this study, the investigation whether the 
transmitted norms further diffuse within the U.S. IMET graduates` national militaries provide 
some valuable insights into the logic of the initially proposed theory. Since many studies 
investigating the effects of U.S. IMET (Lefever 1976; Fitch 1979; Ruby and Gibler 2010; 
Savage and Caverley, 2017) assume that this diffusion occurs but do not provide any 
empirical evidence to support it, therefore the empirical testing of norm diffusion can make 
significant contribution to the existing literature. If the professional norms of the U.S. 
military that are transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants indeed further diffuse throughout 
their national militaries, than one can expect that the respect of the three investigated norms is 
going to be higher among those non-U.S. IMET graduates who have been commanded and 
trained by U.S. IMET graduates than those who has never been led by U.S. IMET alumni. 
Table 5. shows the results of the analysis of the relationship between U.S. IMET graduates` 
leadership and their subordinate soldiers` attitudes towards the three investigated norms. 
 The results demonstrate that those non-U.S. IMET graduates who has been led and 
trained by U.S. IMET graduates indeed have more respect for both democratic values and 
human rights across all models. They also show a reduced probability of supporting the 
military`s intervention into domestic policy making when compared to those who have never 
been commanded by U.S. IMET alumni. Although the relationship demonstrated by the 
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models is exactly what the previous U.S. IMET literature suggests, these results are not 
statistically significant, which suggests that further investigation is needed to provide stronger 
evidence for norm diffusion. 
 At the same time in-depth interview respondents once again seem to provide some 
potential evidence in support of norm diffusion. All 14 respondents reported that they feel 
that they have been able to share what they learned with their fellow Hungarian soldiers. 
However, it is also clear that rank played a crucial role in the U.S. IMET graduates` ability to 
diffuse the learned skills among other soldiers. 
Table 5. Norm Diffusion Within National Militaries  
 (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
VARIABLES Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military 
Interv.#1 
Democratic 
Values 
Human 
Rights 
Military 
Interv.#2 
U.S. IMET_C2 0.578 0.579 -0.485 0.192 0.648 -0.416 
 (0.580) (0.539) (0.468) (0.623) (0.575) (0.504) 
Rank    0.468 1.074*** 0.250 
    (0.401) (0.370) (0.324) 
Age    0.161 -0.0150 0.117 
    (0.319) (0.294) (0.258) 
Gender    -0.337 -0.0605 0.795* 
    (0.518) (0.478) (0.419) 
Education    -0.567 -0.866** -0.410 
    (0.455) (0.420) (0.368) 
Language    0.446 0.319 0.654* 
    (0.451) (0.416) (0.364) 
Dur_service    -0.278 0.110 0.0623 
    (0.335) (0.309) (0.271) 
Deployment    1.017** 0.192 -0.268 
    (0.469) (0.432) (0.379) 
Non-US training    -0.141 0.311 0.259 
    (0.396) (0.365) (0.320) 
Constant 5.583*** 6.125*** 3.958*** 5.113*** 4.720*** 2.664*** 
 (0.546) (0.507) (0.440) (1.258) (1.160) (1.017) 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.056 0.070 0.050 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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While higher ranking officers report that they feel they were very effective in sharing U.S. 
norms and values by including them into Hungarian manuals and training requirements, 
lower ranking soldiers seem to feel less confident in their ability to share the learned tactics, 
techniques and procedures with their peers. For example while Respondent#2 reports that “I 
managed to include the learned values and norms into our leader seminars, training manuals 
and exercises,” Respondent#8 suggests that “I talked with my immediate subordinates about 
what I learned during my U.S. IMET course, but still looking for the means to share it with 
more soldiers.” 
 To further investigate whether the professional norms of the U.S. military diffuse into 
the national militaries of the U.S. IMET graduates I assess the U.S. IMET participants` ability 
to positively influence individuals` professional improvement, organizational change within 
their military establishment and doctrinal improvement compared to those who never 
participated in the U.S. IMET programs. I propose that if U.S. IMET graduates demonstrate 
higher abilities in these categories than it would provide a strong support for relationships 
presented in Table 6 and through that for norm diffusion. 
 The results in Table 7. demonstrate the expected relationships. U.S. IMET 
participation significantly improves the individuals ability to influence other soldiers` 
individual professional qualities, implement doctrinal changes and contribute to positive 
organizational changes. The findings of the norm diffusion analysis provide support to those 
prior studies that argued beyond U.S. IMET`s positive effects on the participating individuals 
and suggested that these programs also positively affect the recipient countries` military as a 
whole. The results demonstrate that the professional norms and values of the U.S. military are 
not only transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants but through them they diffuse and 
positively affect the entire national military organizations as well. 
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Limitations and Potential Criticism of the Study 
I foresee a number of potential criticisms regarding my study both from a theoretical and 
methodological point of view. First, the study might be criticized for its limited scope and 
focus on a single case study. Although Hungary is indeed only one case it is a valuable one 
for the purposes of this investigation due to all of those theoretical and practical conditions 
that I discuss in the research design section. Since this study is one of the first attempts to 
conduct a deep investigation into the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs the 
primary aim is rather the identification and testing of potential mechanisms than strong 
external validity.   
Table 6. U.S. IMET Graduates` Effects on Individuals, Doctrine and Organization  
 (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
VARIABLES Individuals Doctrine Organization Individuals  Doctrine  Organization  
U.S. IMET 0.912*** 2.510*** 2.364*** 0.465** 2.073*** 1.906*** 
 (0.206) (0.251) (0.246) (0.215) (0.271) (0.264) 
Rank    0.542** 0.496* 0.107 
    (0.213) (0.268) (0.262) 
Age    0.104 0.560*** 0.693*** 
    (0.169) (0.213) (0.208) 
Gender    -0.459* -0.312 0.295 
    (0.259) (0.325) (0.317) 
Edu    -0.428* -0.221 0.386 
    (0.238) (0.300) (0.292) 
Language    0.529** 0.358 0.136 
    (0.251) (0.315) (0.307) 
Dur_service    -0.211 0.0187 -0.309 
    (0.174) (0.218) (0.213) 
Deployment    1.029*** 0.182 0.0648 
    (0.243) (0.305) (0.298) 
Non-US train.    0.517** 0.296 0.566** 
    (0.216) (0.271) (0.265) 
Constant 6.867*** 3.476*** 3.471*** 5.054*** 0.440 0.446 
 (0.130) (0.159) (0.156) (0.637) (0.801) (0.782) 
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 
R-squared 0.053 0.223 0.210 0.192 0.292 0.286 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Since this study is one of the first attempts to conduct a deep investigation into the individual 
level effects of the U.S. IMET programs the primary aim is rather the identification and 
testing of potential mechanisms than strong external validity.   
Second, due to the fact that the subjects of my study are military personnel critiques 
might suggest potential inferential issues regarding my survey. I address this potential 
criticism through several measures. First, since military professionals usually tend to do their 
best to please authority, whether it is formal command or academic authority I had to avoid 
potential measurement error due to such social desirability bias. To mitigate this potential 
issue during the introduction to the survey goals I highlighted the fact that the survey is 
anonymous without any chance of identification of the respondents and explained how 
important it is to answer the questions truthfully. Then I asked the participants whether they 
understood what I said, and would they answer all questions truthfully. I also made sure that 
the respondents sat in an order preventing them to see the answers of their peers. 
Additionally, the survey was conducted in an environment in which immediate superiors and 
higher-ranking individuals were either not present or could not see which essay belonged to 
which respondent. Furthermore, to avoid any additional inferential issues like processing 
error, I personally coded the results of the survey and input the data into the dataset. 
Additionally, since the survey was conducted with professional military respondents the 
chances of coverage errors (neither erroneous inclusion nor exclusion) were assessed as 
minimal. 
 The next criticism of this study might suggest that the results of my analysis are being 
driven by the fact that Hungarian military personnel who are being selected for U.S. IMET 
participation already has an increased respect for democratic values, human rights and civil 
supremacy over the military and these factors driving their selection into this program. 
Although it is a valid concern it does not seem to be the case for several reasons. First, I 
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corrected for this potential bias via matching. Second, the Hungarian military does not collect 
data about its members` attitudes towards those three norms. Superiors who nominate their 
subordinates to U.S. IMET participation does not know about their level of respect towards 
democratic values, human rights, and civil control. Furthermore, the selection of the 
nominated individuals is a multilevel process that includes at least two Hungarian higher 
command and the U.S. ODC before the participant is cleared to participate in any U.S. IMET 
program. During my years of service I personally attended three U.S. IMET events and went 
through the selection process three times. Later I was responsible for three years for 
reviewing the nominated Special Forces soldiers` applications and select them for U.S. IMET 
participation. During all these years I never experienced that individual attitudes toward those 
three values played any role in the selection of U.S. IMET participant.  
 Another potential criticism relates to the role of the U.S. ODC in the selection process 
of U.S. IMET participants. The U.S. ODC in Budapest informed me that it has never tried to 
influence the selection process of Hungarian participants. The U.S. ODC does not require and 
does not have any information about the nominated individuals` attitudes towards the three 
norms in question and the approval of U.S. IMET participation has never been subject to 
these norms. Additionally, during Hungary`s almost 30 years history in the U.S. IMET 
program and out of its roughly 3,000 U.S. IMET graduates, the U.S. ODC requested only 
three times that the Hungarian nominees be replaced by other soldiers. These replacements 
were requested because the nominees professional background (and expected future career 
path) and the training event they were selected for showed no justifiable connections.27  
 Finally, some might argue that the research design overlooks some important 
variables that correlates with the selection of the Hungarian military personnel to participate 
 
27 One example for such replacement request was when a fighter jet pilot was nominated to attend the U.S. 
Army`s armored reconnaissance course. Source: ODC representative.  
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in the U.S. IMET programs. This seems to be a valid concern especially because instead of 
their attitudes towards democratic values, human rights and civil control Hungarian soldiers 
are being selected to U.S. IMET participation based on two conditions: English language 
skills and physical requirements. It is indeed a valid concern that these variables might 
correlate with socioeconomic variables that this study does not account for. For example, one 
might argue that it is possible that individuals who are coming from wealthier families are 
more likely to speak English or be physically fit than those who are coming from less wealthy 
background. Although such criticism seems to be fair it does not seem to effect U.S. IMET 
selection for several reasons. First, individuals are not required to know English before they 
join the Hungarian military and they are provided with multiple opportunities to learn English 
throughout their career. Officers learn English in military college and cannot receive their 
commission before securing an intermediate level language certificate. For NCOs annual 
English courses are being run in every military base to provide equal learning opportunity to 
all members of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Finally, similar to the U.S. military`s Military 
Occupational Specialty (hereafter, MOS) code each position in the Hungarian military is 
associated with a unique code that includes specific language and physical requirements 
which everybody who fills the given position must meet regardless of the soldiers 
background. These “MOS” requirements are at least equal or in most cases higher than the 
requirements associated with eligibility for U.S. IMET participation meaning that everyone 
who is an active member of the Hungarian military should meet these requirements. 
Conclusion 
Although international relations literature has extensively explored the potential effects of 
U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer it mostly overlooked the effects 
of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training programs. The 
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limited number of studies that have assessed the effects of the U.S. IMET programs mostly 
focus on country level outcomes and use the same dataset (Ruby and Gibler, 2010) where the 
key explanatory variables are simply the number of U.S. IMET participants per year and the 
annual cost of the U.S. IMET programs per country. These studies assume that the U.S. 
military`s professional norms are transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants, but neither 
present a strong theory explaining how this transmission happens nor offer empirical 
evidence in support of the norms transmission assumption. Furthermore, although those 
studies that investigate the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs make some 
significant contributions to improve our understanding of the relationship between U.S. 
IMET participation and individual attitudes towards democratic values and human rights due 
to some research design issues and methodological limitations they leave some room for 
expansion and improvement. This study intended to address some of these issues and 
contributes to the research program of U.S. military aid in several ways. 
First, it presents a novel dataset that contains individual level variables regarding U.S. 
IMET participation and with that enables other researchers to explore research questions that 
have been either overlooked in the literature or have not been studied due to lack of data. 
 Second, with the proposed theoretical framework and the findings of the statistical 
models this study provides support to prior literature both in case of international norms 
transmission and U.S. IMET specific studies. Furthermore, this analysis provides evidence in 
support of  prior assumptions and strengthens the findings of several prior studies (Reynolds 
2001; Atkinson 2010, 2015; Jungdahl and Lambert 2012).  
 Beyond its contributions to the research agenda the study has significant policy 
implications as well. Although the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act clearly defines the goals of the U.S. IMET program there are no measures of 
effectiveness in place to provide objective feedback about the actual effects of these 
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programs to policy makers. The timeliness of this issue is clearly demonstrated in the fact that 
the 2017 National Defense Authorization Acts once again codifies the requirement to 
establish a functioning evaluation mechanism for the investigation of the effects of the U.S. 
security assistance programs. This study provide feedback directly for this requirement and 
proposes that the U.S. IMET programs indeed meet the goals established by Congress and 
with that effectively support the achievement of U.S. national security and foreign policy 
goals.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SMARTER THE SOLDIERS, THE LONGER 
THE CIVIL WARS – U.S. IMET PARTICIPATION AND CIVIL 
CONFLICT DURATION 
Abstract 
Why does civil conflicts` duration varies so widely? While some conflicts last for years 
others end in just days. Several studies have argued that foreign military aid provided to the 
incumbent governments plays a crucial role in civil conflict duration but always 
operationalized this military aid in the form of weapons and equipment transfers. In this 
paper I explore how a different type of military aid  - U.S. IMET programs - affects the 
duration of civil conflicts. I theorize that participation in U.S. IMET programs improves the 
military human capital of the government forces. This improved military human capital 
makes the overall military more capable and effective which incentivizes rebels to disperse, 
hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this 
argument, I use a new dataset that includes detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. 
IMET participation between 1976 and 2003. The results show that militaries with more U.S. 
IMET participation fights significantly longer civil conflicts. I also find that more U.S. IMET 
participation corresponds with a higher probability of civil conflicts being fought in an 
irregular manner. 
Introduction 
Although there were 50 active armed conflicts around the world as of 2015 only one was 
fought between states (India and Pakistan). The other 49 were intrastate civil conflicts that 
resulted in about 97,000 battle related deaths annually (Melander et al., 2016). Additionally, 
40% of these conflicts were internationalized meaning that at least one of the combatants of 
these civil conflicts were supported by external states (Melander et al., 2016). These facts 
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suggest that civil wars are the dominant form of conflict of our days and external state 
support plays a key role in shaping the characteristics of these conflicts. One of these 
characteristics that have demonstrated a remarkable variation throughout the history of civil 
conflicts is their duration. While the Yemeni government defeated the rebels in 1994 in about 
two months and Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi`s forces were crushed by the insurgents 
in just eight months in 2011 insurgencies in Sri Lanka and Colombia lasted for decades. In 
addition to this dramatic variation in the duration of civil conflicts the fact that the U.S. has 
provided military assistance to over 140 governments since 1945 and it also has been 
involved in its history`s longest war in Afghanistan create a strong incentive for better 
understanding the relationship between U.S. military aid and civil conflict duration.  
Prior studies argue that the variance in civil conflict duration can be explained by 
factors that include regime type, government and rebel military capabilities, rough terrain, 
availability of natural resources, the difference in the belligerents` strategies and external 
support to the different sides (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; 
Cunningham 2006; Buhaug et al. 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012, Caverley and Sechser 
2017). This paper contributes to this literature by further exploring how external support, 
more specifically U.S. military assistance to the incumbent government affects the duration 
of civil conflicts.  
Previous studies (Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Caverley 
and Sechser, 2017) assessing the effects of U.S. military assistance only focused on aid in the 
form of arms and equipment transfers while completely ignored the potential effects of the 
less tangible form of U.S. military aid the International Military Education and Training 
programs (hereafter, U.S. IMET). The primary goal of these programs is to improve the 
recipient states` military human capital and through these better trained and more capable 
military professionals improve the military capabilities of the incumbent governments. 
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Although the U.S. spends close to a billion dollars on these programs annually and trains over 
70,000 foreign military personnel from more than 150 countries every year (Savage and 
Caverley 2017), whether these programs meet their fundamental goals have not been 
explored effectively in international relations literature. While scholars seem to have 
developed a good understanding of how U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment 
transfer affects the characteristics of civil conflicts the same cannot be said about the 
potential effects of the U.S. IMET programs. 
Can better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation be associated with 
swift conflict resolution or does it prolong the civil conflict? I argue that better military 
human capital due to U.S. IMET participation increases incumbent government’s military 
capability and effectiveness, and with that it prolongs the civil conflict. Building on Hendrix 
and Young (2014) I theorize that improved military capability increases the cost of direct 
engagement for the rebels and incentivizes them to disperse and hide making it extremely 
difficult for the government forces to deliver a fatal blow to the rebellion and end the civil 
conflict. Additionally, improved military capability forces the rebels to switch their tactics 
from open military engagements to low level terrorist activities (Hendrix and Young, 2014) 
which also prolongs the duration of the conflicts. Based on this argument I propose that the 
availability of better human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is associated with longer 
civil conflicts.  
To test my theory I employ a merged dataset (Caverley and Sechser 2017; Savage and 
Caverley 2017) containing detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation 
between 1976 and 2003. The results of the analysis demonstrate that improved military 
human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is correlated with longer civil conflicts and 
when this variable is included into the investigation then all the hardware-based military 
capability variables used in previous studies lose significance. Additionally, my analysis also 
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demonstrates that more U.S. IMET participation corresponds with higher probability of civil 
conflicts being fought in an irregular manner. 
These findings suggest that the availability of quality military human capital due to 
U.S. IMET participation might be more important factor than other tangible military 
capabilities in explaining the variation in civil conflict duration and the type of civil conflicts. 
 The paper proceeds in seven parts. It starts with a critical overview of previous 
literature on the duration civil conflicts. Next, the analysis reviews the previous 
measurements of military capability and introduces military human capital as an alternative to 
prior concepts. Then the paper discusses the relationship between U.S. IMET participation 
and military human capital. Next, I present my theory which is followed by the introduction 
of the research design, the data sources, and the empirical strategy. Then, the analysis 
presents the empirical results from a series of event-history models and logistic regressions 
and discusses the main findings. Next, I illustrate my argument through a case study. Finally, 
I offer a summary of my contributions and discuss the potential implications. 
Previous Research on Civil War Duration 
The growing literature that seeks to explore the factors influencing the duration of civil 
conflicts can be organized into four groups. The first group consists of those studies that 
theorize that civil war duration is affected by the rebels` abilities to evade government forces 
and sustain their operations. This literature includes rebel external support, rebel military 
capabilities and rebel strategy as critical factors that affect how long civil wars last. DeRouen 
and Sobek (2004) and Cunningham (2010) find that external support received by the rebels 
enable them to prolong civil wars. Fearon (2004) and Lujala (2010) argue along similar lines 
when they suggest that rebel access to primary commodities or natural resources result in 
longer civil conflicts. On the other hand, these findings are challenged by Humphreys (2005) 
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who finds that the availability of natural resources is associated with shorter civil conflicts. 
Other studies argue that rebel military capabilities (Cunningham et al., 2009; Hultquist, 2013) 
and guerilla strategies (Balcells and Kalyvas 2012) are also associated with longer civil war 
duration. Rebels` capacity to sustain their operations often measured through the availability 
of rough terrain. Bleaney and Dimico (2011) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) argue that 
rebels` access to rough terrain enables them to better hide from the government forces and 
prolong the conflicts while Rustad et al. (2008) finds opposite association. 
 The second group of studies seems to focus on the role of information problems. 
Fearon (1995) and Walter (2009) argue civil wars many times happen due to the participants 
inability to agree on their relative power or resolve and as Walter (2009) suggests the lack of 
information about each other’s` power and resolve is especially acute during the initial phases 
of civil conflicts. Referring to Cunningham (2006); Nilsson (2008); Pearlman and 
Cunningham (2012); Caverley and Sechser (2017) argue that “the existence of multiple 
factions and outside actors can exacerbate the problem, making information about combatants 
difficult to obtain and quickly obsolete” (Caverley and Sechser, 2017: 705). The difficulty of 
information gathering in such a complex situation prevents government forces to resolve the 
conflict quickly leading to prolonged civil wars. 
The next group of relevant literature contains those studies that explore how 
commitment problems affect the duration of civil conflicts. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Weingast 
(1999), and Walter (2002) argue that when the combatants cannot commit to uphold the 
agreements it becomes very difficult to end civil wars without one side`s decisive victory. 
Additionally, Fearon (2004) argues that combatants will not be able to reach any settlements 
if the rebels expect the government forces to become stronger in the future and eventually 
abandon the peace deal. Some other scholars also suggest that the commitment problem is 
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stronger in ethnically diverse societies leading to longer civil wars (Collier et al. 2004; 
Kirschner 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). 
 The last group of studies consists of those works that are focusing on the role of state 
capacity. This literature includes such factors as regime type and incumbent government`s 
military capacity as potential explanatory variables of the variation in civil conflict duration. 
Derouen and Sobek (2004) argue that autocratic regimes fight shorter civil conflicts due to 
their willingness to destroy the rebels quickly and fully. Caverley (2010) argues that 
democracies are less likely to fight long and costly civil wars due to their lower tolerance 
level for casualties. As a challenge to these arguments Fearon (2004) finds that regime type 
does not have significant effect on the duration of civil conflicts. Mason et al. (1999) argue 
that stronger state military capacity increases the duration of the civil conflicts while 
decreasing the chance of rebel victory. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and Hendrix and Young 
(2014) argue along the same lines since both find that larger military capacity prolongs the 
civil conflict however it does not necessarily increase the likelihood of government success. 
Lyall and Wilson (2009), and Lyall (2010) offer another explanation and argue that more 
mechanized government military forces lead to longer civil conflicts because they are ill-
equipped to fight unconventional wars. As one can see all these studies find that stronger 
military capacity is associated with longer civil conflict. Caverley and Sechser (2017) while 
provide further evidence to these arguments also make further contributions to the discussion 
by introducing the “combined arms” strategy as a new variable. They operationalize this 
concept as an interaction term between the land mechanization and air mechanization 
variables of the prior studies and find that the combined arms strategy is associated with 
faster conflict resolution leading to shorter civil wars. 
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Measures of State Military Capacity in Previous Literature  
In the civil war literature states` military capacity seems to be mostly measured through 
indicators that capture capacity to wage conventional rather than civil wars (Hendrix, 2010; 
Kocher, 2010). Mason et al. (1999) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) operationalize their 
military capacity variable as the number of soldiers in the military. Hendrix and Young`s 
(2014) military capacity variable is an index that was derived from the number of military 
personnel, the annual military expenditure, and the military expenditures per soldier of the 
given governments. Lyall and Wilson (2009) and Lyall (2010) measure military capacity as 
the level of mechanization of the government`s military forces. This variable is a scaled index 
showing the conflict onset soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio. The variable has four values 
from 1 to 4. It is coded 1 if the soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio is larger than 834 soldiers 
per vehicle. The variable assumes the value 2 if the ratio is between 288 and 833 soldiers per 
vehicle. It is coded 3 if there the ration is between 109 and 287 soldiers per vehicle, and 4 if 
the number of soldiers is between 11 and 108 per vehicle. Similarly, Sechser and Saunders 
also (2010) develop a hardware-based variable they call the National Mechanization Index 
which draws data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 
series of publications (1968–2004). The value of the variable is based on the number of 
armored vehicles per one hundred soldiers. Caverley and Sechser (2017) further develops the 
mechanization-based approach. First, they separate the ground and air mechanization 
measure. They calculate the former by “dividing an army’s number of motorized vehicles by 
the number of ground soldiers and then calculating the natural logarithm of the resulting 
figure” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710) while the latter “represents the natural logarithm of 
a country`s ratio of combat aircraft to soldier” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). The 
combined arms variable is an interaction term of the ground and air mechanization measures.  
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 Although frequently used these variables do not seem to provide an effective measure 
for incumbent government’s military capability. The way they are calculated seems to leave 
more questions open that they actually answer. I argue that measuring state military capacity 
through these indexes is a faulty approach for at least three reasons. First, the number of 
actual vehicles does not necessarily reflect the realistically available hardware. In many cases 
a large portion of the military vehicles and air platforms are not operational meaning that they 
cannot be part of a combined arms strategy since they cannot leave the barracks. 
Additionally, some small and poor countries maintain a large amount of 30 and 40-year-old 
equipment while others have small number of highly modern vehicles. It seems that in these 
indexes only the number of the mechanized vehicles determine the incumbent government’s 
military capability and the quality of these vehicles are completely ignored.  
 Second, the indexes used in the material-based literature are calculated onset of civil 
conflicts and do not account for the changes in the vehicle-soldier ratio as the civil conflict 
progresses. For example, during long civil wars governments might lose many vehicles and 
aircrafts without the ability to replace them which causes that they might go from a heavily 
mechanized military at the beginning of the conflict to a much less mechanized military at the 
end of the conflict. The contrary also can happen. A government acquires a lot of new 
vehicles and aircrafts during the war which changes its forces early low mechanization index 
into a high index towards the end of the conflict.  
 Lastly, the fact that a military relies on and possesses a lot of hardware does not mean 
that it can use those capabilities effectively. A good example for this is the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War where the attacking Arab forces had ten times as many troops, eight times as many tanks 
and ten times as many artillery pieces than the Israelis their offensive still ended up as a 
complete failure (Pollack, 2004) This case clearly demonstrates the potential weakness of 
using hardware-based measures for military capability. To offer a potential remedy for these 
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issues and to explore the phenomena from a completely new angle I introduce a new measure 
for incumbent government’s military capability in the form of military human capital. 
Improved Military Human Capital due to U.S. IMET Participation 
Biddle (2004) argues that military capacity depends not only on the tangible hardware 
capabilities of the military but also on other less tangible factors. One of these potential 
factors is the quality of the military`s human capital. Biddle and Zirkle (1996) argue that the 
quality of the military`s human capital is a key factor in how capable the military forces are. 
According to their argument the military forces that have limited access to quality personnel 
will be less capable to operate complex weapon systems and implement sophisticated tactics, 
techniques, and procedures than those militaries that have quality human capital. Toronto 
(2018) finds that the lack of quality military human capital prevents success in modern 
combat. He argues that neither sophisticated weapons nor the availability of resources 
matters if militaries cannot take the initiative, innovate, and exploit opportunities as 
they present themselves. Additionally, Biddle and Long (2004) argue that “troops with no 
meaningful formal education will find it harder to draft or carry out instructions for moving 
thousands of soldiers over multiple routes to converge on a distant point at the same moment” 
(Biddle and Long 2004: 531). They conclude that one can see stronger military performance 
from those militaries that have access to better human capital through effective formal 
education. 
Building on these arguments and the works of economist Gary S. Becker I argue that 
one of the most important investment a military organization can do to improve its 
performance is to invest into its “workforce.” As Becker (1994) suggests in his seminal work 
Human Capital, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education 
although the investment into the human capital can take multiple forms the best way is formal 
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education and training. Capitalizing on Becker (1994)  and Biddle and Long`s (2004) 
findings I argue that the best way to improve the military`s human capital is through 
participation in formal education and training. Furthermore, I suggest that one of the best 
ways to obtain such formal quality education and training for military personnel is through 
participation in U.S. IMET programs. 
The U.S. Congress established the general framework of foreign military education 
and training in 1961 when it passed the Foreign Assistance Act. The primary goal of these 
programs is to develop the military human capital of foreign military forces. As Savage and 
Caverley (2017) argue U.S. foreign military education and training is foreign aid “in a very 
specific form: an increase in the military`s human capital” (Savage and Caverley, 545).  
Savage and Caverley (2017) also suggest that U.S. military has accumulated such 
experience and knowledge in counterinsurgency operations that are not available in any other 
training and education programs and sharing such knowledge significantly increases the 
military skills of the U.S. IMET participants especially in case of fighting against insurgents. 
Additionally, the U.S. IMET programs provide a unique framework for military human 
capital development that cannot be compared to any other similar programs in other 
countries. These U.S. programs are unique not only because of the U.S. military`s decades of 
war experience but the size of the U.S. training infrastructure, the presence of an experienced 
and combat focused training cadre, and the budget available28 for education and training 
purposes (Savage and Caverley, 2017). 
Huntington (2006) and Barany (2012) argue that the norm most likely to be 
transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign officers and non-
commissioned officers is the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity. 
 
28 According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the annual training budget of the U.S. military is bigger than entire 
defense budget of 117 countries. 
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Furthermore, Savage and Caverley (2017) suggest that trainees returning home with higher 
levels of military skills and professionalism and suggest that these training programs improve 
“the competence of the trainees within the military and consequently the larger military 
within the government” (Savage and Caverley, 2017: 545).  Lefever (1976), Taw (1984), and 
Ruby and Gibler (2010) argue that the improvement of the capability of the military as a 
whole is due to the facts that the U.S. IMET programs graduates usually become either 
instructors in their national military training systems (Ruby and Gibler, 2010) or influential 
leaders who have the ability to implement changes in their militaries in accordance to the 
learned skills (Lefever, 1976). The authors also find that U.S. IMET programs graduates stay 
long enough in the military service to effectively share the skills they learned in the U.S. 
IMET programs with their peers (Taw, 1984; Ruby and Gibler, 2010). Based on these 
arguments I theorize that through the participation in the U.S. IMET programs the quality of 
the recipient countries` military  human capital increases because foreign military personnel 
obtain such skills, knowledge and experience that fundamentally improves their  professional 
competence.  
Improved Military Human Capital and Civil Conflict Duration 
Fearon (1995) and Walter (2009) argue that wars occur due to bargaining failure between two 
sides. According to these authors bargaining often fails because the two sides cannot agree 
about the balance of power. This disagreement is due to the fact that determining the balance 
of power between the two sides is difficult without fighting. The power of the different sides 
consists of material factors such as tanks, airplanes, artillery and troops; and also less tangible 
factors such as strategy, troop discipline and level of training and education (Caverley and 
Sechser 2017). While in civil conflicts both the government and the rebels are well aware of 
their own capabilities they mostly lack a clear understanding of the other side`s abilities. 
 76 
While gaining information about the other side`s material capabilities is quite easy due to 
these factors observable nature understanding the intangible factors takes much more time 
and only happens through actual engagements between the two sides.  
I argue that U.S. IMET participation improves the quality of the military human 
capital of the incumbent government`s forces. The better training and education materialize 
in better planned, supported, organized, and more effectively executed military operations 
over time. While at the beginning of the civil conflicts the rebels might choose to fight the 
incumbent government`s forces in open engagements this changes over time due to the 
realization of the changing quality of the government forces. Rebels realize that challenging 
the government`s military forces directly is becoming more costly than other, lower scale 
operations. This increased cost of direct engagement and the rebels` need to keep the 
rebellion alive incentivize them to disperse and hide from government forces. (Hendrix and 
Young, 2014). Additionally, the increased cost of direct engagement forces the rebels to 
switch their tactics from guerrilla warfare to low level terrorist activities (Hendrix and 
Young, 2014) and deters them from making any direct attempts at the capital or political 
centers (Bapat, 2011). Additionally, due to its improved military capability the incumbent 
government loses its incentives to agree to any settlement and sees an opportunity to fully 
destroy the rebellion. I argue that these conditions together lead to prolonged civil conflicts. 
Following this logic I propose my first hypothesis as:  
H1: In comparison of incumbent governments, those whose military has access to 
more U.S. IMET participation will fight longer civil conflicts.  
 
 Additionally, if the logic of the above argument holds then the level of U.S. IMET 
participation must also affect the type of civil wars the incumbent government is involved in. 
According to the theory presented above more U.S. IMET participation improves the military 
effectiveness of the incumbent government`s military forces, which incentivizes rebels to 
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switch their tactics, techniques, and procedures to irregular military methods. Based on this 
argument I propose that more U.S. IMET participation correlates with a higher probability of 
recipient government fighting an irregular war. This argument leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: In comparison of incumbent governments, those whose military has access to 
more U.S. IMET participation are more likely to fight irregular civil wars.  
Data Sources and Variables  
I employ the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) 
Armed Conflicts Dataset, v. 3–3005 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) in which conflict-year is the unit 
of analysis and merge it with Savage and Caverley (2017) U.S. Foreign Military Training and 
Coup dataset. The dataset includes detailed information about 147 insurgencies that happened 
between 1976 and 2003.  
My first dependent variable is civil conflict duration that is measured in days. UCDP 
data uses the twenty-five deaths per year rule to include a conflict in the dataset. The value of 
the dependent variable ranges from one day to 9,380 days. The mean value of the duration 
variable is 1,710 days. My second dependent variable is conflict termination. This variable is 
a binary variable and coded 1 if the civil conflict is terminated and 0 if it is still ongoing. The 
third dependent variable is type of civil war. This variable is a binary measure coded 0 if the 
civil conflict was fought in a conventional manner and 1 if the conflict was an irregular war. 
To operationalize human capital through participation in U.S. IMET programs I 
selected data from Savage and Caverley (2017) U.S. Foreign Military Training and Coup 
dataset. The IMET programs were established by the U.S. Congress in 1976 by passing the 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (Savage and Caverley, 2017). 
IMET has been overseen by the Department of State while some sub-elements are 
administered by the Department of Defense (Atkinson, 2010). Today the U.S.IMET programs 
provide education and training for foreign personnel in around 4,000 different courses both 
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within the United States and overseas while it only accounts for about 0.2 percent of the 
budget of the State Department annually. I specifically selected the U.S. IMET programs as 
my independent variable since as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue this program “is the 
most transparent and receives the largest amount of scrutiny” (Savage and Caverley, 
2017:548) meaning that they present the strongest test to my theory. I also chose the U.S. 
IMET program because although it contains several hands-on technical training events the 
majority of U.S. IMET programs belong to the so-called professional military education 
(hereafter PME) programs that are uniquely designed to improve organizational, operational 
planning, management and leadership skills of the participants. 
Based on these characteristics I suggest that if I find any relationship in case of the 
U.S. IMET program then it is likely that the same correspondence exists for the U.S. foreign 
military education and training programs as a whole as well. To ensure the robustness of my 
findings I operationalize my first independent variable in two different ways. First, since 
increasing a country`s military capacity through the improvement of its human capital takes 
time I utilize the logged five-year sum of IMET students as one version of my first 
explanatory variable. Second, because the IMET programs differ in duration and in the 
program of instructions it is unlikely that participants receive the same type and amount of 
education and training. For this reason, as an alternative measurement for human capital 
improvement I also operationalize my independent variable as the logged sum of 5-year total 
IMET spending.  
Control Variables 
According to Fearon (2004) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) there is no clear  agreement in 
the civil conflict literature on which control variables should be used in formal models. I 
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derive my control variables directly from relevant literature. Overall I employ 18 control 
variables to assess the most widely cited alternative explanations.  
 First, to isolate the independent effects of the U.S. IMET programs from hardware-
based U.S. military assistance efforts I employ a control viable for U.S. military aid other 
than IMET. This variable measures the amount of U.S. military aid as a percentage of the 
recipient country`s GDP (Savage and Caverley 2017). 
 Next, I employ Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) ground and air mechanization variables 
to assess the effects of the hardware-based approach in comparison to the human capital-
based approach. They calculate the values of the former variable by “dividing an army’s 
number of motorized vehicles by the number of ground soldiers and then calculating the 
natural logarithm of the resulting figure” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). The air 
mechanization variable “represents the natural logarithm of a country`s ratio of combat 
aircraft to soldier” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). I also use their combined arms variable 
to control for the effects of combined arms doctrine.  
Furthermore, I use several operationalizations of a conflict’s geographic proximity to 
the state`s capital. I employ a variable based on Buhaug and Gates (2002) to account for the 
distance between the capital and the conflict zone, another one denoting whether the civil 
conflict is being fought along international borders (Buhaug et al. 2009) and one that is the 
interaction term between these two. Furthermore, using data from Cunningham et al. (2009) I 
control for rebel fighting capacity and relative rebel strength. I also included a variable to 
account for the availability of lootable resources29 in the conflict area (Lujala et al. 2007; 
Lujala 2009; Gilmore et al. 2005). Following Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Buhaug et al.`s 
(2009) arguments I control for rough physical terrain. This variable is binary and coded 1 if 
 
29 Lootable resources include diamonds and gemstones, illicit drugs, and petroleum deposits. 
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the area where the conflict is fought covered by either 60 percent forest or 60 percent 
mountains. Next, to account for the potential effects of regime type I employ the Scalar Index 
of Polities (Gates et al. 2006). The variable measures regime type on a scale from 0 to 1. 
Furthermore, based on the argument of Fearon (2004), and Balcells and Kalyvas (2012) I 
control for the potential effects of economic factors though the inclusion of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita. I also account for the potential effects of external 
assistance for both the government and the rebels (Cunningham et al. 2009). Lastly, I also 
include binary variables to account for Fearon`s (2004) “sons of the soil” civil conflicts, 
assess the potential effects of the post-Cold War era and to explore how types of civil 
conflicts such as insurgency and irregular conflicts affect their duration (Lyall and Wilson 
2009). The summary statistics of the variables are being presented in Appendix K. 
Estimation Techniques  
First, in order to assess the effects of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration I 
employ two statistical methods. I use Weibull accelerated failure time regressions and then I 
employ several logistic regressions with timedependence controls. These approaches have 
been frequently used to assess civil conflicts` duration.  While the Weibull technique is 
employed by Fearon (2004); Gates and Buhaug et al. (2009); Balcells and Kalyvas (2012); 
and Caverley and Sechser (2017)  logistic regression models are used by Derouen and Sobek 
(2004); Cunningham (2006); and Caverley and Sechser (2017). Due to the fact that states can 
be involved in more than one civil conflict at the same time I estimate all my logistic 
regression models with robust standard errors clustered on country.  
Finally, since the types of civil war dependent variable is binary I employ simple 
logistic regression models to estimate the effects of U.S. IMET participation on this variable. 
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Results and Discussion 
Table 7. includes the results of my twelve Weibull accelerated failure time regressions 
models that estimate the effect of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration.  
In the models shown in Table 7. I use the actual number of U.S. IMET participants as my 
independent variable. The results can be interpreted simply as variables with positive 
coefficients are associated with longer civil conflicts while those that have negative 
coefficients are associated with shorter duration.  
 Model 1 contains only the measures of U.S. IMET participation (the actual numbers 
of U.S. IMET participants per country per year) and demonstrates that there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between U.S. IMET participation and civil conflict duration.  
One unit increase in the number of U.S. IMET participants increases the duration of civil 
conflicts with .0794 days, on average. In order to isolate the effects of U.S. IMET 
participation from other forms of U.S. military assistance efforts Model 2 includes only the 
variable that accounts for the other types of U.S. military aid. The model shows that although 
other types of U.S. military aid seems to reduce the duration of civil conflict the result is not 
significant. In model 3 I include both the U.S. IMET participation variables and the other 
types of U.S. military aid variable. This model shows the same relationships as the first two 
models.  
 In the next 9 models I follow Caverley and Secher (2017) methodology and gradually 
incorporate different sets of controls based on prior civil conflict duration literature. In Model 
12 I include all controls to estimate the effects of U.S. IMET participation while controlling 
for all prior explanations. When I introduce the different control variables the theorized 
relationship between U.S. IMET participation and civil conflict duration remains the same 
across all models which provides strong support to Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 7. Accelerated failure time hazard analysis of the duration of civil conflicts, 1976-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES U.S. IMET Other U.S. Aid Total U.S. Aid Armor Geography Fighting Capacity 
U.S. IMET 0.0794**  0.120*** 0.102** 0.0938** 0.0971** 
  (0.0404)  (0.0441) (0.0437) (0.0408) (0.0468) 
Other Aid  -1.289 -1.131 -1.468 -1.336 -1.865 
   (1.055) (0.969) (2.074) (2.152) (1.698) 
Ground Mech.        0.626 0.866 0.701 
       (0.827) (0.790) (0.740) 
Air Mech.       0.494 0.608 0.639 
       (0.940) (0.914) (0.873) 
Combined Arm       -0.132 -0.157 -0.147 
       (0.138) (0.136) (0.127) 
Distance to Capital         0.474***   
         (0.165)   
Conflict at Border         0.977**   
         (0.423)   
Border X Distance         -0.463*   
         (0.241)   
Rebel Fighting Cap.           -0.0254 
           (0.584) 
Rebel Strength           -0.569 
           (0.915) 
Constant 7.364*** 7.543*** 7.156*** 4.831 0.0687 4.410 
  (0.171) ((0.249) (0.235) (5.475) (5.220) (4.999) 
Observations 940 800 760 496 496 481 
 83 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Terrain Regime 
type 
Economy External 
Factors 
Sons of soil All 
controls 
U.S. IMET 0.108** 0.0901 0.122** 0.0990** 0.113** 0.146** 
  (0.0494) (0.0651) (0.0494) (0.0454) (0.0467) (0.0734) 
Other Aid -0.0350 -1.099 -4.326* -1.588 -1.207 -2.708 
  (2.598) (2.358) (2.298) (2.057) (2.109) (2.564) 
Ground Mech.   0.620 0.892 0.638 0.644 0.975 1.283 
  (0.881) (0.961) (0.800) (0.813) (0.935) (1.152) 
Air Mech.  0.556 0.644 0.361 0.507 1.037 0.985 
  (1.014) (1.182) (0.938) (0.936) (1.039) (1.523) 
Combined Arm  -0.134 -0.175 -0.0971 -0.133 -0.214 -0.202 
  (0.149) (0.170) (0.137) (0.137) (0.161) (0.227) 
Distance to Capital            0.615*** 
            (0.186) 
Conflict at Border            0.726 
            (0.452) 
Border X Distance            -0.653** 
            (0.304) 
Rebel Fighting Cap.            0.230 
            (0.802) 
Rebel Strength            -0.816 
            (1.175) 
Natural Resources  0.532*         0.320 
  (0.319)         (0.372) 
Rough Terrain 0.615*         0.433 
  (0.349)         (0.312) 
Incumbent Democ.    0.247       -0.0870 
    (0.860)       (0.723) 
Gdp per capita      -0.770**     -0.666* 
      (0.348)     (0.387) 
Ext. support govern.       -0.280   -0.0836 
        (0.446)   (0.595) 
Ext. support rebels        -0.0389   -0.0613 
        (0.323)   (0.320) 
Sons of soil          1.433* 1.005 
          (0.794) (1.024) 
Insurgency            0.478 
            (0.535) 
Post-Cold War           -0.293 
            (0.555) 
Constant 3.923 3.581 10.23* 4.909 2.458 0.919 
  (5.931) (6.402) (5.998) (5.428) (5.983) (9.027) 
Observations 496 466 495 496 496 437 
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Additionally, my models demonstrate that other forms of U.S. military aid do not have a 
significant effect on civil conflict duration. Furthermore, the results of my analysis 
demonstrate that when human capital in the form of U.S. IMET participation is included in 
models employed in prior analyses the “traditional” measures of state`s military capability 
(Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Caverley and Sechser, 2017) 
although maintaining the direction of the relationship found in these studies but all of them 
lose statistical significance.  
 Additionally to these primary findings the models yield two additional interesting 
results. The distance to capital variable is consistently significant and shows a positive 
relationship with civil conflict duration. This finding seems to provide support to the 
argument of Rustad et al. (2008) and Buhaug et al. (2009) who suggested that the further the 
conflict takes place from a country`s capital the longer it lasts. Furthermore, according to the 
results those countries that have higher gdp per capita should expect shorter civil conflicts. 
 Another interesting finding is that those factors that previous literature has argued to 
affect civil conflict duration do not seem to demonstrate reliable effects in my analysis since 
none of them show statistical significance.  
 As a robustness check of the results of my analyses, I conduct several additional tests.  
First, I estimate 12 additional models where I use the same independent and control variables 
as in my first set of models but this time I use conflict termination, a binary variable as my 
dependent variable. In these models I include three time-dependence variables to control for 
potential effect of conflict duration. The results of these 12 models are shown in Table 8.  
The results once again provide support to the proposed theory since as these models show 
more U.S. IMET participation is associated with a decreased probability of conflict 
termination.  
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Table 8. Logit Analysis of Civil War Termination, 1976-2003 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
VARIABLES U.S. IMET Other U.S. Aid Total U.S. Aid Armor Geography Fighting Capacity 
U.S. IMET -0.0588**  -0.0826*** -0.0756** -0.0751** -0.0769** 
 (0.0284)  (0.0290) (0.0323) (0.0307) (0.0330) 
Military Aid  0.951 0.843 0.785 0.283 1.338 
  (0.760) (0.703) (2.031) (2.424) (1.879) 
Ground mech.    -0.701 -0.920 -0.841 
    (0.649) (0.666) (0.665) 
Air mech.    -0.491 -0.658 -0.703 
    (0.758) (0.797) (0.791) 
Combined arms    0.126 0.155 0.156 
    (0.112) (0.117) (0.118) 
Distance to capital     -0.326**  
     (0.145)  
Conflict at border     -0.747**  
     (0.304)  
Border x Distance     0.299  
     (0.188)  
Rebel fighting capacity      -0.121 
      (0.488) 
Rebel strength      0.581 
      (0.816) 
Constant -0.887*** -1.034*** -0.766*** 2.265 5.995 3.126 
 (0.172) (0.217) (0.205) (4.294) (4.502) (4.480) 
Observations 940 840 760 496 496 481 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
VARIABLES Terrain Regime 
Type 
Economy External 
Factors 
Sons of 
Soil 
All 
controls 
U.S. IMET -0.0739** -0.0732* -0.0952*** -0.0736** -0.0871*** -0.101* 
 (0.0347) (0.0425) (0.0319) (0.0324) (0.0325) (0.0524) 
Military Aid -0.290 0.867 2.974 1.011 0.334 1.754 
 (2.166) (2.256) (2.330) (2.118) (2.134) (3.148) 
Ground mech. -0.695 -0.819 -0.650 -0.741 -0.802 -1.612 
 (0.702) (0.782) (0.662) (0.642) (0.677) (1.122) 
Air mech. -0.540 -0.504 -0.334 -0.535 -0.724 -1.333 
 (0.827) (0.962) (0.803) (0.752) (0.790) (1.486) 
Combined arms 0.126 0.142 0.0927 0.131 0.157 0.258 
 (0.122) (0.142) (0.119) (0.111) (0.119) (0.219) 
Distance to capital      -0.488*** 
      (0.184) 
Conflict at border      -0.657** 
      (0.312) 
Border x Distance      0.535** 
      (0.255) 
Rebel fight cap.      -0.554 
      (0.691) 
Rebel strength      1.186 
      (1.139) 
Natural resources -0.383     -0.362 
 (0.251)     (0.339) 
Rough terrain -0.348     -0.346 
 (0.252)     (0.276) 
Incum. Democ.  -0.0837    0.00103 
  (0.583)    (0.652) 
Gdp per capita   0.500**   0.456* 
   (0.231)   (0.263) 
External sup. Govt.    0.331  0.308 
    (0.311)  (0.420) 
External sup. Reb.    -0.0308  -0.0474 
    (0.246)  (0.263) 
Sons of soil     -1.189** -1.098 
     (0.538) (0.896) 
Insurgency      -0.270 
      (0.440) 
Post-Cold War      0.272 
Constant 2.879 2.729 -1.616 2.327 3.145 8.570 
 (4.726) (5.116) (5.094) (4.287) (4.423) (8.550) 
Observations 496 466 495 496 496 437 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Once again, similarly to the original 12 models neither the other types of U.S. military 
variable nor the traditional military capability variables show significant relationship with 
civil conflict duration. The findings of these models are consistent with those in Table 7. 
While better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is associated with longer 
civil conflicts neither the other forms of U.S. military aid nor the traditional military 
capability measures show significant effects. 
 Next, to conduct some more robustness checks and provide additional support to my 
theory I run the same two sets of models as in Table 7. and Table 8. but using a different 
operationalization of my independent variable. In these models I use the logged sum of 5-
year total U.S. IMET spending as my independent variable.  The results of these models once 
again show the same relationships and statistical significance as the first two sets of models. 
The actual tables containing these results can be reviewed in Appendix L and M.  
 As I suggested earlier if the logic of my theory holds than the level of U.S. IMET 
participation must also affect the types of civil wars incumbent government fight. If the better 
military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation incentivizes rebels to disperse, hide 
and minimize their operations than more U.S. IMET participation should lead to a higher 
probability of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner rather than conventionally. 
To test this argument I once again run the same 12 models as in the previous analyses but this 
time using civil war type as my dependent variable. The results of my analysis are shown in 
Table 9. 
 As the results in the table demonstrate U.S. IMET participation is associated with an 
increased probability of irregular civil conflicts across all 12 models. One unit increase in the 
number of U.S. IMET participants increases the probability of irregular civil conflict with 
.146, on average.  
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Table 9. Logit Analysis of Civil War Types, 1976-2003 
 (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
VARIABLES U.S. 
IMET 
Other U.S. 
Aid 
Total U.S. 
Aid 
Armor Geography Fighting 
Capacity 
U.S. IMET 0.146***  0.185*** 0.239*** 0.265*** 0.180** 
 (0.0212)  (0.0259) (0.0597) (0.0690) (0.0749) 
Military Aid  -2.864*** -2.445*** -5.288** -3.340 -6.534*** 
  (0.606) (0.643) (2.070) (2.175) (2.418) 
Ground mech.    1.182 1.422 2.083** 
    (0.869) (0.867) (1.047) 
Air mech.    2.540** 3.550*** 3.145** 
    (1.220) (1.262) (1.429) 
Combined arms    -0.369** -0.489*** -0.508** 
    (0.168) (0.174) (0.205) 
Distance to capital     -0.485  
     (0.324)  
Conflict at border     -0.130  
     (0.559)  
Border x Distance     1.309***  
     (0.422)  
Rebel fighting capacity      -0.621 
      (0.562) 
Rebel strength      -2.949*** 
      (1.044) 
Constant 0.901*** 1.629*** 1.004*** -6.341 -6.097 -9.009 
 (0.0898) (0.104) (0.129) (5.979) (6.140) (7.162) 
Observations 1,014 869 832 284 284 281 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
VARIABLES Terrain Regime 
Type 
Economy External 
Factors 
Sons of 
Soil 
All 
Controls 
U.S. IMET 0.211*** 0.172** 0.205*** 0.245*** 0.270*** 0.465*** 
 (0.0616) (0.0738) (0.0658) (0.0599) (0.0633) (0.166) 
Military Aid -4.139* -1.217 -3.472 -5.190** -4.746** 1.739 
 (2.233) (2.409) (2.436) (2.121) (2.087) (4.759) 
Ground mech. 1.209 0.140 1.395 1.303 1.132 1.783 
 (0.898) (1.059) (0.915) (0.910) (0.861) (2.173) 
Air mech. 3.288** 2.831** 2.996** 2.746** 2.885** 5.345* 
 (1.324) (1.347) (1.324) (1.275) (1.240) (3.091) 
Combined arms -0.437** -0.292 -0.445** -0.390** -0.389** -0.703 
 (0.178) (0.195) (0.187) (0.175) (0.167) (0.454) 
Distance to capital      -0.600 
      (0.620) 
Conflict at border      1.234 
      (1.169) 
Border x Distance      0.534 
      (0.948) 
Rebel fighting capacity      -1.113 
      (0.993) 
Rebel strength      -5.543* 
      (2.836) 
Natural resources 0.749     -0.697 
 (0.518)     (1.418) 
Rough terrain -0.746     1.871 
 (0.466)     (1.258) 
Incumbent democracy  2.643***    1.708 
  (0.969)    (1.604) 
Gdp per capita   0.481   2.060** 
   (0.359)   (0.988) 
External support govt    -0.507  -1.591 
    (0.449)  (1.037) 
External support rebels    0.155  -0.171 
    (0.407)  (0.800) 
Sons of soil     1.271 0.784 
     (0.837) (1.891) 
Insurgency      -0.497 
      (0.863) 
Post-Cold War      -2.992** 
      (1.200) 
Constant -7.854 -4.167 -11.07 -7.227 -7.150 -21.11 
 (6.181) (6.708) (7.235) (6.266) (5.960) (16.99) 
Observations 284 263 283 284 284 254 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Other type of U.S. military aid seems to decrease the probability of irregular conflict however 
this relationship loses significance in several models and even changes direction when all 
controls are included in the analysis. From the traditional military capability variables air 
mechanization and combined arms strategy demonstrate statistically significant effects on the 
type of civil conflicts. While higher level of air mechanization is associated with higher chances 
of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner the use of combined arms strategy by 
government forces seems to result in a lower probability of irregular conflicts. These results 
make sense because air supremacy by the government`s military forces rebels to disperse and 
conduct operations in smaller scale and in a faster pace to avoid exposure and potential 
destruction by government air platforms. The use of combined arms strategy might lead to more 
conventional conflicts because as Caverley and Secher (2017) argue this strategy leads to swift 
conflict resolution where the rebels do not have time to switch to irregular methods, because they 
are quickly destroyed by the government forces.  
 From the other variables only rebel strength shows consistent and significant effects on 
the type of civil conflict. These results seem to be logical because it makes sense that the 
stronger the rebels the less likely they use irregular methods but rather challenge the government 
using conventional warfare methods. 
 Finally, to conduct robustness checks for these results I once again rerun the same models 
included in Table 9. but using the other operationalization of my independent variable. The 
results of these models once again show the same relationships and statistical significance as 
depicted in Table 9. The actual results of these additional models are shown in Appendix N. 
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Interaction Between U.S. IMET Participation and Mechanization Levels 
The overall results of my analysis seem to support not only my theory but also other prior 
theories (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996; Biddle, 2004; Toronto 2018) arguing that who operates the 
military technology (human factor) might be more important than the military technology itself. 
To provide further support to these arguments I run several additional models where I assess the 
effects of interaction between my military human capital variable and the traditional military 
capability variables. Figure 6. visually demonstrates the results of the analyses of the interactions 
between U.S. IMET participation and the three different mechanization variables. 
 As Figure 6. demonstrate U.S. IMET participation has a significant effect on civil conflict 
duration even when its interaction is assessed with the traditional mechanization variables. All 
three graphs in Figure 6. once again demonstrate that as U.S. IMET participation increases the 
duration of civil conflicts also increases. Furthermore, the graphs show that the level of ground 
mechanization and the level of combined arms strategy only matters if quality military human 
capital is available for the government forces. 
 The first graph shows that when U.S. IMET participation is low then the level of ground 
mechanization does not make a significant difference in civil conflict duration. At the same time 
when U.S. IMET participation is high then there is a significant difference in the effects of the 
level of ground mechanization on civil conflict duration.  
The graph shows that when both U.S. IMET participation and ground mechanization level are 
high then incumbents government are more likely to fight shorter civil conflicts while high U.S. 
IMET participation and low ground mechanization level are associated with longer civil wars. 
These results suggest that if the better trained and educated soldiers are provided with 
appropriate number of ground equipment they can end the civil conflict earlier. 
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 Next, the second graph demonstrates the effects of U.S. IMET participation and air 
mechanization on the duration of civil conflicts. This graph shows that difference in the level of 
air mechanization has a significant effect on civil conflict duration even if the U.S. IMET 
participation is low. High level of air mechanization is associated with shorter civil conflicts than 
low air mechanization when the U.S. IMET participation is low. When the number of U.S. IMET 
participants increases the difference between the effects of the air mechanization levels 
decreases. Low level of air mechanization and high level of U.S. IMET participation are still 
associated with longer civil conflicts; however the improved military human capital seems to be 
closing the gap between high and low level of air mechanization. 
 Finally, graph three shows the effects of U.S. IMET participation and the combined arms 
strategy on civil conflict duration. This graph shows that when U.S. IMET participation is low 
then the use of a combined arms strategy does not make a significant difference in civil conflict 
duration. At the same time when U.S. IMET participation is high then there is a significant 
difference in the effects of the combined arms strategy on civil conflict duration. The graph 
shows that when U.S. IMET participation is high and combined arms strategy employed then 
incumbents government are more likely to fight shorter civil conflicts while high U.S. IMET 
participation and low levels of combined arms strategy are associated with longer civil wars. 
 These results demonstrate that when the quality of military human capital due to U.S. 
IMET participation is introduced into the analysis then higher levels of ground and air 
mechanization are actually associate with shorter civil conflicts which seem to contradict the 
findings of several previous studies (Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010).   
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Figure 6. U.S. IMET participation and the Mechanization Variables 
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At the same time the results of the last analysis lend support to Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) 
arguments and shows that more effective use of a combined arms strategy is indeed associated 
with faster conflict termination. 
Case Illustrations – Uganda, India, and El Salvador 
To provide further support to the theory proposed in this paper it is important to illustrate the 
argument through actual cases as well. Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset includes 147 
unique civil conflicts from 1976 to 2003. The duration of these conflicts varies between one day 
and 9,380 days with a mean of 1,710 days.  
 Although the availability of better military human capital through the participation in 
U.S. IMET programs seems to be a strong predictor of civil war duration across most cases there 
are several particular cases that demonstrate the difference in explanatory power between the 
traditional military capability measures and military human capital. Two examples that challenge 
the prior explanations while providing support for the theory of this paper are Uganda`s civil 
conflicts in 1972 and between 1978 and 1991, and the civil wars in India between 1967 and 
1972, and between 1978 to 2003.  
 According to Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset both of these two countries 
experienced a short (shorter than the mean value of the civil conflict variable) and a long civil 
war while both countries` militaries` land mechanization, air mechanization and combined arms 
indexes (and all other features captured in the control variables) remained almost exactly the 
same. The lack of variation in these variables means that they cannot explain the variation in the 
duration of the civil conflicts and present an opportunity to explore a better explanation.  
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 When looking at U.S. IMET participation for both countries one can find that they 
significantly vary between the short and long civil wars. Since the U.S. IMET programs did not 
exist before or during the short conflicts they could not improve the military human capital of 
Uganda or India and with that their effects could not prolong the civil conflict. However, before 
and during the long civil wars both Uganda and India have received U.S. military aid in the form 
of U.S. IMET training which ultimately led to longer civil wars. Although these conflicts provide 
some statistical examples of how land mechanization, air mechanization and combined arms 
indexes are all poor predictors of civil conflict duration while U.S. IMET participation is 
strongly associated with longer conflicts more evidence is needed regarding the mechanism 
through which U.S. IMET participation effects civil conflict duration. To provide such evidence 
I present a detailed analysis of another case from Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset, the El 
Salvador civil conflict that lasted from 1979 till 1991 (Wood, 2003). Since this civil war lasted 
for 12 years and the El Salvador military received significant U.S. military aid in both the forms 
of arms transfers and education and training I argue that this conflict is an appropriate case to 
further assess the relationship between civil conflict duration and U.S. IMET participation.   
 Following the overthrow of General Carlos Humberto Romero`s military regime on 
October 15, 1979 a weak civil-military junta took the power in El Salvador. The new regime that 
included centrist and leftist political parties and some reform-minded, young military officers 
pledged to reduce human rights violations, to create a more equal distribution of national wealth, 
to hold free elections and to rewrite the constitution (Ladwig, 2016). While these promises never 
materialized demands for change quickly grew and became more radical among students, 
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peasants and labor unions producing five revolutionary organizations.30 As Ladwig (2016) notes 
“large-scale demonstrations, organized strikes, occupation of foreign embassies, bank robberies, 
kidnapping for ransom, and bomb attacks became weekly occurrences” (Ladwig, 2016:218). 
While the regime struggled for survival, Cuba`s communist leader Fidel Castro brought the five 
revolutionary organizations` leaders together in Havana in December 1979 when they joined 
their ranks and formed a unified insurgent organization the Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front (hereafter, FMLN) (Onate, 2011). 
 At the beginning of the civil conflict the FMLN could field 4,000 guerilla fighters whose 
operations were supported by an additional 5,000 part-time militia members (Bosh, 1999). By 
1983 the number of guerrilla fighters reached 12,000. The FMLN received advice, arms and 
training from communist countries including Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and 
East Germany (Byrne, 1996). On the other side, the El Salvador Armed Forces (hereafter, ESAF) 
consisted of the 8,000 men strong army and the 8,500 men strong Public Security Corps 
(Woerner, 1981). Th ESAF entered into the civil conflict with a non-existent noncommissioned 
officer corps, with low skilled, short-service conscripts, with military equipment that was in 
extremely poor condition and with an officer corps that was not suited for combat operations 
(Ladwig, 2016). The ESAF also lacked intelligence gathering capabilities as well as adequate 
communication equipment (Ladwig, 2016). Given these conditions during the initial years of the 
conflict the FMLN engaged the government forces in open battles and fought more like a 
conventional army than a guerilla force. From the early days of the conflict till 1983 using such 
 
30 These organizations were the Central American Workers’ Revolutionary Party, the People’s Revolutionary Army, 
the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces, the Armed Forces of National Resistance, and the Communist Party 
of El Salvador’s Armed Forces of Liberation. 
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conventional tactics the FMLN could capture ESAF military installations and outposts, close 
down important transportation routes, temporarily capture villages and departmental capitals, 
force ESAF to be on the defensive (Childress, 1995) and annihilate medium-sized ESAF units 
(Ladwig, 2016). However, by the end of 1983 changes in the capabilities of the ESAF slowly 
started changing the way the war was fought on both sides. By this time large number of U.S. 
IMET educated and trained military officers returned to El Salvador bringing their newly learned 
skills into the fight.  
 Besides a short 3-year period at the end of the 1970s when President Carter suspended all 
U.S. military aid programs due to serious human rights violations, El Salvador received 
extensive U.S. IMET support from the beginning of the civil conflict. As Childress (1995) notes 
“over $1 billion in military aid has been provided to the ESAF [El Salvador Armed Forces] since 
1980. In terms of actual training expenditures, El Salvador has received more IMET resources 
than any other Third World country, and only two other Third World countries have had more 
student trained through IMET since 1980” (Childress, 1995: 21). Figure 7. depicts the changes in 
the sum of ESAF participants in the U.S. IMET programs 5 year prior to any given year.  
 
Figure 7. 5-year Sum of U.S. IMET participants, 1975-1997 
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Such a large U.S. IMET support was due to the realization that without a well-trained officer 
corps the war cannot be won (Woerner, 1981). To swiftly increase the number of well-trained 
junior officers more than a thousand ESAF officers were brought to the U.S. IMET programs in 
1981 (Ladwig, 2016) and by the end of the civil conflict over half of the ESAF officer corps and 
each officer under the rank of captain received U.S. IMET education and training in the U.S. 
(Childress, 1995). 
These officers received training in “individual leadership, small-unit operations, and 
counterinsurgency theory” (Ladwig, 2016:245) as well as additional skills that were paramount 
to be able to plan, organize, execute, and sustain effective military operations against the 
insurgents. Table 10. lists the specific U.S. IMET courses and the number of ESAF participants.  
Table 10. List of U.S. IMET Courses Received by ESAF, 1988-1993  
Course Number of Students 
Combat Armor Officer  520 
Training Management Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)  483 
Commando Operations 285 
Officer Candidate Course 283 
Basic NCO Course  168 
Infantry Officer Basic Course  192 
Psychological Operations Officer Course 116 
Instructor Training 103 
Specialized English Language Training 94 
English Language Course 79 
Training Management Officer  66 
Command and General Staff 39 
Battle Staff Operations 30 
Security Assistance Training and Orientation Course 26 
Sapper Course 23 
Operations Training 20 
TOTAL 2527 
 
 Although as several studies note (Childress, 1995; Bosh, 1999; Ladwig, 2016) the 
returning officers met significant pressure from older ESAF officers to ignore U.S. training and 
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conduct operations employing ESAF`s traditional conventional approaches the new knowledge 
and skills brought home by the U.S. IMET graduates still started to effect ESAF`s overall 
combat effectiveness. I argue that although it is true that ESAF did not immediately implemented 
the American way of fighting insurgencies, but the U.S. IMET graduates` newly obtained 
leadership skills, tactical proficiency, better understanding of how to plan and execute military 
operations and how to sustain a force significantly improved the effectiveness even ESAF`s 
conventional approach and slowly turned it into a more American counterinsurgency strategy. 
This is clearly shown in an assessment conducted by the U.S. General Accountability Office 
which found that by the mid-1980s the ESAF clearly became both technically and tactically 
more professional due to U.S. IMET training (Childress, 1995). Besides these factors U.S. IMET 
graduates` leadership skills also added to the improvement of the combat effectiveness of the 
ESAF. Abandoning ESAF`s old centralized decision-making processes and switching to more 
decentralized command and control practices gave the freedom of action to tactical unit 
commanders to take the initiative  and decide how to execute their missions (Ladwig, 2016). Due 
to these improvements generated by the U.S. IMET participants FMLN also needed to 
implement changes in their approach to the war if they wanted to keep the rebellion alive.  
 Castellanos (1991) argues that due to the improvements in ESAF`s combat effectiveness 
FMLN could not sustain large-unit conventional combat operations and was ultimately forced to 
switch to guerilla type hit-and-run tactics. According to Castellanos (1991) a guerilla leader 
referred this switch in tactics a very significant turn in the conflict. Ladwig (2016) argues that as 
the combat effectiveness of the ESAF improved both the insurgents` morale and prospect for 
victory quickly plummeted. Referring to the opinion of a rebel leader Childress (1995) suggests 
that due to the improved combat effectiveness of the ESAF the FMLN was beat down by 1985. 
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As Childress (1995) find FMLN could not capture territory anymore and to survive it was forced 
to switch its modus operandi to hit-and-run guerilla tactics. By this time, as Villalobos (1986) 
notes FMLN no longer tried to win the war through militarily defeating ESAF but trying to break 
the El Salvadorian economy just to be able to sustain the civil conflict. During the upcoming 
years FMLN operations focused on low-level harassing activities such as severing power lines, 
attacking plantations, destroying bridges, and damaging economic productions. These activities 
led to a several years long military stalemate. 
 Following the 1989 national elections the new El Salvador government became more 
open to negotiations with the FMLN and new President Cristiani called for peace talks two days 
after he took office (Ladwig, 2016). FMLN saw the President`s initiative as a major opportunity 
and to strengthen their negotiating positions launched a major combat operation against San 
Salvador and some other areas across the country on 11 November 1989. Although the operation 
was a major surprise for the ESAF, its forces regained control after a three-week campaign 
where they mostly employed American counterinsurgency tactics (Schwarz, 1991). While from a 
military perspective the offensive became a complete disaster for the FMLN because it was 
quickly driven out of the capital while losing 50 percent of its fighters (Thomson, 1994) from a 
political perspective it seems to have achieved its goal. Soon negotiations were initiated between 
the government and the leadership of FMLN which resulted in an UN-brokered peace-agreement 
signed on 16 January 1992 ending the 12-year long civil conflict (Ladwig, 2016).  
 Beyond the statistical support found in the Uganda and the India cases the detailed 
analysis of the El Salvador civil conflict demonstrates how improvement in military human 
capital due to U.S. IMET participation prolongs civil conflict duration. The better leadership and 
technical skills as well as the better tactical proficiency of the government forces due to U.S. 
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IMET participation indeed incentivize rebels to change their modus operandi, to hide, minimize 
their operations and avoid engaging government forces in open conventional battles. 
Potential Criticism 
Some critics might be concerned that potential selection effects are driving the results of my 
analysis. They might suggest that incumbent governments have an incentive to try to get access 
to more U.S. IMET programs if they see the rise of a strong domestic challenger or if they are 
expecting a longer civil war. It is also possible that the U.S. government allocates more U.S. 
IMET in support of those governments who are being threatened by potential insurgencies or are 
already engaging in civil conflicts. To address these concerns I run several models assessing the 
relationship between the occurrence of insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation. In these 
models my dependent variable is insurgency. This variable is coded 0 if a country is not involved 
in an insurgency and 1 if it does. For my independent variable I once again use the actual number 
of U.S. IMET participants and derive my control variables from relevant literature (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Blimes, 2006; Thies 2010; Fearon, 2011). The results of these models can be 
reviewed in Table 11. 
 The results in the table demonstrate across all models that the more U.S. IMET support 
an incumbent government receives the less likely it becomes involved in a civil conflict and with 
that suggest that no selection effects are driving the results of the earlier analysis. As a 
robustness check I run the same models with the secondary operationalization of my independent 
variable and find the same relationship. The results of these models can be reviewed in Appendix 
O. 
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Table 11. Logit Analysis of Insurgency Occurrence, 1976-2003 
 (37) (38) (39) 
VARIABLES U.S. IMET Total U.S. Aid All Controls 
U.S. IMET -0.0861*** -0.160*** -0.134*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0228) (0.0511) 
Other U.S. Aid  -0.344 -3.278** 
  (0.683) (1.342) 
Military Expenditure   -2.18e-08* 
   (1.18e-08) 
Military Personnel   -8.78e-06 
   (8.06e-06) 
Population   -0.268** 
   (0.105) 
Regime Type   -1.650*** 
   (0.500) 
GDP per Capita   -0.144 
   (0.258) 
Natural Resources   0.731** 
   (0.308) 
U.S. Affinity   1.296*** 
   (0.444) 
Oil Exporter   -0.0960 
   (0.446) 
Ethnic Fractionalization   -1.755** 
   (0.723) 
Constant 0.503*** 0.799*** 7.384*** 
 (0.0835) (0.127) (2.244) 
Observations 945 761 378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Another potential challenge to the presented argument might be why the civil conflict 
drags on when the insurgents realize that the incumbent government`s military is becoming more 
effective and impose more cost on them. In this situation the insurgents would be incentivized to 
look for settlement as soon as possible which would be associated with shorter civil wars. This 
argument has some merit; however I suggest that the incumbent government also realizes the 
improvement in its military capabilities, and it is not interested in resolving the conflict trough 
settlement rather through the complete destruction of the rebel movement to avoid the 
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reemergence of the insurgency. The insurgents will try to keep the rebellion alive  as long as 
possible through dispersion, hiding and small-scale operations and try to secure external support 
or wear the government out over time which will be associated with an increase in the duration 
of the civil conflicts. 
Finally, critics might suggest that this study overlooked several additional factors that might 
affect the duration of civil conflicts. These might include prior war experience of the incumbent 
government`s forces, military skills and experience gained by both sides during the actual civil 
conflict, changes in the external support of the rebels due to U.S. support to the government and 
the specifics of the U.S. IMET training received by the government military personnel. I 
acknowledge that these factors can have significant effects on civil conflict duration, but due to 
the very limited availability of such data and space limitations of this paper they could not be 
considered in appropriate extent. They will be subjects of my future data collection efforts and 
topics for upcoming papers. 
Conclusion and Implications 
Several studies have already argued that external support and more specifically military aid to 
the incumbent governments affects the duration of civil conflicts. Prior literature suggested that 
foreign military aid improves the military capability of the government which prolongs civil 
conflict duration. These prior studies always operationalize this improved military capability 
through tangible, hardware-based measures (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 
2011; Caverley and Secher, 2017). In this paper I introduce a new measure for state military 
capacity in the form of military human capital and argue that it is rather the availability of highly 
trained and educated military personnel than military technology that effects the duration of civil 
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conflicts. I theorize that better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation increases 
the government military`s capability which incentivize rebels to hide and minimize their 
operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I use a new dataset that 
includes detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation between 1976 and 
2003.  
The results of my analysis contribute to the literature of civil conflicts in four ways. First, 
my results support the previous claim (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) 
that better military capability is associated with longer civil wars. Second, I show that when 
military human capital is included in the models than neither military mechanization (Lyall and 
Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) nor the combined arms strategy (Caverley and 
Secher, 2017) are significant predictors for civil conflict duration. This result clearly suggests 
that who is operating the military hardware is more important than the hardware itself. Third, I 
find that better military human capital is not only associated with longer civil wars, but it also 
increases the probability of incumbent government`s fighting civil conflicts in an irregular 
manner. Lastly, by using U.S. IMET data as a proxy for availability of quality military human 
capital I provide feedback about the potential effects of these education and training programs 
and with that I contribute to the literature of U.S. foreign military aid. 
In addition to assessing civil conflict duration my study also shed some light on the 
importance of bringing military human capital into the research programs of armed conflicts in 
general. While many studies have explored the effects of military technology (Lyall and Wilson, 
2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) and strategy employed by the belligerents (Biddle 2004; 
Balcells and Kalyvas 2012; Caverley and Secher, 2017) on the duration and outcome of civil 
conflicts the question assessing the effects of who is employing those technologies and strategies 
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has remained mostly unexplored. Bringing the military human capital into the analysis offers 
several questions that might be answered by future research.  
Additional research could help us understand the effects of better trained and educated 
military personnel and the level of both military casualties and civilian collateral damage. 
Further research could isolate the relationship between military human capital and civil conflict 
outcomes. To address these questions better data is needed about military human capital. 
Although U.S. IMET participation seems to be a strong proxy for quality military human capital 
even more reliable new data would enable researchers to better assess the effects of military 
human capital in civil conflicts.  
On a similar note, my study only assessed the military human capital available for the 
incumbent government while ignored the same variable in case of the rebels. Since in many 
conflicts the insurgents are coming directly from the military or have previous military 
experience including a variable that accounts for how educated and trained the rebel forces are 
would make an important addition to research. New data about rebel military human capital 
would enable scholars to specify the relationship more effectively between human capital and the 
duration of civil conflicts.    
In sum, the findings of this analysis underscore the significance of including military 
human capital into the theoretical models of civil conflict research programs. An effective 
explanation of the dynamics of civil conflict requires researchers to better understand how the 
human factor interacts with military technology, terrain, political and economic factors. Further 
exploring the role of military human capital is likely to highlight several new insights helping 
scholars to better understand the dynamics of civil conflicts and potentially enable policymakers 
to make more informed decisions when preparing or involved in such wars.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: TRAINING FOR PEACE – U.S. IMET AND MID 
INITIATION, 1976-2007 
Abstract 
How does U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs affect the likelihood of recipient 
states becoming involved in militarized interstate disputes (hereafter, MIDs)? While the 
relationship between U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer and MID 
involvement has been studied extensively in international relations literature the effects of U.S. 
military aid in the form of foreign military education and training on the same phenomena has 
been completely ignored. This study intends to fill some of this gap by systematically assessing 
the effects of this latter form of U.S. military aid on the recipient states` international conflict 
behavior. I theorize that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home 
with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, 
civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. These military personnel 
advise their political masters against the use of military force during international disputes 
leading to a decreased probability of MID initiation. To test this argument I use data from the 
Correlates of War Project`s MID data set (version 4.3) and the most prominent U.S. foreign 
military education and training program the International Military Education and Training 
(hereafter, U.S. IMET) and I find that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely 
it initiates MIDs. I also find that countries that receive U.S. IMET support are less likely to 
escalate ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility. 
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Introduction 
How does U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs affect the likelihood of recipient 
states becoming involved in MIDs? While the relationship between U.S. military aid in the form 
of arms and equipment transfer and MIDs has been studied extensively in international relations 
literature the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training on 
the same phenomena has been completely ignored. Besides leaving this less tangible, but 
important variable out from previous studies this research agenda requires further exploration 
due to the contradicting results of prior research. While theoretically all previous studies agree 
that U.S. military aid improves the military capabilities of the recipient states some studies argue 
that this improved military capability is associated with higher probability of interstate conflict 
initiation (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; Brzoska and Pearson, 1984; Pearson, Brzoska, and 
Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and Smaldone, 2002) while others find the 
opposite relationship (Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth, 1988; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995). 
Additionally, Durch`s (2000) analysis suggest that there is no relationship between arms and 
equipment transfer and armed conflict involvement. 
 This paper intends to contribute to this ongoing debate about the relationship between 
military aid and conflict involvement by systematically assessing how U.S. military aid in the 
form foreign military education and training programs influence the probability of recipient 
states becoming interstate conflict initiators. The scope of this investigation focuses only on 
militarized interstate disputes (hereafter, MID) and one of the fourteen U.S. foreign military 
education and training programs31, the International Military Education and Training programs 
 
31 The U.S. foreign military education and trainings programs are: the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement, Global Peace Operations Initiative, Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies, 
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because the U.S. IMET programs are the most prominent of these efforts. It is the largest in size 
and budget; has the most clearly defined goals and subject to continuous scrutiny from 
policymakers and the U.S. Congress. Given these facts I suggest that the relationship found 
between the U.S. IMET programs and MID involvements also applies to the U.S. foreign 
military education and training effort as a whole.  
Since one of the goals assigned to the U.S. IMET programs by Congress is to support 
regional stability and decrease the likelihood of armed conflict between countries32 this 
investigation does not only contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate about the effects of U.S. 
military aid on MIDs but potentially provides direct feedback to policy makers whether the U.S. 
IMET programs meet the goals assigned to them by Congress. 
To be able to investigate the research question and provide policy feedback related to the 
U.S. IMET programs I build on the general theoretical frameworks of the previously listed 
studies and suggest that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs also improves the 
military capabilities of the recipient states. However, I propose that while military aid in the form 
of arms and equipment transfer improves the more tangible, hardware related elements of the 
recipient states` militaries, the U.S. IMET programs improve a less tangible factor, the military 
human capital. I argue that the improvement in the military human capital acts differently than 
capability improvement through the reception of arms and equipment. I propose that the more 
education and training foreign military personnel receive in the U.S. IMET programs the better 
 
Section 1004 – Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Training Support,  Mine Action Programs, Disaster Response, 
Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, Section 2282 – Global Train and Equip Program, 
Service-Sponsored Activities, Foreign Assistance Act and the Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard 
Activities Program. 
32 Department of State and the Department of Defense Foreign Military Training Joint Report, Fiscal Year 2012 and 
2013. 
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understanding they will have about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, 
civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. Based on this improved 
understanding the graduates of the U.S. IMET programs advise their civilian masters against the 
offensive use of military force in case of an interstate dispute, which reduces the probability of 
interstate conflict initiation. Empirically I find that indeed the more U.S. military aid countries 
receive in the form of U.S. IMET participation the less likely that they initiate interstate 
conflicts. Additionally, the results of my analysis also show that more U.S. IMET participation is 
also associated with a decreased probability of escalating ongoing MIDs to the higher levels of 
hostility. The study proceeds in six parts.  
To establish a strong foundation for the further discussion this paper starts with a review 
and discussion of the most significant previous literature that explores the causes of conflict 
initiation. Next, the paper proceeds with the development of a theoretical argument to explain 
how participation in the U.S. IMET programs improves the military human capital of the 
recipient states and why this improved military capability is associated with a decreased 
probability of interstate conflict initiation. Next, I discuss the research design, the data sources, 
measurements, and my empirical strategy. Then, the study presents the empirical analysis and 
discusses the main findings. The analysis concludes with a short summary of the findings and 
contributions alongside with some potential policy implications and ideas for further research. 
Theories of MID Initiation 
Militarized interstate disputes are military conflicts among two or more sovereign states 
involving nonaccidental, government-sanctioned, overt, and explicit threats, displays, or uses of 
military force, with the potential of escalating to war (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996). In 
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international relations scholarship the question of why some countries are becoming involved in 
such conflicts has been studied extensively. Some scholars suggest that the variation in this 
phenomenon can be explained by the difference in countries` regime types (Snyder 1991; Downs 
and Rocke, 1994; Van Evera 1994, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 
2002; Caverley, 2014). Other experts argue that changing power balance due to different growth 
rates of states are the possible sources of conflict and might lead to MIDs (Organski and Kugler, 
1980; Gilpin, 1981; Maoz, 1982; Wallerstein, 1984; Midlarsky, 1990; Geller, 1992). 
Furthermore, building on Vasquez`s (1993) argument Huth (1996) and Krause (2004) argue that 
countries that are involved in territorial disputes are more likely to initiate MIDs. Others argues 
that alliances play a crucial role in states` international conflict behavior. While according to the 
findings of several studies membership in alliances increase the probability of countries 
becoming aggressive others suggest that certain types of alliances prevent its members to 
become instigators of MIDs (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson, 2011). 
Additionally, several researchers find that military capabilities that states possess determine 
whether a country becomes involved in MIDs (Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1984, 1993; Jervis 
1989; Blair 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur 2005; Bell and Miller, 2015). In relation to the military 
capabilities argument several studies also investigate the effects of foreign military aid on MIDs. 
This study intends to contribute to this latter literature by exploring their theoretical arguments 
from a different angle and expanding on their empirical methods and findings.   
 The studies that assess the relationship between foreign military aid and probability of the 
recipient countries` international conflict involvement can be divided into two groups from a 
theoretical perspective: the encouragement and the discouragement arguments. Those studies 
that belong to the former group (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; Brzoska and Pearson, 1984; 
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Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and Smaldone, 2002) 
argue that more foreign military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer increases the 
probability of MID involvement. According to these studies several mechanisms might drive this 
relationship. First, Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz (1992) suggest that “arms deliveries are a factor 
in decisions to go to war because of considerations of military superiority” (Pearson, Brzoska, 
and Crantz, 1992: 399). Additionally, Craft and Smaldone (2002) argue that “the importation of 
weapons may increase the perceived military capability of the state in the minds of its leadership, 
making it more confident of a favorable military-political outcome in armed confrontations, and 
therefore more likely to initiate or participate in them” (Craft and Smaldone, 2002: 704). Finally, 
Craft and Smaldone (2002 ) also propose that “weapons acquisitions may heighten the prestige 
and institutional role of the military in society and government policy determination and lead to 
more aggressive responses to perceived security threats” (Craft and Smaldone, 2002: 704). These 
studies find empirical support to their claims and argue that more foreign military aid in the form 
of arms and equipment transfer increases the probability of MID involvement. 
Contradictory to these arguments the restraint literature (Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth, 
1988; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995) proposes that military arms and equipment transfer reduces 
the probability of MID involvement of the recipient states. These studies suggest that this type of 
military aid improves the recipient countries` military capabilities and with that improves the 
military balance with potential adversaries (Kinsella and Tillema, 1995). Furthermore, this 
improved capability enables the recipient states to deter potential foreign aggressors and 
increases the recipient states` perception of security. According to the restraint studies the 
increased perception of security reduces the incentive to initiate MIDs and because of that the 
more military aid a country receives in the form of arms and equipment transfer the less likely it 
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will be involved in MIDs (Kinsella and Tillema, 1995). Finally, Durch (2000) argues that both 
groups of  studies are wrong because there is no relationship between arms and equipment 
transfer and recipient states` involvement in armed conflicts. 
Although all these studies make significant contributions to the overall research agenda 
they also leave some room for potential improvement and expansion. I suggest that the 
contradicting results of the previous studies are due to their different research designs (case 
studies versus large-N analysis) and their use of different proxies for foreign military aid. 
Furthermore, the authors` limited regional scopes and the small number of cases compared to 
“world-wide” large-N studies might also contribute to the contradicting empirical findings. 
Besides these challenges all of these studies only assess the relationship between foreign military 
aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers and MID involvement, while systematically 
ignore the potential effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and 
training. The inclusion of this variable into this research agenda is important for several reasons. 
 First, the U.S. foreign military education and training effort makes up quite a substantial 
part of the overall U.S. military aid efforts since for example in fiscal year 2015 the U.S. 
provided $876.5 million worth of IMET training to about 76,400 students from 154 countries 
(Savage and Caverley, 2017). Second, Biddle and Zirkle (1996) argue that without well trained 
and educated military personnel the availability of complex modern weapons or large military 
budget are not sufficient to increase a country`s military capabilities. Furthermore, Biddle (2004) 
suggests that state military capabilities do not only depend on tangible factors such as number of 
military personnel, number of major weapon systems (tanks, airplanes, ships, etc.), possession of 
nuclear capability (Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1984, 1993; Jervis 1989; Blair 1993; Sagan 1994; 
Kapur 2005) or military expenditure (Hendrix, 2010; and Kocher, 2010) but also on less tangible 
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elements including the availability of well trained and educated military personnel. Finally, 
Toronto (2018) suggests that without highly trained and educated military personnel states` 
military forces cannot be successful in modern conflict. 
Through the introduction of the U.S. IMET programs into the investigation of the 
relationship between U.S. military aid and MID involvement and focusing on the effects of 
military human capital this study establishes a new approach within this research agenda. 
Furthermore, the introduction of a different type of military aid might also help decide the debate 
between the encouragement and the discouragement literature or sides with Durch`s (2000) 
argument by providing further empirical evidence to either side. Next, besides its contributions 
to the ongoing scholarly debate assessing the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the recipient 
states` international conflict behavior also has significant policy implications. Since one of the 
major goals of the U.S. IMET programs is to support regional stability and minimize the 
probability of interstate conflict initiation the results of this study can provide direct feedback to 
policy makers whether the U.S. IMET programs meet the assigned goals.  
Theory of U.S. IMET and MID Initiation 
The U.S. military aid is being delivered to the recipient states in two forms: arms and equipment 
transfers and foreign military education and training programs. One of the main goals of both 
types of U.S. military aid is to improve the military capabilities of the recipient states so they can 
deter foreign aggression and defend themselves in case of an armed conflict (Cope, 1995; 
Atkinson, 2010; Savage and Caverley, 2017). While U.S. military aid in the form of arms and 
equipment transfer improves the recipient states` military capabilities through better hardware 
the U.S. IMET programs improve the recipient states` military human capital (Savage and 
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Caverley, 2017). Since as Biddle and Zirkle (1996); Biddle (2004) and Toronto (2018) argue 
without well trained and educated military personnel the availability of complex modern 
weapons is not sufficient to increase a country`s military capabilities countries that rely on U.S. 
foreign military aid are incentivized to also improve their military human capital to U.S. IMET 
participation. These programs provide a unique framework for foreign militaries to improve their 
military human capital for several reasons.  
Atkinson (2010) and Savage and Caverley (2017) argue that the U.S. military is currently 
the best military force in the world and possess the best military educational and training 
programs. Additionally, the U.S. IMET programs are unique because the U.S. military 
accumulated decades of war experiences. Furthermore, the size and modernity of the U.S. 
training infrastructure, the availability of an experienced and combat focused training cadre, and 
the size of the budget available33 for education and training purposes cannot be compared to any 
other country`s similar programs (Savage and Caverley, 2017). Besides these factors foreign 
military also send their military personnel to the U.S. IMET programs, because as Farrell (2001) 
argues militaries around the world admire the professional norms, values and procedures of those 
foreign militaries that have won victories in recent wars or have gone through major 
technological developments. According to Farrell (2001) military organizations emulate the 
norms and procedures of those victorious examples even if those norms and procedures do not fit 
the strategic interest of the given countries. The author argues that the implementation of an 
American style military, following the U.S. dramatic victory in the Gulf Wars, in countries like 
Botswana, Monaco or Micronesia are clear examples of such norm emulation (Farrell 2001; 
 
33 According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the annual training budget of the U.S. military is bigger than entire 
defense budget of 117 countries. 
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Goldman 2003, 2006). Based on this argument I propose that most foreign militaries admire the 
recent victories and technical advancement of the U.S. military and want to emulate its norms 
and values. 
Savage and Caverley (2017) suggest that the foreign military personnel who participates 
in the U.S. IMET programs absorb the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity as 
well as its core values, which significantly improves the professionalism of the recipient states` 
military as a whole. Furthermore, Stepan (1986), Huntington (2006), and Barany (2012) argue 
that the more professional a military considers itself, the higher the temptation to be involved in 
state affairs both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, Atkinson (2010) argues that the 
U.S. IMET programs teaches participants about the role of the military as an instrument of 
national power, about appropriate civil-military relations and the potential cost of an interstate 
war. Additionally, as a part of their training U.S IMET graduates learn about the importance of 
quality military advice in the foreign policy making process and how even low or mid-level 
military leaders can indirectly affect high level decisions34. Finally, based on interviews 
conducted with U.S. IMET graduates from the country Georgia, Phadnis (2019) finds that these 
graduates are catalyzing and leading their country`s defense transformation and argues that U.S. 
IMET graduates` “impact at the highest levels of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and General 
Staff cannot be overstated” (Phandis, 2019).  
Based on these arguments I theorize that U.S. IMET program graduates return home as 
more professional and more capable soldiers with the ability and willingness to influence 
 
34 Based on the National Security Act of 1947 which was amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 the 
highest-ranking military leader, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the "principal military advisor" to 
the President of the United States. However, the advice delivered by the Chairman is based on the assessment and 
analysis of numerous low and mid-level military leaders who all provide input into this product. 
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political leaders` decisions directly or indirectly. Due to their participation in the best and most 
respected military education and training programs (Atkinson, 2010; Savage and Caverley, 2017)  
U.S. IMET graduates improve the military`s respect within their home society and increase the 
military`s role in government policy determination. In support of this assertion Lefever (1976) 
suggests that the graduates of the IMET programs do not only become more professionals, but 
also senior military leaders with significant political influence and responsibility.  
I also suggest that recipient states` political leaders listen more to the military advise of 
the U.S. IMET graduates than those military leaders who has never attended American education 
and training. This is the case because the political leaders send military personnel to the U.S. 
with the goal to obtain better educated and trained military human capital. They understand that 
the U.S. IMET programs are the best military education and training opportunity in the world 
and because of that they listen to the advice of the U.S. IMET graduates more than those who 
were never educated or trained in the U.S. The military advice given by the U.S. IMET graduates 
are driven by the norms and values they learn in these programs. They return home with a better 
understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, about 
appropriate civil-military relations, the importance of diplomacy and international cooperation, 
and the potential cost of an interstate war. Due to these factors when time comes to advise 
political leaders regarding the potential use of military force in an international dispute U.S. 
IMET graduates are more likely to caution their political masters against such aggression than 
those military leaders who has not participated in such U.S. education and training programs. 
These assertions lead to my first two hypotheses: 
H1: In comparison of countries, those receiving U.S. IMET support are less likely to initiate 
MIDs. 
 
 
 
122 
H1a: In comparison of countries, the more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely 
it initiates MIDs. 
 
 If the U.S. IMET graduates are less likely to promote the use of military in case of an 
international dispute than those military leaders who has never participated in such programs 
than it is also logical that they will advise against escalating ongoing MIDs to higher levels of 
hostility. According to Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) MIDs can be divided into five 
categories based on the level of hostility in an ongoing conflict. These five categories include no 
militarized action, the threat of use of force, display of force, use of force and full war (Jones, 
Bremer, and Singer, 1996). I argue if the politician leaders of the recipient states indeed listen to 
the advice of the U.S. IMET graduates and these military personnel based on the norms and 
values they learn in the U.S. IMET programs advocate for the use of military force only as the 
last resort in international disputes than U.S. IMET participation must be associated with less 
likelihood of conflict escalation. Based on this argument I propose two additional hypotheses: 
H2: In comparison of countries, those receiving U.S. IMET support will be less likely to escalate 
interstate conflicts to the higher levels of hostility. 
 
H2a: In comparison of countries, the more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely 
it escalates interstate conflicts to the higher levels of hostility. 
Research Design 
To assess the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on MID involvement and escalation I employ 
large-N statistical analysis through a series of logistic regression models. The interpretation of 
these models is being discussed in detail in Long (1997). 
To conduct a rigorous assessment of the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the recipient 
states` international conflict behavior and to ensure to include all potential alternative 
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explanations presented in the previous studies I generate a new dataset by merging five 
frequently used datasets. First, I use the Correlates of War (hereafter, COW) Militarized 
Interstate Dispute data set version 4.3 (Glenn, et al, 2015) and the COW National Material 
Capabilities dataset version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). Next, I derive my regime 
type variable from Boix et al. (2012). and my U.S. IMET related variables from Savage and 
Caverley (2017) whose IMET data ranges from 1976 to 2007. Finally, I use several variables of 
the COW Formal Alliances dataset version 4.1 (Gibler, 2009). The new dataset contains 3558 
observations. The unit of analysis is country-year.  
To operationalize my first dependent variable, conflict initiation I use the COW MID 
dataset initiator variable. This is a dichotomous variable which is coded 0 if a country did not 
initiate the given conflict within a given year and 1 if it did initiate the MID. The frequency of 
occurrence of conflict initiators can be reviewed in Table 12.  
Table 12. Frequency of MID Initiator variable 
Initiator Frequency Percent Cum 
0 320 8.99 8.99 
1 3,238 91.01 100.00 
Total 3,558 100.00  
 
My second dependent variable is COW MID dataset`s levels of hostility variable. This 
variable is coded from 1 to 5. 1 is being no militarized action, 2 is the threat of use of force, 3 is 
display of force, 4 represents the use of force and finally 5 is full war. The frequency of the 
hostility level variable can be reviewed in Table 13.  
My key explanatory variable is participation in U.S. IMET programs. I use Savage and 
Caverley`s (2017) IMET variables. To ensure the robustness of my findings I operationalize the 
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U.S. IMET variable three different ways. My first independent variable is a binary variable 
coded 0 if the country does not receive any U.S. IMET support and 1 if the country does receive 
military education and training from the U.S. My second independent variable is the number of 
U.S. IMET students. Since increasing a country`s military capacity through the improvement of 
its human capital takes time I use the logged five-year sum of U.S. IMET students measuring the 
total number of U.S. IMET participants of a given country during the five years prior before the 
actual MID started. Finally, since the U.S. IMET programs are different both in their content and 
their duration I employ a different measure as well to account for this variance. I use the logged 
sum of 5-year total U.S. IMET spending as my second operationalization.  
Table 13. Frequency of Hostility Level variable 
Hostility Level Frequency Percent Cum. 
1 914 25.69 25.69 
2 71 2.00 27.68 
3 1,320 37.10 64.78 
4 1,220 34.29 99.07 
5 33 0.93 100.00 
Total 3,558 100.00  
 
Next, I aggressively control for potential cofounding variables and derive my controls 
from the most widely cited literature addressing the potential causes of militarized interstate 
dispute initiation and escalation. The first alternative explanation I control for is other types of 
U.S. military aid. I use Savage and Caverley`s (2014) military aid variable to account for the 
effects of U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer. This variable measures 
the amount of U.S. military aid as a percentage of the recipient country`s GDP.  Savage and 
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Caverley (2014) generated this variable by including “US Military aid (USAID), deflated to 
2005 dollars and divided by total GDP” (Savage and Caverley, 2014: 549) of any given country. 
My next control variable is regime type (Snyder 1991; Downs and Rocke, 1994; Van 
Evera, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 2002; Cavelrey, 2014;) 
To account for the potential effects of regime type I utilize the regime type variable of Boix et al. 
(2012). This variable was developed through the consideration of multiple factors using 
information from 219 countries between 1800 and 2007. This binary variable is coded as 1 if the 
regime qualifies as democracy based on the authors` requirements and 0 if it does not.  
I derive my next control variable from the literature that argues that alliances play a 
crucial role in states` international behavior (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson, 
2011). To account for the potential effects of different alliances this analysis employs three 
alliance variables (defense, nonaggression, and entente) from the Correlates of War Formal 
Alliances dataset version 4.1 (Gibler, 2009) and also accounts for neutrality. All three alliance 
variables are dichotomous and coded as 0 if a country is not a member of the given alliance and 
1 if it is a member. The neutrality variable is also binary coded 0 if a country not neutral and 1 if 
it is. Since it is also being argued in previous literature (Krause, 2004) that U.S. affiliation might 
improves states` security perceptions and reduces their incentives to initiate interstate conflict I 
also control for this potential effect. This variable is continuous and measured on a scale between 
-1 and +1 where -1 means no U.S. affiliation, while +1 means U.S. security guarantee for the 
given state. 
The next variable controls for the possession of nuclear capabilities (Waltz, 1981; 
Mearsheimer, 1984, 1993; Jervis, 1989; Blair, 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur, 2005) I use a binary 
variable to control for the effects of the possession of nuclear capabilities. The variable is coded 
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0 if the country does not have nuclear weapons and 1 if the country possesses such capabilities. 
Additionally, following the controls used in previous studies I control for the potential effects of 
national capabilities. I use the gdp, the iron and steel production ability, the total population size, 
the military expenditure, and military size data from the Correlates of War National Material 
Capabilities dataset version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). All of these variables are 
interval variables. Last, but not least to address potential endogeneity problem I included Savage 
and Caverley`s (2017) ongoing conflict variable as well among my controls. This variable is 
coded 0 if a country is not involved in a civil war and 1 if it does. The summary statistics for all 
my variables can be reviewed in Appendix P. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 14. exhibits the findings from eleven logistic regression models assessing the effects of the 
U.S. IMET programs on the probability of becoming the initiator of MIDs. In the models I use 
the three different operationalization of U.S. IMET participation. The results can be interpreted 
simply as variables with negative coefficients are associated with a decreasing probability of 
becoming an interstate conflict initiator. Model 1 includes only the binary measure of U.S. IMET 
participation. In the second model I include the actual number of U.S. IMET participants while 
the third model assesses how changes in the annual IMET spending effects the probability of 
MID initiation. In Model 4 I show how the other form of U.S. military aid (arms and equipment 
transfer) variable effects the recipient states` international conflict behavior. In Model 5 through 
8 I assess the different U.S. IMET variables and the other form of U.S. military aid variable 
when I control for all the factors that previous literature argues having significant effects on 
becoming the instigator of an interstate conflict. 
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Table 14. U.S. IMET participation and MID initiation, 1976 - 2007. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES IMET 
Binary 
IMET 
Students 
IMET 
Spending 
Other 
Aid 
IMET 
Binary 
IMET 
Students 
IMET  -0.722***    -0.745***  
 (0.121)    (0.178)  
IMET(stud.)  -0.105***    -0.133*** 
  (0.0183)    (0.0276) 
IMET(spend.)   -0.0708***    
   (0.0135)    
Other Aid    2.948***   
    (1.132)   
Defense     -0.182 -0.201 
     (0.191) (0.191) 
Non-aggr.     0.173 0.177 
     (0.161) (0.162) 
Entente     -0.179 -0.143 
     (0.155) (0.156) 
Neutrality     -0.325* -0.347* 
     (0.191) (0.192) 
Military Exp.     1.52e-08** 1.29e-08* 
     (6.68e-09) (6.69e-09) 
Army size     -0.000639* -0.000626* 
     (0.000345) (0.000348) 
Iron/Steel     1.25e-05 1.54e-05* 
     (8.25e-06) (8.31e-06) 
Total Pop.     4.58e-06*** 4.56e-06** 
     (1.70e-06) (1.79e-06) 
GDP     -0*** -0*** 
     (0) (0) 
Democracy     -0.0973 -0.0377 
     (0.198) (0.199) 
Civil war     0.856*** 0.960*** 
     (0.161) (0.165) 
Nuclear Cap.     -0.437 -0.526 
     (0.328) (0.330) 
U.S. Affinity     -0.922*** -0.997*** 
     (0.218) (0.220) 
Constant 2.705*** 2.431*** 2.493*** 2.115*** 2.305*** 1.972*** 
 (0.0947) (0.0654) (0.0720) (0.0730) (0.238) (0.209) 
Observations 3,558 3,558 3,558 2,863 2,696 2,696 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES IMET 
Students 
IMET 
Spending 
Other Aid IMET 
Binary 
IMET 
Students 
IMET 
Spending 
IMET     -0.821***   
    (0.180)   
IMET(stud.) -0.133***    -0.144***  
 (0.0276)    (0.0278)  
IMET(spend.)  -0.0765***    -0.0847*** 
  (0.0202)    (0.0204) 
Other Aid   3.634** 4.801*** 4.980*** 4.735*** 
   (1.533) (1.664) (1.715) (1.684) 
Defense -0.201 -0.181 -0.287 -0.278 -0.299 -0.273 
 (0.191) (0.191) (0.192) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) 
Non-aggr. 0.177 0.189 0.177 0.107 0.113 0.128 
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.161) (0.162) (0.163) (0.162) 
Entente -0.143 -0.162 -0.231 -0.192 -0.151 -0.170 
 (0.156) (0.155) (0.153) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) 
Neutrality -0.347* -0.342* -0.391** -0.274 -0.302 -0.294 
 (0.192) (0.191) (0.187) (0.191) (0.192) (0.191) 
Military Exp. 1.29e-08* 1.39e-08** 1.73e-08*** 1.45e-08** 1.19e-08* 1.29e-08* 
 (6.69e-09) (6.60e-09) (6.39e-09) (6.76e-09) (6.75e-09) (6.66e-09) 
Army size -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Iron/Steel 1.54e-05* 1.31e-05 1.04e-05 1.88e-05** 2.20e-05*** 1.92e-05** 
 (8.31e-06) (8.25e-06) (8.10e-06) (8.45e-06) (8.53e-06) (8.45e-06) 
Total Pop. 4.56e-06** 4.51e-06*** 3.92e-06** 5.02e-06*** 5.01e-06*** 4.93e-06*** 
 (1.79e-06) (1.74e-06) (1.52e-06) (1.76e-06) (1.88e-06) (1.81e-06) 
GDP -0*** -0*** -0** -0*** -0*** -0*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Democracy -0.0377 -0.0914 -0.108 0.0391 0.111 0.0445 
 (0.199) (0.198) (0.201) (0.206) (0.208) (0.206) 
Civil war 0.960*** 0.887*** 0.786*** 0.895*** 1.008*** 0.928*** 
 (0.165) (0.162) (0.157) (0.164) (0.168) (0.164) 
Nuclear Cap. -0.526 -0.425 -0.146 -0.530 -0.608* -0.507 
 (0.330) (0.326) (0.303) (0.328) (0.328) (0.325) 
U.S. Affinity -0.997*** -0.948*** -0.880*** -0.811*** -0.900*** -0.849*** 
 (0.220) (0.217) (0.217) (0.221) (0.222) (0.220) 
Constant 1.972*** 2.045*** 1.638*** 2.061*** 1.677*** 1.778*** 
 (0.209) (0.214) (0.221) (0.250) (0.229) (0.231) 
Observations 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the last three models I combine the U.S. IMET variables with the other U.S. military aid 
variable while keep controlling for the alternative explanations. 
 The results of my models provide evidence for the proposed theory and support H1 and 
H1a. All three forms of U.S. IMET variables show the expected negative relationship with MID 
initiation and all results are statistically significant. This means that those countries that receive 
U.S. IMET support are less likely to become the initiators of MIDs. Besides demonstrating that 
U.S. IMET participation is associated with a decreasing probability of interstate conflict 
initiation my models also show some additional interesting empirical findings. 
 First, across all my models the other U.S. military aid variable demonstrates a statistically 
significant positive relationship with interstate conflict initiation. These findings provide support 
the arguments of the encouragement literature (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; Brzoska and 
Pearson, 1984; Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and 
Smaldone, 2002) and suggest that U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer 
indeed associated with a higher probability of MID initiation.The difference between the effects 
of the two types of the U.S. military aid might be explained by the two different potential 
interpretation of how their effects on the recipient states` military capabilities. At one hand, the 
presence of state-of-the-art American weapons and equipment might “increase the perceived 
military capability of the state in the minds of its leadership, making it more confident of a 
favorable military-political outcome in armed confrontations and therefore more likely to initiate 
or participate in them” (Craft and Smaldone, 2002:704). On the hand, U.S. IMET participants 
change the military capabilities of the recipient countries through a different way. Due to their 
American education and training they have a better understanding about the role of the military 
as an instrument of national power, about appropriate civil-military relations, the importance of 
 
 
130 
diplomacy and international cooperation and the potential cost of an interstate war. Due to these 
factors U.S. IMET graduates are more likely to caution their political masters against military 
aggression than those military leaders who has not participated in such U.S. education and 
training programs decreasing the likelihood of MID initiation. 
 Furthermore, since variables employed to account for different alliances do not 
demonstrate any clear and significant association with MID initiation my results do not seem to 
support those arguments suggesting that alliances play a crucial role in a state becoming a MID 
initiator (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson, 2011). At the same time close 
affinity to the U.S. seems to be a strong predictor for a decreased probability of initiating a 
conflict. This might be explained either by states being afraid of U.S. punishment in case they 
initiate an interstate conflict or by trusting U.S. protection, which reduces the incentives for 
affiliated states to take preventive actions against potential adversaries.  
 Additionally, regime type related arguments are not supported by the results of my 
models because my regime type variable show mixed results. From those variables that are used 
to account for the effects of states` national capabilities all seems to have some significant effects 
on the probability of MID initiation. The analysis suggests that as a country`s military 
expenditure, population size and iron and steel production capability increase the likelihood of 
being a MID initiator also increases. These findings can be explained in several ways. Larger 
military expenditure, iron and steel production, and population size are necessary resources of 
war making and when more is available from these essential resources the more likely that 
decision maker elites become more aggressive in disputes. At the same time countries with larger 
army size seems to be less likely to become the instigators in interstate conflicts. This might be 
the case, because countries with larger military forces can be more successful in pre-conflict 
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bargaining due to the deterring effects of the sheer size of their military. Furthermore, wealthier 
countries with higher GDP seems to be associated with a decreasing probability of MID 
initiation.  
 Next, while the results of my models do not support those arguments (Waltz, 1981; 
Mearsheimer, 1984, 1993; Jervis, 1989; Blair, 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur, 2005) suggesting that 
the possession of nuclear weapons effects whether a state becomes the instigator in interstate 
conflicts they do provide support to the findings of prior research suggesting that ongoing civil 
wars make it more likely that countries become involved in MIDs. This result might be explained 
by the fact that in many cases leaders who struggle with an internal conflict try to get their 
countries involved in an international conflict in order to deviate the domestic audience`s 
attention away from the internal issues and try to unify the population against a foreign enemy. 
Finally, as argued by Krause (2004) U.S. affiliation is associated with a decreased probability of 
MID initiation because close relationship with the U.S. might improve the security perception of 
the countries.  
 Since COW MID dataset is frequently criticized for including a lot of low level disputes 
that do not really qualify as interstate conflicts I re-run all my models to ensure the robustness of 
my findings after dropping the low levels of disputes and including only those conflicts in which 
military forces are actually used. 35 These models demonstrate the same relationships as the 
original models and their results can be reviewed in appendix R. 
 Next, I run another 11 models (Model 14 to 24) to assess the relationship between U.S. 
IMET participation and MID escalation. The results of these models are shown in Table 15. 
 
35 Level1 - no militarized action, Level2 - the threat of use of force, Level3 - display of force, Level4 - use of force 
and Level5 - full war. In this case I run my models by using only level 3, 4 and 5. 
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Table 15. U.S. IMET participation and MID escalation, 1976 - 2007. 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
VARIABLES IMET 
Binary 
IMET 
Students 
IMET 
Spending 
Other 
Aid 
IMET 
Binary 
IMET  -0.127**    -0.130 
 (0.0618)    (0.0806) 
IMET (stud.)  -0.0390***    
  (0.00966)    
IMET (spend.)   -0.0215***   
   (0.00697)   
Other Aid    0.519  
    (0.441)  
Defense     0.0124 
     (0.0934) 
Non-aggr.     0.138 
     (0.0903) 
Entente     -0.0624 
     (0.0828) 
Neutrality     -0.385*** 
     (0.0959) 
Military Exp.     -1.62e-08*** 
     (2.69e-09) 
Army size     0.001*** 
     (0.0002) 
Iron/Steel     -1.52e-05*** 
     (2.45e-06) 
Total Pop.     -1.45e-07 
     (2.71e-07) 
GDP     0*** 
     (0) 
Democracy     -0.0628 
     (0.108) 
Civil war     0.254*** 
     (0.0842) 
Nuclear Cap.     -0.0857 
     (0.149) 
U.S. Affinity     -0.0409 
Constant     (0.116) 
Observations 3,558 3,558 3,558 2,863 2,696 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
VARIABLES IMET 
Students 
IMET 
Spending 
Other Aid IMET 
Binary 
IMET 
Students 
IMET 
Spending 
IMET     -0.128   
    (0.0806)   
IMET (stu.) -0.0730***    -0.0729***  
 (0.0133)    (0.0133)  
IMET (spend.)  -0.0379***    -0.0378*** 
  (0.00965)    (0.00965) 
Other Aid   -0.526 -0.507 -0.509 -0.503 
   (0.541) (0.543) (0.549) (0.547) 
Defense 0.0237 0.0239 0.0137 0.0189 0.0301 0.0302 
 (0.0936) (0.0936) (0.0935) (0.0936) (0.0939) (0.0938) 
Non-aggr. 0.121 0.128 0.156* 0.148 0.131 0.139 
 (0.0906) (0.0904) (0.0908) (0.0910) (0.0912) (0.0911) 
Entente -0.0508 -0.0548 -0.0623 -0.0614 -0.0497 -0.0538 
 (0.0829) (0.0828) (0.0828) (0.0828) (0.0829) (0.0828) 
Neutrality -0.333*** -0.349*** -0.420*** -0.397*** -0.344*** -0.360*** 
 (0.0960) (0.0961) (0.0956) (0.0967) (0.0967) (0.0969) 
Military Exp. -1.99e-08*** -1.86e-08*** -1.54e-08*** -1.62e-08*** -1.98e-08*** -1.85e-08*** 
 (2.76e-09) (2.76e-09) (2.65e-09) (2.70e-09) (2.76e-09) (2.76e-09) 
Army size 0.00142*** 0.00137*** 0.00131*** 0.00132*** 0.00141*** 0.00137*** 
 (0.000165) (0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000165) (0.000165) 
Iron/Steel -1.40e-05*** -1.45e-05*** -1.55e-05*** -1.53e-05*** -1.42e-05*** -1.46e-05*** 
 (2.38e-06) (2.41e-06) (2.48e-06) (2.47e-06) (2.40e-06) (2.43e-06) 
Total Pop. -3.07e-07 -2.21e-07 -1.33e-07 -1.31e-07 -2.93e-07 -2.07e-07 
 (2.72e-07) (2.71e-07) (2.71e-07) (2.71e-07) (2.72e-07) (2.72e-07) 
GDP 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Democracy -0.00740 -0.0330 -0.0864 -0.0708 -0.0153 -0.0410 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
Civil war 0.361*** 0.312*** 0.228*** 0.252*** 0.359*** 0.311*** 
 (0.0865) (0.0856) (0.0827) (0.0842) (0.0865) (0.0856) 
Nuclear Cap, -0.128 -0.0953 -0.0853 -0.0969 -0.139 -0.106 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
U.S. Affinity -0.0907 -0.0696 -0.0455 -0.0510 -0.101 -0.0793 
Constant (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) 
Observations 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Besides the hostility level as the dependent variable the eleven ordered logistic regression 
models contain the same explanatory and control variables as the models in Table 14. Once 
again, I find the expected negative relationship between U.S. IMET participation and 
escalation, which provide support to H2 and H2a. I visually demonstrate the effects of U.S. 
IMET participation on all 5 levels of MID escalation in Figure 8. To build this graph I 
grouped the number of students in three categories. The first category shows the cases with 
less than or equal to 500 students, the second category shows the cases with students between 
500 and 1000, and the final category is all the cases with more than 1000 U.S. IMET 
participants. Additionally, besides the U.S. IMET related findings the models also 
demonstrate some additional interesting results. They show that the other U.S. military aid 
variable does not have significant effects on conflict escalation and the results are mixed. 
Furthermore, while alliance membership has no effect on whether a country escalates on 
going MIDs to higher levels of hostilities neutral countries are less likely to escalate interstate 
disputes. 
 
Figure 8. The effects of U.S. IMET participation on MID Escalation, 1976-2007 
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The same relationship seems to exist between the size of military expenditure and iron and 
steel production and MID escalation. capability and total population size. At the same time 
states with larger armies and higher Gdps seems to be more likely to escalate MIDs once they 
are involved in a conflict. Finally, those countries that are involved in civil wars are also 
more likely to escalate MIDs. 
 The results of the two sets of analyses provide strong support to the proposed theory. 
U.S. IMET participation consistently and significantly decreases the probability of MID 
initiation as well as conflict escalation. However, to further support the argument it is 
necessary to discuss some potential criticisms related to the proposed theory and the used 
methodological approach. 
Potential Criticisms and Alternative Explanations 
It might be argued that the results of my models are simply statistical artifacts, or the U.S. 
simply provides more aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs to countries that are less 
conflict prone. In other words, states might not be less aggressive because they are getting US 
military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs, but rather they are getting U.S. IMET 
support because they are less likely to initiate conflict anyway. However, this explanation 
does not seem to be plausible, because empirical evidence suggests that U.S. military aid has 
been allocated to both aggressive countries as well as states that have never initiated interstate 
conflicts. Simply looking at a map with those countries who have received IMET between 
1976 and 2007 one can conclude that no clear pattern can be established regarding whether 
only peaceful countries receive U.S. IMET support or countries that are located in peaceful 
regions. Figure 9. shows the geographic location of those countries that have received IMET 
sometimes between 1976 and 2009. For further evidence, I include a list with the names of 
MID initiators in Appendix S. 
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 Other critics might argue that recipient countries simply do not initiate or escalate 
interstate conflicts because they do not want to lose the free and the best military education 
and training available to them. 
 
Figure 9. IMET recipient countries from 1976 to 2007 
 This argument indeed seems appealing, however if one looks at the number of 
students of these programs even in case of the largest recipient only a small percentage of its 
military personnel goes through the U.S. IMET programs. The same is true when the dollar 
value of the U.S. IMET programs is compared to the recipient states` overall military 
expenditure (Savage and Caverley, 2017). These factors make it highly unlikely that 
countries would not pursue their foreign policy goals in fear of losing some seats in these 
programs. However, this argument brings up another challenge. If indeed only several 
officers and non-commissioned officers attend the U.S. IMET programs from the recipient 
countries than how realistic it is to claim that U.S. IMET programs have significant effects on 
the recipient countries` political decision-making process. I argue that indeed the U.S. IMET 
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programs can potentially have such effects on the recipient countries behavior for several 
reasons.  
 First, the idea behind the U.S. IMET programs are the so called, train-the-trainer 
concept. The idea behind this concept is to train people who can train and educate additional 
personnel when they return to their home countries about the norms and values they learn in 
the U.S. IMET programs. This process can be imagined as the spread of a disease. One 
contract the virus, spreads it to others and soon many people are infected. Second, a major 
part of the U.S. IMET programs is focusing on professional military education for senior 
level military decision makers. Additionally, as Lefever (1976) argues U.S. IMET graduates 
frequently return to their home countries to assume key policy positions (senior advisors to 
politicians, Chief of Defenses, Service Commanders, etc.) which enables them to inject 
themselves into foreign policy related decision-making process. Furthermore, based on 
several interviews she conducted with Georgian military personnel who participated in 
different U.S. IMET programs Phadnis (2019) finds these graduates are catalyzing and 
leading their country`s defense transformation and argues that U.S. IMET graduates` “impact 
at the highest levels of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and General Staff cannot be overstated” 
(Phandis, 2019). In addition, there is a selection process preceding U.S. IMET participation. 
Countries usually send (and the U.S. accepts) participants who are candidates of key 
positions upon their returns, which once again allow U.S. IMET programs to influence 
foreign militaries and through them the behavior of countries. 
 The next criticism might suggest that my argument is not specific enough, because 
asking for and listening to military advise is conditional on regime type. According to this 
argument U.S. IMET graduates are only able to influence political decision makers in 
democratic countries and effect the probability of MID initiation and escalation. To address 
this potential criticism I run several models where I include the interaction term between U.S. 
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IMET participation and recipient states` regime type. Figure 10. visually demonstrates the 
effects of this interaction on MID initiation. 
 
Figure 10. Margins plot of interaction between Regime Type and U.S. IMET support, MID 
Initiation, 1976-2007 
  As Figure 10. demonstrates democracies are less likely to initiate MIDs than 
autocracies regardless of receiving U.S. IMET support or not. Additionally, the graph also 
shows that when U.S. IMET support is provided to both regime types than the probability of 
conflict initiation decreases in both autocracies and democracies. This means that the effects 
of U.S. IMET participation on MID initiation is independent from the recipient countries` 
regime type. 
Conclusion  
Foreign military aid programs have been used for decades to influence recipient states` 
behavior in support of U.S. foreign policy goals. Understanding the effects of U.S. military 
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aid has attracted some scholarly attention but this interest has been mostly limited to the 
exploration of how military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers influence the 
behavior of recipient states` international conflict behavior. This paper contributes to the 
literature of U.S. military aid but approaches the question from a new angle. It assesses the 
effects of U.S. military aid in the form foreign military education and training programs 
(more specifically the U.S. IMET programs) on recipient states` international conflict 
behavior.  
Besides finding support to the proposed argument that U.S. IMET support is 
associated with decreasing probability of MID initiation and escalation the results also show 
that U.S. IMET participation effects both democracies and autocracies the same way. 
Additionally, the findings of the analysis also provide some support to several prior studies` 
arguments while also refuting some previous findings. While I find that U.S. military aid in 
the form of arms and equipment transfers is indeed associated with an increased probability 
of recipient states becoming the instigators of MIDs no support is found for the potential role 
that alliances play in conflict initiation. The results of the analysis provide support to those 
earlier works arguing that there is a positive relationship between national capabilities and the 
presence of civil conflicts; and the probability of becoming MID initiator. The findings also 
show that wealthier countries are less likely to start interstate conflicts. In addition to these 
contributions to the ongoing debate the findings of this study also have some significant 
policy implications.  
Although the results are initial they still present strong evidence in support of the 
argument that U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs fulfill their goals that 
were established by the U.S. Congress. The results of this analysis show that U.S. IMET 
programs improve the military human capital of the recipient states and with that it supports 
the achievement of U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals of supporting regional 
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stability and preventing interstate wars. These findings might urge policy makers to consider 
paying more attention to this less tangible form of U.S. military aid and invest more efforts 
and resources to support and to further improve these foreign education and training 
programs. 
 Since this study is the first in assessing the relationship between the U.S. IMET 
programs and the recipient states` international conflict behavior there is much more research 
needed to be done on this topic. Future studies may expand and improve this research agenda 
through better data collection efforts, by introducing country-level case studies and exploring 
the conditions of how the U.S. allocates IMET program support to the recipient states. These 
and many other questions need to be addressed to improve our understanding of the effects of 
different forms of military aid on the recipient states` behavior and to help policy makers 
make better informed decisions regarding the allocation and the content of foreign military 
aid packages.   
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation aimed to explore how U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs 
affect the participating individuals and through them the recipient states` domestic and 
international conflict behavior. The dissertation answered this research question through 
investigating three independent but interrelated sub-questions.  
 First, the dissertation investigated the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET 
programs and explored whether participation in these programs is associated with 
improvement in individual qualities. While the studies that had investigated the effects of the 
U.S. IMET programs at the participating individual level all seem to assume that participation 
in these programs improves the personal qualities of the participants through the transmission 
of the professional norms and values of the U.S. military such as respect for democratic 
values, human rights and civil control, no studies have provided either a strong theory of 
norm transmission or convincing empirical evidence whether this process actually happens. 
In the first study I argued that the norms and values of the U.S. military are transmitted to 
U.S. IMET participants through the mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure and 
common identity and with that the personal qualities of participants indeed improve. I tested 
the proposed theory through the employment of an original survey conducted in Hungary 
with 350 military respondents and in-depth interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduate. 
The first contribution this study makes is an original dataset on the individual level effects of 
the U.S. IMET programs, which can be used for further research by other scholars interested 
in this research agenda. Next, my analysis of this dataset demonstrated that the professional 
norms and values of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since 
graduates of these programs demonstrated higher respect for human rights, democratic values 
and civilian control than their non-U.S. IMET graduate peers the findings of this study 
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supported the argument that U.S. IMET participation is associated with improved personal 
qualities and with that better military human capital of the recipient states. The data analysis 
also provided some promising initial results regarding whether the U.S. military`s norms and 
values further diffuse within the recipient country`s military organization.    
 Beyond its contributions to the research agenda about the effects of U.S. military aid 
the study has significant policy implications as well. Although the 1976 International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act clearly defines the goals of the U.S. IMET 
program there are no measures of effectiveness in place to provide objective feedback about 
the actual effects of these programs to policy makers. The timeliness of this issue is clearly 
demonstrated in the fact that the 2017 National Defense Authorization Acts once again 
codifies the requirement to establish a functioning evaluation mechanism for the investigation 
of the effects of the U.S. security assistance programs. This study provided feedback directly 
for this requirement and proposes that the U.S. IMET programs indeed meet the goals 
established by Congress and with that effectively support the achievement of U.S. national 
security and foreign policy goals. 
Second, the dissertation also explored how improved military human capital due to 
U.S. IMET participation affects recipient states` behavior during domestic conflicts. In this 
part I introduced a new measure for state military capacity in the form of military human 
capital. In contradiction to previous literature I argued that it is rather the availability of 
highly trained and educated military personnel than military technology that effects the 
duration of civil conflicts. I theorized that better military human capital increases the 
government military`s capability which incentivize rebels to disperse, hide and minimize 
their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I analyzed a new 
dataset that included detailed information on civil conflicts and military human capital 
between 1976 and 2003 and employed several statistical models. To provide further support 
 
 
147 
to the findings of the statistical analysis I also illustrated the theoretical argument through a 
case study of the civil conflict in El Salvador between 1979 and 1991. The findings of my 
analysis contributed to the literature of civil conflicts in several ways. First, my results 
supported the previous claim (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) that 
better military capability is associated with longer civil wars. Second, I showed that when 
military human capital is included in the models than neither military mechanization (Lyall 
and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) nor the combined arms strategy (Caverley 
and Secher, 2017) are significant predictors for civil conflict duration. Furthermore, my 
analysis suggested that the level of ground mechanization and the level of combined arms 
strategy only matters in determining the duration of civil conflicts when quality military 
human capital is available for the government forces. Third, I find that better military human 
capital is not only associated with longer civil wars, but it increases the probability of the 
civil conflict being waged in an irregular manner. Fourth, by using U.S. IMET data as a 
proxy for availability of quality military human capital I once again provided feedback about 
the potential effects of these U.S. education and training programs and with that I contributed 
to the literature of U.S. foreign military aid. Fifth, my study also shed some light on the 
importance of bringing military human capital into the research programs of armed conflicts 
in general. While many studies have explored the effects of military technology (Lyall and 
Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) and strategy employed by the belligerents 
(Biddle 2004; Balcells and Kalyvas 2012; Caverley and Secher, 2017) on the duration and 
outcome of civil conflicts the question assessing the effects of who is employing those 
technologies and strategies has remained mostly unexplored. Bringing the military human 
capital into the analysis offers several questions that might be answered by future research. 
Finally, the findings of this paper underscored the significance of including military human 
capital into the theoretical models of civil conflict research programs. An effective 
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explanation of the dynamics of civil conflict requires researchers to better understand how the 
human factor interacts with military technology, terrain, political and economic factors. 
Further exploring the role of military human capital is likely to highlight several new insights 
helping scholars to better understand the dynamics of civil conflicts and potentially enable 
policymakers to make more informed decisions when involved in such wars. 
 The last paper in my dissertation was the first attempt to investigate the relationship 
between U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs and the recipient states` 
international conflict behavior. In this paper I argue that American educated and trained 
foreign military personnel return home with a better understanding about the role of the 
military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, the value of cooperation 
and the cost of war. These U.S. IMET graduates advise their political masters against the 
offensive use of military force during international disputes leading to a decreased probability 
of MID initiation. I tested this argument by merging U.S. IMET data with data from the 
Correlates of War Project`s MID data set (version 4.3). The results of my analysis supported 
the proposed argument that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it 
initiates MIDs. I also found that countries that receive more U.S. IMET support are less likely 
to escalate ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility. Additionally,  the findings of the 
analysis also provided support to several prior studies` arguments because I found that U.S. 
military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers was indeed associated with an 
increased probability of recipient states becoming the instigators of MIDs. 
 Taken together, the results of this dissertation provided strong evidence that the U.S. 
IMET programs indeed fulfill the goals established by the U.S. Congress. The results of my 
analysis showed that participation in these programs improves the individual qualities of 
participating foreign military personnel and with that the military human capital of the 
recipient states. The improved military human capital affects the recipient states conflict 
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behavior both domestically and internationally and with that supports the achievement of 
U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals. 
 There is still much to learn about the specifics of the effects of U.S. IMET programs. 
Conducting similar surveys and interviews in other countries, addressing potential 
confounding variables, assessing additional cases and collecting better individual and 
aggregate level data about the U.S. IMET programs are just some potential future directions 
for scholars interested in further exploring this research agenda. Although dissertation made 
some significant steps forward the road ahead is still long and full of interesting challenges.  
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Greetings Survey Participant, 
 
This questionnaire is part of a research project aiming to identify the effects of military education and training 
programs on the individuals participating in those programs.  Your professional and honest input is very 
important to me and would be much appreciated. Your active participation is expected to last no more than 10 
minutes and your answers will remain completely anonymous.  
 
Please complete the following survey.   
 
1. In which rank category do you belong? (NCO stands for Non-commissioned Officer) 
 
Junior NCO      Senior NCO    Junior Officer    Mid-level Officer        Senior Officer 
                  (enlisted-ssgt)      (sfc-WO)          (2ndLt-Cpt)             (Maj-Col)                   (Generals) 
 
2. In which age group do you belong? 
 
18-25  26-35  36-45  46-55  55+ 
 
3. What is your gender? 
 
a. Male 
b. Female 
 
4. What is your highest education level? 
 
       Elementary school       Highschool     College (Bachelor)      University(Master`s)     Doctorate 
 
5. What is your branch of service? 
 
a. Army 
b. Airforce 
c. Special Operations 
 
6. Where are you serving at this moment? 
 
a. Land Unit 
b. Special Forces Unit 
c. Air Force Unit 
d. Hungarian Defense Forces Command 
e. Ministry of Defence 
f. Military Educational Institution 
g. Support Establishment 
e. Other 
 
7. Including your mother tongue, how many languages do you speak? 
 
1  2-3  4-5  more than 5 
 
8. How many years have you served in the military? 
 
Less than 5             between 5 and 15 between 16 and 25 more than 26 
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9. Have your done any combat deployment during your military career (Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Balkans, etc)? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
10. To your best knowledge have you ever served under the command of an officer/non-
commission officer who graduated from an American military school? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
I have had a chance through my career to positively affect doctrinal change within my military. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
12. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
Based on the training and education I received during my career I feel confident in my military 
skills that are relevant in a conventional war. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
13. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
Based on the training and education I received during my career I feel confident in my military 
skills that are relevant in a counterinsurgency (intrastate war). 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
14. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
My military knowledge and skills make me completely interoperable with foreign military 
personnel. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
15. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
My English language skills are adequate to make me completely interoperable with foreign 
military personnel. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
I have had a chance through my career to positively affect the professional development of my 
peers through training and educating them. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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17. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
I have had a chance through my career to positively affect organizational change within my 
military. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
18. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
During my military education and training my instructors always made sure that me and my 
fellow soldiers had a good understanding of human rights and democratic values such as  
freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for all. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
19. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
Freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for all must be respected under every 
circumstance. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
20. To what extent do you agree with the following statement:  
 
If the government does not respect democratic values domestically then it is a responsibility of 
the military to intervene. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
21. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
Universal human rights must be respected under every circumstance. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
22. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
If the government does not respect Human Rights then it is a responsibility of the military to 
intervene. 
 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
23. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
The military should be involved in the formulation of domestic policies. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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24. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
The government should use the military more frequently domestically to support the police  in 
solving domestic issues.  
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
25. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
The military should be involved in the formulation of foreign policies. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
26. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
The government should use the military more frequently in international disputes. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
27. Have you participated any education and training programs that you would consider “outside” 
of your own service (a navy course for army guys, an army school for air force guys, etc.)? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
28. Have you ever participated in any foreign education and training programs other than an 
American program? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
29. Have you ever participated in U.S. International Military Education and Training program (U.S. 
IMET)? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
30. When did you finish your latest American education or training event? 
 
More than 10 years ago   Less than 10 years but more than 5 years ago Less than 5 years ago 
 
31. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following 
question: How many U.S. IMET programs did you participate?  
 
1  2-3  4-5  more than 5 
 
 
32. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following 
question: What type of U.S. IMET program did you participate last?  
 
 Language training   Technical training   NCO training   Junior Officer   Mid-level Officer   Senior Officer 
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33. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following 
question: How many times were you invited to attend a breakfast/lunch/dinner with American 
families?  
 
1  2-3  4-5  more than 5 
 
34. Do you still keep in touch with any of your American classmates? 
 
No  Yes 
 
35. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following 
question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
During my American education and training program there was more emphasis on human 
rights and democratic values than during my national education and training. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
36. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following 
question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
I have successfully shared the knowledge and skills that I acquired during my American military 
education and training with my fellow Hungarian soldiers who has not participated in American 
education and training. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
37. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following 
question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
 
The participation in the U.S. IMET program(s) improved my military skills. 
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
This is the end of the survey. 
Thank you very much for your time and input. 
 
Very respectfully,  
 
Sandor Fabian  
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Variable#1 – Rank (ordinal variable) (Rank) 
Range from 1 to 5. 
Responses are coded based on which rank category the participant belongs. 
Junior Non-Commissioned Officer – 1 
Senior Non-Commissioned Officer – 2 
Junior Officer – 3 
Mid-level Officer – 4 
Senior Officer – 5 
 
Variable#2 – Age (ordinal variable) (Age) 
Range from 1 to 5. 
Responses are coded based on which age group the participant belongs. 
18-25 – 1 
26-35 – 2 
36-45 – 3 
46-55 – 4 
55+ – 5 
 
Variable#3 – Gender (binary variable) (Gender) 
Responses are coded based on which gender the participant belongs. 
Female – 0 
Male – 1 
 
Variable#4 – Education level (ordinal variable) (Edu) 
Range from 1 to 5. 
Responses are coded based on the highest education level of the participant. 
Elementary school – 1 
High school – 2 
College – 3 
Masters – 4 
PhD – 5 
 
Variable#5 – Military Service (nominal variable) (Service) 
Range from 1 to 3. 
Responses are coded based on which military service the participant belongs. 
Army – 1 
Air Force – 2 
Special Forces – 3 
 
Variable#6 – Military Unit (nominal variable) (Unit) 
Range from 1 to 8. 
Responses are coded based on which type of military unit the participant belongs at the time of the 
survey. 
Land Forces – 1 
Special Forces– 2 
Air Forces – 3 
Higher Command – 4 
Ministry of Defense – 5 
Military Educational Institution – 6 
Support Establishment – 7 
Other – 8 
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Variable#7 – Language (ordinal variable) (Language) 
Range from 1 to 4. 
Responses are coded based on how many languages the participant speaks. 
1 – 1 
2-3 – 2 
4-5 – 3 
5+ – 4 
 
Variable#8 – Duration of Service (ordinal variable) (Dur_service) 
Range from 1 to 4. 
Responses are coded based on how many years the participant has served in the Hungarian military. 
Less than 5 years – 1 
Between 5 and 15 years – 2 
Between 16 and 25 years – 3 
25+ years – 4 
 
Variable#9 – Combat Deployment (binary variable) (Deployment) 
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in combat deployment. 
No – 0 
Yes – 1 
 
Variable#10 – U.S. IMET C2 (binary variable) (U.S. IMET_C2) 
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has been commanded by an U.S. IMET 
graduate. 
No – 0 
Yes – 1 
 
Variable#11 – 26 are all interval variables measured through a 1-10 Likert-scale, where 1 represent 
strongly disagree while 10 means strongly agree. (Doctrine, Conventional, Unconventional, 
Inter_Ops, Inter_Lan, Change_others, Org_change, Nat_Democ, Always_Democ, Milint_no_democ, 
Always_human, Milint_no_human, Domestic_mil, Gov_mil_domestic, Foreign_mil, Gov_mil_foreign) 
 
Variable#27 – Outside training (binary variable) (Outside_training) 
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in national training outside of 
their respective military service. 
No – 0 
Yes – 1 
 
Variable#28 – Other Foreign Training (binary variable) (Non_UStraining) 
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in international training that 
was not provided by the U.S. 
No – 0 
Yes – 1 
 
Variable#29 – U.S. U.S. IMET training (binary variable) (U.S. IMET) 
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in U.S. U.S. IMET training. 
No – 0 
Yes – 1 
 
Variable#30 – Time since graduation from U.S. U.S. IMET training (ordinal variable) (Grad_time) 
Range from 1 to 3. 
Responses are coded based on how long ago the participant graduated from U.S. U.S. IMET training. 
Less than 5 years ago – 1 
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Between 5 and 10 years ago – 2 
More than 10 years ago – 3 
 
Variable#31 – Number of U.S. U.S. IMET training (ordinal variable) (Num_U.S. IMET) 
Range from 1 to 4. 
Responses are coded based on how many U.S. U.S. IMET training events the participant attended.  
1 – 1 
2-3 – 2 
4-5 – 3 
5+ - 4 
 
Variable#32 – Type of U.S. U.S. IMET training (binary variable) (PME) 
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in PME or not. 
No – 0 
Yes – 1 
 
Variable#33 – Participation in social events (ordinal variable) (Social) 
Range from 1 to 4. 
Responses are coded based on how many times they participated in social events during their U.S. 
U.S. IMET training. 
1 – 1 
2-3 – 2 
4-5 – 3 
5+ - 4 
 
Variable#34 – Keeping contact with peers (binary variable) (Intouch) 
Responses are coded based on whether the participant still keeps contact with his U.S. 
classmates/peers. 
No – 0 
Yes – 1 
 
Variable#35 – 37 are all interval variables measured through a 1-10 Likert-scale, where 1 represent 
strongly disagree while 10 means strongly agree. (U.S. IMET_Democ, Diffusion, Prodev)  
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The following questions were asked to learn about the participants` experience regarding their 
participation in the U.S. IMET programs. 
1. What is your rank? 
2. What is your age? 
3. What is your gender? 
4. What military service do you belong to? 
5. What is your highest education? 
6. How long have you been serving in the Hungarian military? 
7. How many languages do you speak besides Hungarian? 
8. Have you ever been deployed in combat? If yes, where were you deployed? 
9. How many U.S. IMET course have you attended? 
10. When did you graduate from your last course? 
11. Did you participate in organized social events during your U.S. IMET participation? If yes, 
how many such events did you participate? 
12. Did you think that the U.S. military was a professional organization? If yes, explain, why you 
thought that? 
13. Do you think the U.S. IMET programs contain more democracy and human rights related 
curricular content than your national training courses? 
14. Did your participation in the U.S. IMET programs improve your professionalism? If yes, 
please explain how? 
15. Do you think you were able to share what you learned during the U.S. IMET programs with 
your fellow Hungarian soldiers after your return home? 
16. What are the most memorable events about your U.S. IMET participation and why? 
17. Anything else you would like to tell about your U.S. IMET experience?  
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES TO CHAPTER THREE 
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Table 16. List of Interviewees 
 Rank Gender Service Date of the 
Interview 
Interview I. Colonel Male Special Forces 10/26/2019 
 
Interview II. Major Male Special Forces 10/28/2019 
 
Interview III. Second Lieutenant Male Special Forces 11/01/2019 
 
Interview IV. Warrant Officer Female Special Forces 11/01/2019 
 
Interview V. Sergeant First Class Male Special Forces 11/05/2019 
 
Interview VI. Colonel Male Land Forces 10/30/2019 
 
Interview VII. Major Male Land Forces 11/08/2019 
 
Interview VIII. Second Lieutenant Female Land Forces 11/12/2019 
 
Interview IX. Warrant Officer Male Land Forces 10/28/2019 
 
Interview X. Sergeant First Class Male Land Forces 11/08/2019 
 
Interview XI. Colonel Female Airforce 10/30/2019 
 
Interview XII. Major Male Airforce 11/08/2019 
 
Interview XIII. Second Lieutenant Male Airforce 11/12/2019 
 
Interview XIV. Warrant Officer Male Airforce 11/01/2019 
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APPENDIX E: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER THREE 
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Table 17. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Democracy 350 6.791429 2.50488 1 10 
Human Rights 350 6.991429 2.285481 1 10 
Military Intervention 350 3.362857 2.066874 1 10 
U.S. IMET 350 .4 .4905993 0 1 
Rank 350 2.645714 .9516515 1 4 
Age 350 2.737143 .7790545 1 5 
Gender 350 .1771429 .3823361 0 1 
Edu 350 2.888571 .8440832 2 5 
Language 350 1.96 .4056902 1 3 
Dur_service 350 2.514286 .7709418 1 5 
Deployment 350 .7685714 .4223494 0 1 
Non-US Training 350 .5685714 .4959847 0 1 
Land Forces 350 .5571429 .4974351 0 1 
Air Forces 350 .3028571 .4601518 0 1 
Special Forces 350 .14 .3474838 0 1 
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APPENDIX F: MILITARY SERVICE SPECIFIC RESULTS TO 
CHAPTER THREE  
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Table 18. Military Service Specific Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Democracy 
Land 
Democracy 
Air 
Democracy 
SOF 
Human 
Rights Land 
Human 
Rights Air 
U.S. IMET 1.535*** 1.550*** 1.505*** 0.541** 0.575** 
 (0.282) (0.283) (0.283) (0.269) (0.270) 
Rank 0.249 0.246 0.263 0.535** 0.526** 
 (0.279) (0.280) (0.280) (0.267) (0.267) 
Age 0.391* 0.375* 0.433* 0.110 0.0704 
 (0.221) (0.224) (0.223) (0.212) (0.214) 
Gender -0.191 -0.167 -0.179 -0.256 -0.225 
 (0.339) (0.339) (0.340) (0.324) (0.324) 
Edu -0.137 -0.134 -0.123 -0.350 -0.350 
 (0.312) (0.312) (0.313) (0.298) (0.298) 
Language 0.470 0.444 0.561* 0.245 0.173 
 (0.329) (0.335) (0.331) (0.314) (0.319) 
Dur_service -0.383* -0.364 -0.372 0.0118 0.0370 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.217) (0.217) 
Deployment 0.884*** 0.878*** 0.838*** 0.0831 0.0910 
 (0.318) (0.319) (0.318) (0.304) (0.305) 
Non_UStraining 0.00419 0.0115 0.0123 0.358 0.366 
 (0.282) (0.283) (0.283) (0.270) (0.270) 
Land -0.457*   -0.644***  
 (0.255)   (0.244)  
Air  0.357   0.654** 
  (0.285)   (0.272) 
SOF   0.342   
   (0.363)   
Constant 4.492*** 4.166*** 3.830*** 5.697*** 5.321*** 
 (0.883) (0.849) (0.849) (0.843) (0.811) 
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 
R-squared 0.175 0.171 0.169 0.094 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Human 
Rights SOF 
Intervention 
Land 
Intervention 
Air 
Intervention 
SOF 
U.S. IMET 0.511* -0.552** -0.557** -0.581** 
 (0.272) (0.251) (0.252) (0.251) 
Rank 0.551** 0.158 0.162 0.169 
 (0.269) (0.248) (0.249) (0.248) 
Age 0.154 0.237 0.245 0.274 
 (0.214) (0.197) (0.199) (0.198) 
Gender -0.227 0.0207 0.0356 0.0145 
 (0.327) (0.302) (0.302) (0.301) 
Edu -0.329 -0.303 -0.296 -0.295 
 (0.301) (0.278) (0.278) (0.277) 
Language 0.346 0.508* 0.530* 0.583** 
 (0.318) (0.293) (0.298) (0.293) 
Dur_service 0.0367 0.0327 0.0451 0.0282 
 (0.220) (0.203) (0.203) (0.202) 
Deployment 0.0212 -0.381 -0.400 -0.408 
 (0.306) (0.283) (0.284) (0.282) 
Non_UStraining 0.373 0.174 0.180 0.175 
 (0.272) (0.251) (0.252) (0.251) 
Land  -0.240   
  (0.227)   
Air   0.0281  
   (0.254)  
SOF 0.237   0.438 
 (0.349)   (0.322) 
Constant 4.865*** 2.639*** 2.380*** 2.187*** 
 (0.816) (0.786) (0.756) (0.752) 
Observations 350 350 350 350 
R-squared 0.077 0.038 0.035 0.040 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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APPENDIX G: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING EVALUATION TO 
CHAPTER THREE 
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Propensity Score Matching Evaluation for Democracy, Human Rights and Military 
Intervention Variables 
 
 
  
                                                                                
         _cons    -2.154858   .5412127    -3.98   0.000    -3.215616   -1.094101
Non_UStraining     1.045202   .1573607     6.64   0.000     .7367811    1.353624
    Deployment     .1429939   .1936219     0.74   0.460    -.2364979    .5224858
   Dur_service     .0098498   .1358255     0.07   0.942    -.2563632    .2760628
      Language     .2949328    .208557     1.41   0.157    -.1138314    .7036971
           Edu    -.2584831   .1886502    -1.37   0.171    -.6282308    .1112645
        Gender     .2106959   .2045384     1.03   0.303    -.1901919    .6115837
           Age     .0924252   .1361162     0.68   0.497    -.1743576     .359208
          Rank     .3749269   .1676916     2.24   0.025     .0462575    .7035964
                                                                                
          IMET        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
Log likelihood = -197.91403                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1598
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(8)        =      75.28
Probit regression                               Number of obs     =        350
. psmatch2 IMET Rank Age Gender Edu Language Dur_service Deployment Non_UStraining, out (Domestic_mil) common
     Total           5        345         350 
                                             
   Treated           5        135         140 
 Untreated           0        210         210 
                                             
assignment   Off suppo  On suppor       Total
 Treatment          support
 psmatch2:     psmatch2: Common
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APPENDIX H: UCF IRB APPROVAL FOR SURVEY EXECUTION TO 
CHAPTER THREE 
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APPENDIX I: UCF IRB APPROVAL FOR INTERVIEW  EXECUTION 
TO CHAPTER THREE 
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APPENDIX J: HUNGARIAN APPROVAL FOR SURVEY AND 
INTERVIEW  EXECUTION TO CHAPTER THREE 
 
  
 
 
177 
  
 
 
178 
APPENDIX K: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER FOUR 
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Table 19. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conflict Termination 1,562 .1581306 .3649803 0 1 
Civil War Type 1,466 .7755798 .4173423 0 1 
U.S. IMET (Students) 7,651 1.710107 3.718991 -2.302585 11.11419 
U.S. IMET (Spending) 7,651 3.046359 4.837627 -2.302585 11.10763 
Other U.S. Aid 7,021 .0753487 .1254612 0 2.223215 
Distance to Capital 1,562 5.698553 1.296719 1.609438 8.121183 
Conflict at Border 1,562 .7816901 .4132312 0 1 
BorderXDistance 1,562 .0130604 1.016943 -4.090562 2.421183 
Population 1,561 10.11732 1.552068 5.342334 13.86401 
Regime Type 1,459 .4365789 .3597569 0 .9589228 
GDP per Capita 1,552 6.824206 1.212623 3.871201 10.00951 
Post-Cold War 1,562 .3975672 .4895518 0 1 
Rebel Fighting Capacity 1,518 1.294466 .5169338 1 3 
Rebel Strength 1,523 .1300066 .3364211 0 1 
Insurgency 1,040 .5682692 .4955557 0 1 
Natural Resources 1,054 .6982922 .459217 0 1 
Rough Terrain 1,054 .4108159 .4922155 0 1 
Ground Mechanization 783 6.466517 1.082524 3.218876 9.493095 
Aircraft Mechanization 865 4.558787 1.14137 .5978368 7.388728 
Combined Arms 693 29.13171 9.535191 8.168157 60.31901 
External Support Rebel 2,612 .4728178 .4993562 0 1 
External Support Government 2,612 .5451761 .4980503 0 1 
Oil Exporter 1,400 .1457143 .3529456 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization 1,400 .5809832 .2708404 .0355107 .9016318 
Sons of Soil 2,905 .0595525 .2366966 0 1 
Military Expenditure 6,784 3328235 1.35e+07 0 3.18e+08 
Military Spending per Soldier 6,409 16706.56 42491.64 0 1722499 
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APPENDIX L: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR 
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Table 20. Accelerated failure time hazard analysis of the duration of civil conflicts, 1976-2003 
  (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) 
VARIABLES U.S. IMET Other U.S. Aid Total U.S. Aid Armor Geography Fighting Capacity 
IMET (Spend.) 0.0640** -1.289 0.0903*** 0.0776** 0.0712** 0.0744** 
  (.0305) (1.055) (0.0338) (0.0334) (0.0315) (0.0363) 
Other Aid   -1.224 -1.535 -1.422 -1.930 
    (0.968) (2.060) (2.143) (1.684) 
Ground Mech.      0.640 0.884 0.702 
     (0.825) (0.789) (0.739) 
Air Mech.     0.547 0.659 0.668 
     (0.938) (0.912) (0.872) 
Combined Arm     -0.136 -0.163 -0.149 
     (0.138) (0.136) (0.127) 
Distance to Capital      0.481***  
      (0.169)  
Conflict at Border      0.971**  
      (0.425)  
Border X Distance      -0.476*  
      (0.248)  
Rebel Fighting Cap.       -0.0512 
       (0.593) 
Rebel Strength       -0.541 
       (0.930) 
Constant 7.294*** 7.543*** 7.078*** 4.566 -0.223 4.275 
  (0.181) (0.249) (0.243) (5.448) (5.213) (4.978) 
Observations 940 800 760 496 496 481 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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  (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) 
VARIABLES Terrain Regime 
type 
Economy External 
Support 
Sons of 
Soil 
All 
controls 
IMET (Spend.) 0.0827** 0.0696 0.0905** 0.0753** 0.0866** 0.114** 
  (0.0373) (0.0494) (0.0375) (0.0348) (0.0355) (0.0545) 
Other Aid -0.0930 -1.184 -4.304* -1.650 -1.277 -2.683 
  (2.593) (2.361) (2.266) (2.044) (2.095) (2.438) 
Ground Mech.   0.624 0.890 0.653 0.658 0.983 1.221 
  (0.882) (0.961) (0.799) (0.810) (0.932) (1.136) 
Air Mech.  0.604 0.673 0.429 0.561 1.091 0.922 
  (1.017) (1.181) (0.933) (0.932) (1.037) (1.492) 
Combined Arm  -0.137 -0.176 -0.104 -0.137 -0.218 -0.192 
  (0.149) (0.170) (0.136) (0.137) (0.161) (0.223) 
Dist. to Capital       0.637*** 
       (0.178) 
Confl. at Border       0.708 
       (0.460) 
Bord. X Dist.      -0.686** 
       (0.290) 
Rebel Fight Cap.       0.217 
       (0.787) 
Rebel Strength       -0.793 
       (1.175) 
Natural Res.  0.544*     0.331 
  (0.323)     (0.371) 
Rough Terrain 0.617*     0.437 
  (0.353)     (0.325) 
Incumb. Democ.  0.229    -0.0742 
   (0.854)    (0.756) 
Gdp per capita    -0.747**   -0.658* 
    (0.341)   (0.337) 
Ext. support gov.     -0.273  -.0727 
     (0.449)  (.820) 
Ext. support reb.    -0.0382  -0.0727 
     (0.325)  (0.320) 
Sons of soil      1.441* 1.000 
      (0.789) (1.004) 
Insurgency       0.505 
       (0.541) 
Post-Cold War       -0.335 
       (0.573) 
Constant 3.694 3.440 9.776* 4.639 2.196 0.973 
  (5.942) (6.390) (5.940) (5.399) (5.964) (8.843) 
Observations 496 466 495 496 496 437 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21. Logit Analysis of Civil War Termination, 1976-2003 
  (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) 
VARIABLES U.S. IMET Other U.S. Aid Total U.S. Aid Armor Geography Fighting Capacity 
IMET (Spending) -0.0476** 0.951 -0.0628*** -0.0577** -0.0571** -0.0586** 
  (0.0214) (0.760) (0.0221) (0.0245) (0.0235) (0.0255) 
Other Aid   0.920 0.825 0.332 1.365 
    (0.700) (2.021) (2.419) (1.865) 
Ground Mech.      -0.715 -0.936 -0.846 
     (0.652) (0.668) (0.666) 
Air Mech.     -0.540 -0.706 -0.737 
     (0.763) (0.801) (0.792) 
Combined Arm     0.130 0.160 0.159 
     (0.113) (0.118) (0.118) 
Distance to Capital      -0.328**  
      (0.145)  
Conflict at Border      -0.740**  
      (0.304)  
Border X Distance      0.306  
      (0.191)  
Rebel Fighting Cap.       -0.0996 
       (0.493) 
Rebel Strength       0.565 
       (0.822) 
Constant -0.831*** -1.034*** -0.706*** 2.496 6.228 3.271 
  (0.174) (0.217) (0.204) (4.306) (4.538) (4.476) 
Observations 940 800 760 496 496 481 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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  (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) 
VARIABLES Terrain Regime 
type 
Economy External 
Support 
Sons of 
Soil 
All 
controls 
IMET (Spend.) -0.0566** -0.0557* -0.0701*** -0.0557** -0.0671*** -0.0736* 
  (0.0262) (0.0321) (0.0245) (0.0250) (0.0245) (0.0418) 
Other Aid -0.250 0.917 2.919 1.039 0.368 1.639 
  (2.151) (2.260) (2.310) (2.104) (2.123) (3.133) 
Ground Mech.   -0.703 -0.824 -0.674 -0.755 -0.818 -1.601 
  (0.706) (0.784) (0.665) (0.643) (0.679) (1.136) 
Air Mech.  -0.584 -0.542 -0.410 -0.584 -0.781 -1.353 
  (0.833) (0.965) (0.804) (0.755) (0.794) (1.497) 
Combined Arm  0.130 0.145 0.101 0.136 0.162 0.259 
  (0.122) (0.142) (0.119) (0.112) (0.119) (0.221) 
Dist. to Capital       -0.486*** 
       (0.184) 
Confl. at Border       -0.635** 
       (0.323) 
Border X Distance       0.540** 
       (0.253) 
Rebel Fighting Cap.       -0.535 
       (0.706) 
Rebel Strength       1.188 
       (1.154) 
Natural Resources  -0.391     -0.363 
  (0.253)     (0.340) 
Rough Terrain -0.347     -0.343 
  (0.252)     (0.280) 
Incumb. Democ.   -0.0763    -0.0214 
   (0.576)    (0.655) 
Gdp per capita    0.480**   0.434* 
    (0.229)   (0.262) 
Ext. support gov.    0.323  0.302 
     (0.313)  (0.422) 
Ext. support reb.     -0.0312  -0.0398 
     (0.247)  (0.266) 
Sons of soil      -1.206** -1.091 
      (0.535) (0.900) 
Insurgency       -0.270 
       (0.446) 
Post-Cold War       0.293 
       (0.468) 
Constant 3.076 2.893 -1.152 2.558 3.415 8.727 
  (4.755) (5.129) (5.086) (4.293) (4.433) (8.573) 
Observations 496 466 495 496 496 437 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 22. Logit Analysis of Civil War Types, 1976-2003 
 (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) 
VARIABLES U.S. IMET Other U.S. Aid Total U.S. Aid Armor Geography Fighting Capacity 
 U.S. IMET                    0.108***       0.181***                0.133***   0.198*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0157)  (0.0442) (0.0193) (0.0515) (0.0565) 
Military Aid  -2.864*** -5.677*** -2.559*** -4.052* -6.925*** 
  (0.606) (2.029) (0.646) (2.130) (2.366) 
Ground mech.   1.164  1.385 2.058** 
   (0.862)  (0.858) (1.047) 
Air mech.   2.518**  3.526*** 3.080** 
   (1.206)  (1.247) (1.431) 
Combined arms   -0.366**  -0.484*** -0.501** 
   (0.167)  (0.172) (0.205) 
Distance to capital     -0.501  
     (0.333)  
Conflict at border     -0.147  
     (0.562)  
Border x Distance     1.303***  
     (0.429)  
Rebel fighting capacity      -0.683 
      (0.566) 
Rebel strength      -2.875*** 
      (1.044) 
Constant 0.805*** 1.629*** -6.368 0.907*** -5.909 -8.826 
 (0.0978) (0.104) (5.922) (0.140) (6.096) (7.171) 
Observations 1,014 869 284 832 284 281 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) 
VARIABLES Terrain Regime 
Type 
Economy External 
Factors 
Sons of 
Soil 
All 
Controls 
U.S. IMET 0.160*** 
(0.0456) 
0.131*** 
(0.0544) 
0.156*** 
(0.0483) 
0.184*** 
(0.0442) 
0.205*** 
(0.0469) 
0.365*** 
(0.128) 
Military Aid -4.596** -1.508 -3.742 -5.571*** -5.188** 1.405 
 (2.198) (2.438) (2.416) (2.078) (2.044) (4.678) 
Ground mech. 1.193 0.0782 1.387 1.281 1.094 1.334 
 (0.893) (1.062) (0.908) (0.900) (0.854) (2.254) 
Air mech. 3.276** 2.793** 2.983** 2.722** 2.847** 4.298 
 (1.315) (1.346) (1.310) (1.259) (1.224) (3.129) 
Combined arms -0.435** -0.284 -0.444** -0.386** -0.383** -0.581 
 (0.177) (0.196) (0.185) (0.173) (0.165) (0.465) 
Dist. to capital      -0.441 
      (0.601) 
Confl. at border      0.904 
      (1.154) 
Border x Distance      0.366 
      (0.907) 
Rebel fight cap.      -1.344 
      (1.040) 
Rebel strength      -5.109* 
      (2.729) 
Natural resources 0.740     -1.175 
 (0.520)     (1.470) 
Rough terrain -0.755     1.813 
 (0.468)     (1.213) 
Incumb. democ  2.701***    1.719 
  (0.971)    (1.617) 
Gdp per capita   0.502   2.212** 
   (0.356)   (1.004) 
External sup. govt    -0.487  -1.590 
    (0.451)  (1.059) 
External sup. reb.    0.163  -0.303 
    (0.408)  (0.807) 
Sons of soil     1.316 0.337 
     (0.840) (1.945) 
Insurgency      -0.540 
      (0.866) 
Post-Cold War      -3.205*** 
      (1.230) 
Constant -7.871 -3.973 -11.26 -7.253 -7.097 -18.59 
 (6.134) (6.717) (7.163) (6.194) (5.901) (17.48) 
Observations 284 263 283 284 284 254 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 23. Logit Analysis of Insurgency Occurrence, 1976-2003 
 (76) (77) (78) 
VARIABLES U.S. IMET Total U.S. Aid All Controls 
U.S. IMET -0.0722*** -0.137*** -0.140*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0182) (0.0428) 
Other U.S. Aid  -0.186 -3.548*** 
  (0.696) (1.360) 
Military Expenditure   -2.35e-08** 
   (1.16e-08) 
Military Personnel   -1.02e-05 
   (7.91e-06) 
Population   -0.249** 
   (0.106) 
Regime Type   -1.695*** 
   (0.505) 
GDP per Capita   -0.146 
   (0.264) 
Natural Resources   0.719** 
   (0.311) 
U.S. Affinity   1.303*** 
   (0.452) 
Oil Exporter   -0.0284 
   (0.453) 
Ethnic Fractionalization   -1.738** 
   (0.725) 
Constant 0.592*** 0.987*** 7.608*** 
 (0.0927) (0.143) (2.299) 
Observations 945 761 378 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 24. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Initiator 3,558 .9100618 .2861334 0 1 
Hostility level 3,558 2.827712 1.182454 1 5 
IMET (Binary) 10,436 .4535263 .4978594 0 1 
IMET (students) 10,436 .4414376 3.098447 -2.302585 10.42976 
IMET (spending) 10,436 1.615719 4.253173 -2.302585 9.887631 
Other Aid 8,435 .0651867 .1165006 0 2.223215 
Defense 3,558 .292018 .4547544 0 1 
Non-aggression 3,558 .6231029 .4846769 0 1 
Entente 3,558 .589095 .4920672 0 1 
Neutrality 3,558 .3302417 .4703661 0 1 
Military Expenditure 8,589 2.07e+07 5.28e+07 0 3.18e+08 
Army Size 3,558 1071.714 1240.27 -9 4300 
Iron and Steel Production 3,558 43750.88 55506.38 0 489712 
Total Population 3,558 136880.3 202262.7 63 1334344 
GDP 8,435 2.14e+11 4.31e+11 1.60e+07 4.75e+12 
Democracy 8,946 .4632238 .4986735 0 1 
Civil War 10,436 .2363933 .4248868 0 1 
Nuclear Capability 3,558 .5056211 .5000387 0 1 
U.S. Affinity 9,218 -.303984 .4351709 -1 1 
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Table 25. U.S. IMET and MID initiation, 1976-2007 
 (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
VARIABLES IMET 
Binary 
IMET 
Students 
IMET 
Spending 
Other 
Aid 
IMET 
Binary 
IMET 
Students 
IMET -0.416***    -0.514**  
 (0.139)    (0.217)  
IMET(stud.)  -0.0438**    -0.0781** 
  (0.0217)    (0.0335) 
IMET(spend.)   -0.0348**    
   (0.0157)    
Other Aid    3.306**   
    (1.501)   
Defense     -0.180 -0.187 
     (0.243) (0.243) 
Non-aggr.     0.103 0.118 
     (0.201) (0.201) 
Entente     -0.319 -0.295 
     (0.196) (0.196) 
Neutrality     -0.302 -0.334 
     (0.236) (0.236) 
Military Exp.     4.00e-09 3.06e-09 
     (9.20e-09) (9.23e-09) 
Army size     -0.000405 -0.000370 
     (0.000459) (0.000459) 
Iron/Steel     2.91e-05** 2.99e-05** 
     (1.22e-05) (1.23e-05) 
Total Pop.     3.30e-06** 3.16e-06* 
     (1.66e-06) (1.68e-06) 
GDP     -0*** -0*** 
     (0) (0) 
Democracy     -0.435* -0.414* 
     (0.245) (0.247) 
Civil war     1.368*** 1.433*** 
     (0.206) (0.210) 
Nuclear Cap.     -0.0433 -0.0613 
     (0.402) (0.403) 
U.S. Affinity     -0.965*** -1.007*** 
     (0.248) (0.250) 
Constant 2.534*** 2.360*** 2.401*** 2.168*** 2.066*** 1.802*** 
 (0.101) (0.0718) (0.0782) (0.0893) (0.297) (0.262) 
Observations 2,573 2,573 2,573 2,023 1,882 1,882 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) 
VARIABLES IMET 
Spending 
Other Aid IMET 
Binary 
IMET 
Students 
IMET 
Spending 
IMET    -0.660***   
   (0.221)   
IMET(stud.)    -0.101***  
    (0.0342)  
IMET(spend.) -0.0544**    -0.0710*** 
 (0.0244)    (0.0248) 
Other Aid  5.569*** 6.892*** 6.990*** 6.967*** 
  (2.122) (2.245) (2.290) (2.290) 
Defense -0.172 -0.363 -0.377 -0.386 -0.365 
 (0.243) (0.251) (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) 
Non-aggr. 0.122 0.0685 0.00946 0.0267 0.0329 
 (0.201) (0.202) (0.204) (0.203) (0.203) 
Entente -0.299 -0.393** -0.370* -0.339* -0.343* 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) 
Neutrality -0.320 -0.325 -0.241 -0.282 -0.263 
 (0.236) (0.233) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) 
Military Exp. 3.31e-09 4.28e-09 3.32e-09 1.90e-09 2.24e-09 
 (9.20e-09) (9.04e-09) (9.33e-09) (9.35e-09) (9.32e-09) 
Army size -0.000399 -0.000411 -0.000462 -0.000425 -0.000453 
 (0.000459) (0.000453) (0.000460) (0.000461) (0.000460) 
Iron/Steel 2.98e-05** 3.15e-05** 3.68e-05*** 3.79e-05*** 3.77e-05*** 
 (1.22e-05) (1.23e-05) (1.23e-05) (1.24e-05) (1.24e-05) 
Total Pop. 3.26e-06* 3.16e-06* 3.74e-06** 3.54e-06** 3.67e-06** 
 (1.68e-06) (1.64e-06) (1.70e-06) (1.72e-06) (1.73e-06) 
GDP -0*** -0** -0** -0** -0** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Democracy -0.438* -0.423* -0.263 -0.231 -0.265 
 (0.245) (0.248) (0.254) (0.256) (0.253) 
Civil war 1.400*** 1.344*** 1.407*** 1.490*** 1.448*** 
 (0.208) (0.205) (0.209) (0.214) (0.210) 
Nuclear Cap. -0.0434 0.122 -0.234 -0.247 -0.231 
 (0.402) (0.378) (0.407) (0.407) (0.406) 
U.S. Affinity -0.978*** -0.862*** -0.822*** -0.889*** -0.845*** 
 (0.248) (0.250) (0.252) (0.252) (0.251) 
Constant 1.885*** 1.505*** 1.830*** 1.487*** 1.598*** 
 (0.269) (0.275) (0.304) (0.278) (0.281) 
Observations 1,882 1,882 1,882 1,882 1,882 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 26. List of MID Initiator Countries, 1976-2007 
Afghanistan Ghana Romania 
Albania Grenada Russian Federation 
Algeria Greece Rwanda 
Angola Guinea Saudi Arabia 
Argentina Guinea-Bissau Senegal 
Armenia Hungary Sierra Leone 
Australia India Slovakia 
Azerbaijan India South Africa 
Bangladesh Indonesia Spain 
Belarus Iran, Islamic Republic Of Sudan 
Benin Iraq Swaziland 
Bosnia And Herzegovina Israel Syrian Arab Republic 
Bulgaria Italy Tajikistan 
Burkina Faso Jordan Togo 
Burundi Kazakhstan Tunisia 
Canada Kenya Turkey 
Cameroon Korea, Republic Of Turkmenistan 
Central African Republic Kuwait Uganda 
Chad Kyrgyzstan Ukraine 
China Latvia United Arab Emirates 
Chile Lebanon Uzbekistan 
Republic Of Congo  Liberia Vietnam 
The Democratic Republic Of Congo  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Zambia 
Cote D'Ivoire Lithuania  
Croatia Mali  
Czech Republic Malta  
Egypt Mauritania  
Equatorial Guinea Moldova, Republic Of  
Eritrea Morocco  
Ethiopia Mozambique  
Finland Niger  
France Nigeria  
Gambia Pakistan  
Georgia Poland  
Germany Qatar  
 
